Lebanon
Northern residents view the Lebanon ceasefire negatively. This is understandable: they will have to live with its gaps. In contrast, Diplomatic-Security Cabinet ministers and IDF senior officials view it positively. This too is understandable: they need to present it to the public as a success.
Both sides are somewhat right. Like any agreement, it has advantages and notable disadvantages. Anyone who thought the war would end in unilateral surrender wasn't living in reality. Israel never intended to decisively defeat Hezbollah: it aimed to strike them hard. By objective measures, it hit them harder than hoped. This resulted from years of planning, excellent intelligence, and maximizing operational opportunities, combined with every possible mistake by an adversary living in past conventions and failing to adapt to changing realities.
In none of the scenarios presented before the war (and there were many) did anyone predict that the IDF would achieve so much while Hezbollah would gain so little. Analysts expected we would manage to strike part of Hezbollah's leadership: in practice, it was almost completely eliminated. They also expected we would hit about half of Hezbollah's firepower: in practice, estimates suggest the organization lost about 90% of its rocket capabilities and precision weapons of various types. They predicted Hezbollah would inflict enormous damage on Israel's home front, that hundreds to thousands would die and many buildings would collapse, and that hundreds of soldiers would die in southern Lebanon: the reality turned out very differently.
This week I heard Likud members of parliament claiming the IDF scared the government, which is why Israel didn't act in Lebanon earlier. This is clearly false: the IDF unanimously recommended on Oct. 11 to launch a preemptive strike in Lebanon, beginning with eliminating Hezbollah's entire leadership. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu opposed this and enlisted Benny Gantz and Gadi Eizenkot, who had just joined the War Cabinet, to block the move. He also resisted pressure to shift the main effort northward in the following months. Ultimately, approval was given only when there were concerns that Operation Pagers was about to be exposed. From there, it's all history.
The turning point came last July. The Hezbollah rocket that killed 12 children in Majdal Shams led to the elimination of the terror group's chief of staff, Fuad Shukr, in central Beirut. Hezbollah then deliberated how to respond. They hesitated, thinking Iran would act in response to Ismail Haniyeh's elimination in Tehran. But the Iranians also delayed, and Hezbollah lost momentum.
When the beepers were activated in September (under pressure from Mossad Director David Barnea), Hassan Nasrallah experienced two things. First, he was shocked: thousands of his men were hit, including from his inner circle. Second, he was worried: he discovered his organization was compromised, and he agonized over where the next strike would come from. The next day, communication devices were activated – causing less damage than planned because Israel had to activate them just before they were exposed – and Hezbollah's shock intensified. Still, Nasrallah was convinced Israel was operating according to the "equations" that had governed both sides since the Second Lebanon War. That it wouldn't dare go further.
Three days later, Hezbollah's head of operations and special forces commander, Ibrahim Awil, was eliminated in Beirut. Again, Nasrallah didn't respond, still believing in those same equations. He assumed Israel would kill military commanders but wouldn't dare target him, and especially wouldn't dare destroy Beirut. That's why he refrained from activating the massive rocket array he had built over years. Had he chosen to do so, the scope of casualties and damage in Israel would have risen dramatically.
Critics of the agreement will say that if we achieved so much, if Hezbollah was hit so hard, we should have pressed the gas pedal a bit more to maximize achievements. Supporters will say we can't just look at the half-full glass. There are also significant risks in continued fighting. One needs to know when to end.
Three more days passed, and the Air Force launched its largest operation in its history, and one of the largest in military history worldwide. More than 1,900 Hezbollah targets were struck in a single day, primarily rockets, launchers, and other weaponry. There was one place Israel didn't touch then: Beirut. Nasrallah understood from this that the equations were still valid, so he avoided breaking them and again didn't attack Tel Aviv. This cost him his life: three days later, he was eliminated. This was the signal for the assault on Beirut, which continued until the ceasefire two days ago.
The 12 days between activating the beepers and Nasrallah's elimination not only broke the equations: they gave Israel an opportunity to reshape the region. The ground operations that followed were more extensive than planned, and the strikes (and eliminations) executed were deeper and more effective than estimated possible. Still, there wasn't a complete victory in them. Agreement opponents will say if we achieved so much, if Hezbollah was hit so hard, we should have pressed a bit more to maximize achievements. Supporters will say we can't just look at the half-full glass. There are also significant risks in continued fighting. One needs to know when to end.
Iran
The war in Lebanon wasn't planned to destroy Hezbollah, nor to eliminate Nasrallah. The Cabinet's decision established that it was meant to create conditions allowing northern residents to return home safely. Whether this has been achieved remains unanswered at this stage: it will be tested on the ground.
The government refrained this week from calling residents to return home. It understands their concerns. There's now an interim period of up to 60 days, and what's the point of returning if they'll have to evacuate again in two months. Still, many will likely return even without an official call. The quiet will allow it, along with homesickness and curiosity. Some will just visit, others will stay. Those with children studying elsewhere, or who started work in other locations, will likely wait before making decisions.
The state would do well to use this quiet to get ahead of civilian needs. To check what was damaged, and where, and to reach into its pocket. It should also accelerate future plans for the north: not rehabilitation plans, but development plans. This is an opportunity to transform the north into what it deserves to be: a leading and attractive region. This requires investing in education, infrastructure, healthcare, industry, and high-tech. It requires government policy and budgetary investment. Past experience raises concerns that very little of this, if any, will happen.
Even before that, trust in security needs to be restored. That something will truly change now. The IDF promises this will be the case: forces will remain in communities near the fence, there will be significant barriers, and a zero-tolerance policy will be implemented for any violation of the agreement by Hezbollah. Residents, scarred by past experience and future concerns, know that life has its own dynamics. That forces will gradually be reduced, that Hezbollah will slowly infiltrate the border area, that a world wanting quiet will prevent Israel from acting, and that over the years – five, ten or 20 -–we'll return to square one under worse conditions.
It's difficult to argue with these feelings. The burden of proof lies with the IDF, and with the government that must approve force deployment policies. The residents' claim that we shouldn't have stopped now requires an answer. Part of it lies in the field: in the physics of life, the IDF's achievements would have eroded, and the price would have risen. Soldiers would have died, rockets would have continued flying, and a third of the country would have remained paralyzed (not to mention the costs to the economy, aviation, tourism, and more). At the price of a few more tactical achievements, Israel would have extended the strategic damage.
The other part of the answer lies in the conference rooms: Israel faced immense international pressure. The fear that the Americans wouldn't veto at the UN Security Council was real, especially against the backdrop of distancing from France, the recently issued international arrest warrants, and concerns that continued pounding of Lebanon – which many demanded should include strikes on state infrastructure – would lead to boycotts and embargoes against Israel. This is why demands to maintain a security strip in Lebanon or expand the IDF's future operational freedom were unfeasible: Israel achieved quite a bit under challenging diplomatic conditions, including the Biden administration's agreement to release remaining armaments in their possession.
If at the start of the campaign Iran's "ring of fire" strategy seemed successful, now it's Tehran that feels exposed and vulnerable. But in the Middle East, everything is temporary and reversible – and this is particularly worrying. Not just because Hezbollah can be rebuilt, but because when Iran is cornered, it might make dangerous decisions. In one word: nuclear.
This likely underpinned Netanyahu's statements this week. Israel has barely mentioned nuclear issues since Oct. 7, and now it's back in our lives. In the background stand updated assessments from senior security experts, ranging from concerned to gloomy, about how Iran's leader, Ali Khamenei, might act given the blows he's suffered and Trump's expected return to the White House. On one hand: fear of losing everything. On the other: the thought that perhaps nuclear weapons would immunize him and the regime, as happened with North Korea.
Israel has two urgent matters regarding Iran. First, nuclear. Iran steadily approaches it, and swift action is needed. Military strike remains on the table, but for that Israel needs the US, which isn't there right now, and in closed rooms there's renewed talk of an agreement that, unlike the previous one, would distance Iran from the bomb for decades and present it with a credible military threat. As always, the path there will be riddled with obstacles, possibly including sanctions and crises.
The second matter is preventing the reconstruction of the ring of fire. How to stop Iran in Lebanon and Gaza, and in other arenas (primarily the West Bank). Israel can do much alone: it cannot do everything alone. It needs the Americans, Europeans, and Gulf states, among other things to seal the Syria-Lebanon border and prevent weapons smuggling, and it has a significant opportunity to bring them closer if it manages to link this to an arrangement in Gaza that would lead to the broader normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia and other nations.
For this to happen, some dreams must be abandoned along the way. For instance, settlements in Gaza, or the notion that we can both free hostages and remain in the strip. Those who achieved an arrangement in the north under imperfect conditions, leaving behind a weakened but still capable enemy, can certainly reach an arrangement in the south under better conditions, facing an enemy many times weaker. In other words: we can reach an arrangement in the south under reasonable security conditions, knowing that fighting there will continue at varying intensities for many years.
If this happens, Israel can get back hostages, especially those still alive, primarily the women and female soldiers. The northern agreement brought us to a decision point where bluffing is no longer possible: it's time for the hostages. There's no more important or urgent matter than this.
Conclusions
Hezbollah started the war in the north to support Hamas. The ceasefire agreement separates the fronts. This is a significant Israeli achievement, which makes the claims of "victory" heard this week in Beirut laughable. Hezbollah paid maximum and achieved minimum. Not that Israel won: you can't claim victory when the north is evacuated and shelled for 14 months, but this is certainly not the bitter stalemate that ended the Second Lebanon War.
The end of this campaign (assuming it has ended) frees Israel to do several more things, after the hostage saga is completed. First, to investigate. The IDF inquiries are delayed, and so is the establishment of the state commission of inquiry. The arrest warrants issued in The Hague taught us that those who don't investigate here will be investigated abroad. In my view, more important is that those who don't investigate here won't truly know what happened, and those who don't know what happened won't learn what they need to fix to avoid making mistakes again.
Alongside investigation, accountability must be implemented. When the hostages return, all those responsible must step down: in the IDF, in the Shin Bet, in the government. If they don't do this voluntarily, they'll face unprecedented protests that will channel all the energy that's accumulated since Oct. 7. Leading these will be all those affected by the war: in the south and north, civilians and military personnel. Reserve soldiers have always known how to lead protests, and they'll lead now too – especially when they hear that now there's no need to draft the ultra-Orthodox because the war is over and the need for soldiers has decreased.
And this protest, which will come, will be more justified than ever. Israel needs correction and healing, and above all, it needs a different horizon. The Knesset doesn't understand this: they continue to engage in divisiveness and accusations, insisting on returning Israel to Oct. 6. Israel deserves better than this: it deserves to win.
