"While the Iran-Israel war has not yet been decided, it is nearing a decisive juncture surrounding the Iranian nuclear project. But does the Syrian arena present Israel with a real threat in the form of Turkey? Israel's existential wars since its establishment can be divided into three parts.
Firstly, in the 1920s, a war began between us and the destructive movement of the Arabs in the land. We have not yet decisively won it, even though many mistakenly thought we were heading towards resolution at certain times (in 1949-1967, and in the brief burst of optimism around the Oslo Accords). Although we defeated this movement at several important junctures and strengthened ourselves immeasurably compared to it, we have not yet won the war against it. We haven't even clarified to ourselves what the nature of the resolution will be, after the conception that resolution lies in a two-state solution has completely collapsed.
As we tensely await a resolution in the Iran-Israel war, is a strategic confrontation forming between Israel and Turkey in the Syrian arena? Will Turkey repeat the imperialist pattern of a populous state clashing with Israel, as Egypt and Iran have done?

Secondly, in the Egypt-Israel war, Egypt organized the Arab states around a war against the State of Israel with the aim of annihilating it. That war began with the Egyptian invasion in 1948, or when the Free Officers movement led by Nasser, with its imperialist ambitions in the region, came to power in Egypt in 1952. It ended with a clear political-strategic victory for Israel in 1979, several years after an important but not decisive military victory by Israel in 1973.
Only in 1979, after a series of military defeats and in light of Israel's political alliance with the US, was Egypt forced to sign a peace agreement and officially and practically abandon the campaign to annihilate Israel. Begin and Dayan realized that victory, based on wars and struggles waged by their predecessors Ben-Gurion, Eshkol, Golda and Rabin. This does not mean that there is no threat from Egypt now, especially if an aggressive Islamist regime takes hold there as foreshadowed during the "Arab Spring" years. A decisive (or "absolute") victory does not mean a "final victory" after which there is no danger of war.
As an act of the devil, today, we know that we were not given respite after the agreement with Egypt. In that year of victory, 1979, we were forced into the beginning of a war with Iran, when the Islamist regime of Shi'ite clerics - the new claimant to regional hegemony after Egypt's failure - came to power that very year. The Iran-Israel war began slowly, and the first arena was Lebanon, where Iran established Hezbollah (in 1981-1984), during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Although fighting for its existence, the Islamist regime in Iran then began its long war against us, stemming from a distorted "redemption" doctrine and a justified perception that the US and Israel stand in its way to acquiring imperial hegemony.
There is a risk of a similar serious development with Islamist Turkey today. As we tensely await a resolution in the Iran-Israel war, is a strategic confrontation forming between Israel and Turkey in the Syrian arena? Will Turkey repeat the imperialist pattern of a populous state clashing with Israel, as Egypt and Iran have done?
Long before its Islamist supporters took over the Aleppo-Damascus axis, Turkey under Erdogan's leadership embarked on a path of hostility towards Israel - in religious subversion in Jerusalem, in support of the brief Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt (together with the Obama administration and Qatar), and in practical and rhetorical support for the murderous barbarians of Hamas. It also shows quasi-imperialist activism throughout the region - in Libya, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, Syria and against Greece and Cyprus.
If these trends continue, the confrontation will come. But it is not a decree of fate. The government in Turkey may change, and Israel has an interest in preventing a confrontation. It can, for example, limit cooperation with the Syrian Kurds, who threaten Turkey because of their ties to the PKK terrorist organization operating in Turkey. But Israel will not be able to ignore Turkey's hostility and act with appeasement that invites aggression. Vigilance is therefore required for the possibility that Turkey will not resist the temptation and will stand against Israel in Syria."
Prof. Avi Bareli is a historian and researcher at Ben-Gurion Univesity of the Negev.