Dr. Saeed Ghasseminejad believes there's already a detailed plan to transform Iran's political landscape. Born in Tehran, he regularly participated in protests against the clerical rule during his university years. "One day, while driving back from a protest, two Revolutionary Guard members suddenly got into my car," he recalls in a phone conversation with Israel Hayom from New York. "I drove in silence for several minutes with them inside, until they moved me to the back seat and drove me directly to a detention facility. I spent a month in solitary confinement and received a two-year suspended sentence. Following this, I left Iran, leaving my family behind."
He relocated to the United States, completed his doctorate in economics, and became a prominent opposition voice. He later joined the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a nonpartisan research institute in Washington focusing on national security, which includes Israeli researchers such as former National Security Council chiefs Eyal Hulata and Jacob Nagel.
"Many people say there's no chance the Iranian regime will fall. I think that's a mistake," says Ghasseminejad. "There's currently great disappointment with the regime in Iran. In the last presidential election, for instance, voter turnout was the lowest ever. The economic situation is fragile, and since 2017, protests have occurred in more than 150 cities across Iran. Since September 2022, there have been over 7,000 demonstrations in Iran."
These statistics, he believes, indicate that the regime is unstable and the Iranian government stands on shaky ground. According to him, all the Iranian people need to overcome the clerical leadership is some external assistance. That's exactly why a five-point plan was formulated.
"Maximum Defection"
In recent years, Ghasseminejad served as an advisor to Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, son of Iran's last shah who has lived in the US since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, where he formed a fragile coalition of Iranian opposition figures. The two even visited Israel together about a year and a half ago, a visit we'll discuss later.
In his role, Ghasseminejad was involved in formulating Pahlavi's plan to transform Iran's political system. According to sources who spoke with him, the crown prince doesn't seek to take control of the country, but rather to return as a unifying, symbolic figure under whom a new republic would be established. Not everyone agrees with this idea.
Ghasseminejad breaks down the plan into five points: "The first point is applying maximum economic pressure on the regime by outside nations. The Iranian regime has a narrow support base, maintained through money offered to its supporters. If you cut off economic resources through sanctions and other tools, it becomes increasingly difficult for the regime to buy loyalty."
External support can also weaken the Iranian economy from within, he says. "Workers' strikes, for example. There have been brief strikes in Iran, including by truck drivers, which significantly impacted the economy. But to maintain an effective strike over an extended period, you need to support people who go on strike and aren't receiving wages. This can be done through external funding."
The second point in the plan is what Ghasseminejad describes as the maximum empowerment of the Iranian people.
"Let me give you an example. The regime constantly tries to disconnect the Iranian people from the global internet. Internet access allows people to express their opinions, organize protests, and share information the regime doesn't want reaching the public. That's why the regime filters extensive content online. If we could somehow provide free internet access to Iran's residents, the regime would face serious problems."
The third point in the plan seeks to mobilize Iranian emigrants who have flooded Europe and America since 1979. "We're talking about five to eight million people, many of them affluent, who can pressure governments in their host countries to act against the regime in Iran," Ghasseminejad explains.
The fourth point addresses the day after. "His highness the crown prince has a detailed plan for the first 100 days following regime change."
This brings us to the final point in the plan, which Ghasseminejad calls "maximum defection." "To transform the regime, you need some security institutions in Iran to join the revolution, or at least declare neutrality. You need support from insiders. It would be very difficult without this. Such a delicate and complex matter is something foreign governments can greatly assist with. Especially governments with proven intelligence capabilities inside Iran. Israel, for instance."
Israel, Ghasseminejad adds, has already enabled the beginning of the journey toward regime change. "In the current war, the Islamic regime in Iran has been revealed as a paper tiger. It's losing many of its proxies in the Middle East, its intelligence organizations are deeply compromised, and its military power hasn't impressed. When you put all this together, you discover the regime is at a very weak, fragile point. We have an opportunity to transform it."
"Not on the Agenda"
Despite the compliments to Israel, it's uncertain whether the five-point plan receives warm reception here. When Ghasseminejad is asked if Israel is involved in some way in his efforts to transform Iran's political landscape, he responds diplomatically, "I believe all stakeholders who see the regime's fall and its replacement with a responsible government as aligned with their national interests should improve their coordination and cooperation beyond current levels."
Sources in Israel who have been involved in intelligence and diplomatic efforts regarding Iran in recent years agree that generally, Israel should increase its efforts concerning Iranian regime change.
A former senior official in the diplomatic system, who is well-versed in relevant cabinet discussions says, "Regime change in Iran wasn't on the agenda in the last ten years. It was never Israel's objective to change the regime, or even engage with it. All kinetic activities carried out by the Mossad in Iran, such as eliminating scientists, stealing the nuclear archive, and more, were excellent operations, but they focused on the nuclear program. There wasn't even one significant operation aimed at regime change targets."
This week, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did address the Iranian people directly, saying in a recorded message that "there is one force putting your family in grave danger: the tyrants of Tehran. That's it." Netanyahu went further and repeated, in Persian, one of the protest slogans against the Tehran regime: "Zan, Zendegi, Azadi – Women, Life, Freedom!" But there's a long way from here to actual efforts for Iranian regime change.
Sima Shine, an Iran expert who previously served in Military Intelligence's Research Division and headed research at the Mossad, says, "Israel needs to be involved, or at least formulate a plan, regarding the possibility of regime change in Iran, but in my opinion, it's not doing enough. There are things I tried to promote over the years, but there wasn't really a receptive ear or allocated budget. Even if sometimes people are asked to raise ideas – when it comes to implementation, it doesn't really happen.
Probably because regime change is a Sisyphean process, it's hard to measure its success, and it's difficult to know if it will bring the desired outcome," says Shine, co-founder of Forum Dvorah and head of the Iran program at the Institute for National Security Studies.
These statements align well with comments from a former Mossad senior official who dealt with Iran in his role. "Regime change has been an operational topic for years, but I'm skeptical about whether it's even possible. In terms of territory, Iran is 74 times larger than Israel. In terms of population, Iran is seven times larger than Israel. It's an enormous country with two armies – the Iranian military and the Revolutionary Guards – and its people have endured more than 50 years of totalitarian rule. Not simple.
"When we came to discuss regime change, many more question marks emerged than exclamation points: Do we need partners like the US for such an operation, or can we do it alone? Is the target economic, social, or governmental collapse? Is it enough to focus on Tehran, or should we think about other Iranian cities? This process is complex, takes years, and needs constant recalibration. This doesn't mean the Tehran regime won't fall – even Communism and the Roman Empire collapsed – I just don't know if it's something that can be done from the outside and through coercion."
The Prime Minister's Office did not respond to these statements.
So how can Iran's Islamic regime be changed, and is it even possible? Conversations with Iranian exiles, Iran researchers in Israel, and former security system officials attempt to provide the answer. The bad news is that most interviewees agree this is not an achievable objective in the near term. Worse still: they point to the possibility that when the clerical leadership is eventually removed from power, their successors might be even more extreme and combative than they are.
But let's start with the good news. The roots of political revolution in Iran stretch back more than 100 years. In 1892, under the leadership of religious figures, the Iranian public forced the shah to cancel the comprehensive concession he had granted to a British commercial company for the sale of all tobacco in Iran. The civil struggle, known as the "Tobacco Protest," included the issuance of a religious ruling that prohibited Iranian residents from buying and smoking tobacco, and ended with the shah's surrender. "An entire society suddenly stopped smoking," says Dr. Ori Goldberg, an Iran expert.
Shortly after, in 1906, following a civil war that erupted in the country, the Iranian shah was forced to adopt a democratic constitution and establish a parliament, a move that fundamentally changed Iran. In 1951, Iranians took to the streets again, and with American CIA assistance, overthrew their prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh.
The next time the Iranian people rose up was in 1979, against the oppressive regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, which ended in his dramatic overthrow. "This was the fourth time in less than 100 years that the Iranian people carried out a popular revolution," Goldberg says.
However, the popular revolution of 1979 didn't end as many Iranians expected. "The political outcome of a revolution only crystallizes after it takes place. The revolution forces the government to do something, or overthrows it, but it doesn't necessarily bring with it a clear political vision. In 1979, no one dreamed that the revolution that led to the Shah's removal would ultimately lead to the establishment of an Islamic republic," Goldberg explains.
"Those who led the street demonstrations weren't religious figures, but rather secular economic and class elites, usually liberal ones as well. The entire Islamic story is a product of the political chaos that emerged after the shah's departure. That's why, by the way, Iranians today fear regime change. When they look at the Middle East and see what happened following the Arab Spring in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, many of them calculate that maybe the current situation isn't so bad."
"The Guardian Council"
The Islamic Revolution of 1979, which brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power, gave birth to the "Islamic Republic of Iran," which is effectively a religious dictatorship. Dr. Tamar Eilam Gindin, an Iran specialist at the University of Haifa's Ezri Center for Iran & Persian Gulf Studies, says, "Ostensibly, Iran has a democracy with separation of powers, a body that oversees the Supreme Leader, and free elections. But ultimately, Khamenei rules Iran absolutely, and his word is final."
Khamenei, designated as the Republic's "supreme leader," rules through the "Guardian Council," a 12-member body that approves all candidates for political positions in the country, including the president, as well as the laws enacted by the Majles, the Iranian parliament. Khamenei personally appoints the six religious clerics who serve on the council, as well as the head of the judiciary, who in turn appoints the six jurists who serve on it. Through this, the supreme leader effectively controls all branches of the Republic – executive, legislative, and judicial.
"I haven't heard of any confrontations between Khamenei and anyone in Iran's political leadership," Eilam Gindin says. "When former president Ahmadinejad tried, for example, to do things on his own initiative, he received an angry phone call from the supreme leader, was sick for 11 days, and never tried to defy his orders again."
Other presidents elected to lead Iran have also found themselves powerless against the supreme leader's authority. "The current president, Pezeshkian, is the one who disappointed the fastest of them all. After he was elected, committees sat for four weeks, each in its field, developing recommendations for ministers to fill various government ministries. In the end, there was no connection between these recommendations and the actual appointments. The government he presented was almost identical in composition to the previous government, including the interior minister who was involved in violent suppression of protests. The ministers' identities were imposed on the president from above."
The Revolutionary Guards also stand ready to assist the supreme leader, being Iran's strongest institution and the one charged with preserving the regime. The Revolutionary Guards have been granted authority to suppress riots, prevent Western cultural infiltration, capture regime opponents, and more. Their loyalty to the regime is absolute.
According to Goldberg, the Iranian regime controls the country not only through force, but also through cunning and wisdom. "In Israel, this is less recognized, but within the Iranian regime there are significant differences of opinion," he says.
"The republic reflects a variety of political views and perceptions about Iran's future, and in the corridors of power, they place great importance on public opinion and sentiment. In Iran, the rulers always know something that former Egyptian President Mubarak, for example, didn't know – that the people can always take to the streets and remove them.
"While Khamenei makes the decisions, he knows where the public stands, and within the leadership, there are constant discussions about how to improve relations with citizens and increase their loyalty. One reason for this is that Iran's rulers don't come from a disconnected elite – quite the opposite. The religious leaders succeeded in taking control of the country precisely because they had direct connection with Iranian citizens, a connection that exists to this day."
"Closer to Israel"
The Iranian regime is certainly a fortified target, but in recent years its walls have begun to crack. Since 2009, civil unrest has been common in Iran, manifesting in several waves of political protests. The peak came in 2022, during what was called the "Hijab Protests," which erupted after the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini. For a moment, it seemed the turbulent demonstrations across the country, ignited in response to strict enforcement of hijab laws, threatened regime stability. The revolutionary spirit of the Iranian people was felt in the streets.
However, once again the "republic" managed to silence the protest: according to opposition group estimates, about 500 people were killed in Iran during the suppression of the riots. Thousands more were injured or arrested. The clerical leadership's suppression machine proved its effectiveness.
"In 2022, the protest was strong, the world's eyes were on the demonstrations in Iran, and for the first time the Iranian protest movement became something global that people talked about worldwide," says an Iranian regime opponent living in the US, who asked to remain anonymous. "If regime opponents living outside Iran, led by Crown Prince Pahlavi, had managed to capitalize on the momentum, Oct. 7 wouldn't have happened, because we would have changed the regime in Iran two years ago. When Khomeini overthrew the shah, he had a plan, networking, internal organizations. The Iranian opposition had 40 years to build such a system, and they didn't do it."
When asked whether Israel can be part of such a process, the regime opponent said, "I always thought that Israel, which was historically our best friend, could help. We are much closer to Israel than to our Muslim neighbors – Arab countries, Pakistan, or Afghanistan. It took time for people in Iran to understand that Israel is our best ally in the region."
Not everyone agrees with this. After the suppression of the Hijab Protests, Pahlavi again tried to form a coalition of Iranian exiles to exert international pressure on Iran, but this too quickly fell apart. One of the reasons was Pahlavi's visit to Israel in April 2023, at the invitation of then-Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel.
The crown prince's cooperation with Israel was not well-received among all members of the coalition he had built around him, and beyond. "The visit was a major embarrassment," says a source familiar with the details. "They took him to private Likud party gatherings, threw him celebrations that weren't exactly fitting for a royal. It also became clear that he would be a puppet king, because if he was already a puppet of the intelligence minister, how could he be expected to rule an entire country?"
"Through the Iranian People"
Indeed, one of the reasons why Iran's Islamic regime hasn't fallen yet is the absence of a single leader who could unite a broad coalition of sectors and classes in Iran under his leadership. According to Goldberg, "Iran is an enormous country, very diverse in human terms, with a very sophisticated and complex society. There isn't necessarily one element that could control the country by itself.
"Historically, what's common to all revolutions in Iran, including that of 1979, is that they were coalition revolutions. They only occurred when different groups within Iranian society, with different interests and different priorities, managed to connect and form a platform through which they acted together. The problem is that currently in Iran there's no feasibility for such a coalition that could unite together to change the regime."
Q: We've been conditioned to think that Iran has economic difficulties that are shared by broad population groups. Isn't that enough to create a coalition?
"True, there are economic difficulties, but don't forget that most are due to the international sanctions regime, and sanctions were imposed on Iranians as Iranians. This isn't perceived by the Iranian people as something solely related to the current regime, but rather as an act motivated by hatred toward Iran. The counter-reaction to economic difficulties isn't 'let's remove the corrupt rulers and everything will be fine.'"
Dr. Raz Zimmt, senior researcher and Iran expert at the Institute for National Security Studies, says, "Changing the Iranian regime is a worthy and completely legitimate objective, but the only way to achieve this is through the Iranian people living in Iran. The possibility always exists, it certainly increases over the years because the regime's legitimacy crisis continues to deepen, and I roughly estimate that the Iranian regime currently doesn't enjoy support from more than 20% of the public. But that doesn't mean the remaining 80% are ready tomorrow morning to risk their lives and stand against it."
According to Zimmt, every few years someone from the intelligence community invites him for a consultation meeting, inquiring about the possibility of regime change. "Every time this happens, I have a sense of déjà vu," he laughs. "In my opinion, in the past this was a more intensive objective of the defense establishment, and there were activities in this direction. There were initiatives in various areas that I can't elaborate on, but as the years passed, I too developed a great deal of cynicism and skepticism toward this possibility."
Nevertheless, Zimmt says, Israel should definitely prepare for the day when the Iranian people take their fate into their own hands. "Imagine the protest reawakens, and now there are two-thre million people in the streets," he says. "And at that moment, a Basij member (militia subordinate to the Revolutionary Guards) can't withdraw money from the ATM, and instead of dealing with suppression, he has to handle an economic crisis. Imagine that simultaneously you could shut down all ATMs and gas stations across Iran. Could that provide the necessary push for regime change?"
Unknown hands have already performed such acts in Iran. In July 2021, a cyber attack paralyzed train traffic across the country, and Khamenei's office phone number was posted on digital timetable boards at stations. In December 2023, a cyber attack disabled many gas stations across Tehran.
Zimmt thinks that the US too should join preparations for when protests in Iran resurge. Many interviewees for this article believe Trump's election as president advances such a move. "As long as the State Department dictated America's foreign policy, there was no chance America would take action aimed at regime change in Iran," explains Yoram Ettinger, former consul and minister at the Israeli Embassy in the US.
"Since the 1979 revolution, the State Department has traditionally opposed this option and adhered to negotiating with the regime, despite the clerical leadership's extreme anti-American behavior. There were only four years during which the State Department didn't dictate American policy toward Iran: during Trump's term, he removed the State Department from the center of American diplomatic and security activity for the first time."
"Not Necessarily from the Opposition"
Speaking of aging leaders, it's worth discussing Khamenei. He has served as supreme leader for 35 years and recently marked his 85th birthday. "After Khamenei dies – and he's neither young nor healthy – succession battles might open some window of weakness in the government, through which the Iranian people could change the regime," Eilam Gindin says, with cautious optimism.
Khamenei, she says, never officially designated a successor, and the one who emerged as a prominent candidate to replace him was Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi, who died last May when his helicopter crashed. Recently, claims have emerged that Khamenei wants to appoint his son, Mojtaba, who is considered an extreme conservative, as his successor. To do this, he'll need to overcome two major obstacles: power in the Islamic Republic isn't meant to pass by inheritance, and he doesn't hold the title of ayatollah, which would make it difficult for religious clerics to accept him as leader."
Goldberg says, "Who knows what power struggle will occur in the country when Khamenei dies. On the other hand, I think it's more likely there will be an orderly process to replace him. While this has never happened before, there is a process in the current Iranian constitution for how to replace a supreme leader. Beyond that, as much as we perceive the Islamic Republic as fanatical and extreme, this entity has existed for many years. There are institutions there, people invested in these institutions, and power distribution is organized. This isn't North Korea."
A former senior Mossad official adds, "And let's say tomorrow a new leader is appointed in Iran. Does he change the country's policies and objectives? Not at all certain. Iran is a power, and a power needs nuclear capability and military strength. The only thing that might change, perhaps, is Iranian support for terrorism. But is that the revolution we want?"
What's certain – there's one revolution we really don't want. Many interviewees raised the possibility that if the clerical regime in Iran falls – those who will inherit its place are the Revolutionary Guards. Shine says, "When thinking about the possibility of change in Iran, regardless of whether it's due to Khamenei's death or not, one of the options everyone talks about is the Revolutionary Guards taking control. Currently, they are the dominant force."
Q: How would this happen?
"For example, the Revolutionary Guards commander might announce some kind of military rule, or implement security regulations to prevent street demonstrations. The question is whether the Revolutionary Guards want to emerge from behind the leader's shadow and become the face of Iran, and most think not. Therefore, it's more likely they'll appoint a leader who's weak enough and dependent enough on them to implement their policy."
And this policy is extreme and combative even compared to that of the religious leaders. Zimmt says, "The concern with such a scenario is that although the Revolutionary Guards organization isn't homogeneous or monolithic, its leadership is typically characterized by radical, nationalistic and anti-Western worldviews, with willingness to take even greater risks compared to the current leadership.
"The issue also came up during the Hijab Protests, when some argued that if the Revolutionary Guards sense a significant and immediate threat to regime stability, they would prefer to 'sacrifice' Khamenei and execute some kind of military takeover to preserve their interests and also protect the revolution.
"Bottom line, any discussion about regime change in Iran must consider that those who might replace the current leadership won't necessarily come from liberal or secular opposition ranks. It's actually more likely that instability will be exploited by 'deep state' institutions, primarily the Revolutionary Guards, to take control of Iran."
