Amos Yadlin, former head of the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate and retired major general, gave an interview last weekend to Israel's Channel 12 TV in which he asserted that Israel needs to do "two things: strike Hezbollah at a much higher level than we have so far, targeting their strategic infrastructure, their commanders, and their leaders. We should hit them every day."
The interviewer, Gideon Oko, sought clarification: "So you would continue the pattern we've seen over the past week?" Yadlin responded: "That has been Mind Israel's consistent recommendation: Israel should go after Hezbollah with full force, like drumming on a drum – hit after hit."
Mind Israel, if you didn't know, is a new security consultancy, founded by Yadlin. But has "going after Hezbollah with full force" been Mind Israel's consistent recommendation, or is it in fact the opposite? Let's take a closer look.
"The short-term potential for an agreement comes from the fact that both sides have an interest in preventing a large-scale war" (quote from a policy document published by Mind Israel in February. (Mind Israel website).
"If we can secure an agreement that keeps Hezbollah away from the border, with no presence south of the Litani River, I believe we can avoid the immense costs of war. Such an agreement is within reach." (Amos Yadlin in an interview on Keshet just a day earlier, on September 20).
"It is in both our interest and Nasrallah's to close this matter." (September 17, following the pager attack). "There is a man by the name of Amos Hochstein. If we can reach an agreement without war, that's preferable" (September 15, interview on 103 FM radio)."There is optimism in Washington that mediator Amos Hochstein will manage to secure an agreement to push Hezbollah away from the border – but only after a ceasefire in Gaza. The idea that, if Hochstein fails, Israel might push Hezbollah away from the border through a limited military operation has been met with a cold shoulder" (September 12, Mako website).
"A pause in the fighting in Gaza will have a cooling effect on the entire region. It will reduce the risk of the unification of fronts and provide the U.S. with an opportunity to advance a diplomatic agreement that could potentially allow residents in the north to return to their homes" (Yadlin and Col. (ret) Udi Evental, a senior adviser at Mind Israel, September 8, Mako website). "After a Gaza ceasefire, the fighting in the north is likely to end as well, creating an opportunity to explore a diplomatic solution to distance Hezbollah from the border." (Yadlin and Evental in a policy paper published on the Mako website, following the Iranian attack on Israel on April 14).
"In my view, Hezbollah wants a ceasefire... Hochstein is the person who can broker a deal because, at the core, Nasrallah doesn't want war, and neither do we." (Calcalist conference, April 9). "Radwan forces are no longer sitting directly on the border; they've been hit and pushed back by about three kilometers. For as long as the campaign continues, we can push them back even further without escalating into a full-scale war. We should prepare for an orchestrated operation that begins with a diplomatic efforts." (Yadlin in a radio interview on November 13, just over a month into the war).
"Nasrallah fears confrontation. He's trying to avoid an all-out war with Israel." (Analysis piece for Globes on October 10, three days after the massacre). Watching these same figures, whose professional failure we've all witnessed firsthand, continue to offer advice without pausing for a moment to reflect on their own role, is a disturbing experience. It's gaslighting in leather jackets and authoritative tones. In that same document, Yadlin wrote that "before any action against Hezbollah, there must be a massive military campaign to topple Hamas's rule in Gaza," in order to send Nasrallah a "critical deterrence message." Incidentally, that initial document did not make any mention the hostage issue.
In fact, the belief that "Hezbollah is deterred" appeared in Yadlin's writings and interviews even before October 7. Neither Nasrallah nor the State of Israel want to find themselves in a full-scale war," the former head of the Intelligence Directorate predicted as early as July 2023 in an interview with Maariv. In that same interview, he also expressed "unconditional support" for reserve pilots who had suspended their volunteering. He also conveyed a sense of urgency: "It is important for the Israeli public to understand that the Third Lebanon War will be much tougher than the wars they have previously experienced. This time, rockets will reach Tel Aviv. The IDF might have to stop Hezbollah attempts to cross the border southwards and take over settlements. Air Force flights over Lebanon will face significant challenges."
At the Makor Rishon conference held in the Negev that same month, Yadlin outlined similar scenarios in the event of war on the northern front. A few years earlier, in the summer of 2019, while serving as head of the Institute for National Security Studies, he warned in a ynet studio interview that "Hezbollah could strike Israel's power centers, Air Force bases, intelligence facilities, the Kirya in Tel Aviv, and power stations with an accuracy of 5–10 meters." It was quite surprising, then, to see Maj. Gen. (ret) Yadlin on television this week recommending strikes on Hezbollah and downplaying past fears: "People talked about hundreds, thousands of casualties. So, there are hundreds of rockets, but many are intercepted, and some miss their targets because of the chaos within Hezbollah today."
What about the southern front? In recent years, Yadlin has provided numerous assessments claiming that "Hamas is deterred." on the southern front. His evaluations emphasized that Hamas had been deterred, particularly following key military operations. For example, during "Operation Guardian of the Walls," Yadlin stated: "Militarily, [Hamas] is defeated, they've lost by a knockout. The damage in Gaza is enormous, including significant hits to their underground infrastructure and rocket launchers. Next time, Hamas will think very carefully before firing at Jerusalem" (103FM radio, May 2021).
Later that year, in an August 2021 interview with Gideon Oko following rocket fire at Sderot, Yadlin said, "Deterrence can be measured in several dimensions. Strategically, it exists because Hamas isn't firing rockets in any significant way." In May 2023, Yadlin reiterated the deterrence narrative: "Hamas has been deterred since 'Guardian of the Walls''... Reoccupying the Gaza Strip is an option that comes with high costs – in terms of occupation, clearing the area, and long-term control – and negative benefits." (Mako, May 2023).
That same month he added: "Hamas is deterred. It desperately need workers to be able to leave [to work in Israel], it needs the Qatari money, and it needs to avoid the electric network being shut down." (Channel 12 TV, May 2023). However, just three weeks before the October massacre, Yadlin observed: "Hamas, which has invested significant effort in rebuilding the Strip since 'Guardian of the Walls,' generally prefers to keep Gaza out of the conflict." (Globes, September 2023). Just three days before the October 7 massacre, Yadlin said: "We are fifty years after the Yom Kippur War... At least now, [IDF] intelligence is much better at giving early warnings, reading the situation, and helping military and political leaders understand what's happening around us... In my view, the enemy's ability to surprise is much less than it was fifty years ago." (Washington Institute, October 2023).
Shifting Positions
It isn't only Yadlin who is guilty of such an embarrassing series of statements and predictions. Every day, we are bombarded with a chorus of advice and confident analyses from those who misjudged the situation before the war. Almost everyone has past quotes reflecting outdated assumptions, and the most audacious are those who have shifted positions without signaling, even as the conflict continues. Nearly everyone has made statements in the past that show they were guilty of falling to the conceptzia, but the worst of all are those who changed their positions mid-conflict without any contrition for their previous beliefs. Maj. Gen (res) Israel Ziv, for example, now consistently support beating Hezbollah into the dust. "Already about six months ago, we should have shifted the entire campaign to the north and ended the southern conflict," Ziv said in a recent interview. "What's happening now is part of that strategy – albeit delayed – but the IDF's entry [into Lebanon] and pounding of Hezbollah is highly significant."
But not too long ago, he spoke rather differently. For instance, last June, he said: "Getting dragged into a campaign in the north right now is not in Israel's interest… Israel needs the courage to conclude the Gaza campaign, which could give a chance for a pause in the north. We need to wait a year or two until we build the army up to full strength." In February, he said: "We should work to bring residents back to the north, restore UN Security Council Resolution 1701, and deal with Hezbollah when it suits us." It is interesting to note the evolution of Channel 13 commentator Alon Ben-David's stance regarding the Philadelphi Corridor, as tracked by journalist Avishai Grinzeig. Prior to the IDF's entry into Rafah, Ben-David wrote that "entering Rafah would be a political mistake," calling it "the remote southern corner of the Gaza Strip, not the crux of our existence or the event that will determine the outcome of the war."
However, by the end of May, after the IDF entered Rafah, Ben-David commented that, "The IDF is currently trying to block the supply lines, ensuring no weapons flow from Egypt into Gaza." By June, he revealed in a column that "Rafah is a very significant component in Hamas' force build-up... IDF forces found a tunnel shaft every ten meters along the Philadelphi Corridor, the border between Gaza and Egypt. This isn't figurative language but a factual description. The entire border is riddled with smuggling tunnels connected to rocket launch pits, command tunnels in the city, and attack tunnels leading into Israel."
Yet, at the beginning of September, Ben-David suddenly explained that "not a single tunnel was found with an opening on Egyptian soil. No usable tunnels were found beneath the Philadelphi Corridor... this image of the Philadelphi Corridor as a roaring river of weapons smuggling into Gaza is simply not true."
In the end, it seems one's self-image is the most important thing.In September 2023, two weeks before the massacre, Brig.-Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, Chairman of the Israel Security & Defense Forum (Bitchonistim) was interviewed by the Knesset Channel. When asked in connections with riots along the Gaza border fence, whether Israel was suffering from the misconception that "Hamas doesn't want a fight," Avivi confidently responded, "Hamas is currently acting for the usual reasons – it's about money... The way Hamas is behaving suggests that, strategically, it doesn't want a conflict at this stage. If Hamas wanted conflict, it would fire rockets. The activity along the fence is the type of operation Hamas knows won't lead to a full-scale escalation."
In a May 2023 interview on Channel 12, Avivi explained to Sivan Rahav-Meir that, unlike Palestinian Islamic Jihad, "Hamas bears responsibility for the population and is keenly aware of the consequences of that responsibility, which is why it acts differently than Islamic Jihad." Days later, in another interview with the Kipa website, he stated, "Reoccupying Gaza is a major decision that isn't relevant right now; it doesn't align with the IDF's main tasks, like preparing for Iran... I don't think any of them will be rushing to fire rockets anytime soon."
When I confronted Avivi recently with his pre-war statements, he clarified that he had consistently opposed the idea that "Hamas is deterred" and had warned of the possibility that Hamas might launch a surprise attack to seize border communities, a warning he also mentioned in his book published six months before October 7. He emphasized that his previous comments in the September interview were specific to Hamas' intentions at that particular moment.
However, this explanation raises questions, given his statement just two weeks before the massacre that "strategically, [Hamas] doesn't want conflict." Nonetheless, Avivi does reference in his book, No Retreat: How to Secure Israel for Generations to Come, that attacks and attempts to seize settlements and military posts could be launched from both Lebanon and Gaza. Moreover, in a January 2022 lecture, Avivi declared, "We are not deterring anyone – certainly not the Iranians and certainly not the Gazans. They are not deterred; they are building up their forces. They are preparing themselves for battle. Whether they fire at us or not is not a matter of deterrence. It is a fact that the Gazans repeatedly engage in campaigns against us, so can we say they're deterred? No. It's a matter of when they choose to act, it is not a question of deterrence."
A Rare admission
Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, former head of the National Security Council, is still a sought-after interviewee despite having previously stated in August 2018 that "Israel's real problem is not the Gaza Strip but Iran's entrenchment in Syria. Every ounce of energy and attention should be focused there, and if some concession in Gaza is required, we should go ahead." In that same interview, he also argued that a ground invasion of Gaza "would be foolish. It isn't something anyone is seriously proposing."
In a May 2023 interview on Channel 12, Avivi explained to Sivan Rahav-Meir that, unlike Palestinian Islamic Jihad, "Hamas bears responsibility for the population and is keenly aware of the consequences of that responsibility, which is why it acts differently than Islamic Jihad." Days later, in another interview with the Kipa website, he stated, "Reoccupying Gaza is a major decision that isn't relevant right now; it doesn't align with the IDF's main tasks, like preparing for Iran... I don't think any of them will be rushing to fire rockets anytime soon."
After Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021, Amidror wrote that "there are many creative plans for Gaza's future, but the harsh truth is that the current status quo remains the least problematic option among the available alternatives." In the summer of 2022, the former head of the Intelligence Directorate's Research Division explained that "no one in Gaza doubts who's stronger; they're still licking their wounds from the last operation over a year ago. They know exactly who is stronger. It's no coincidence that Hamas is trying to rein in Islamic Jihad." Around the same time, he also expressed support for the gas deal with Hezbollah.
However, Amidror stands out among security commentators as one of the few who has publicly admitted to his mistakes. In several interviews during the first weeks of the war, he reflected on those errors. In an October interview with Keren Marciano, Amidror admitted, "I too made mistakes; I'm not proud of them. My assessment was that Hamas had interests beyond terror. As a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, I mistakenly thought that they understood how to govern a population, and that the economic factor was part of this and beneficial to them. I was wrong. It's a terror organization, like any terror organization, like ISIS, and we need to eliminate it."
Even though critics may dismiss this as mere lip service, the rarity of such admissions is striking. Those with experience in the security establishment can offer valuable insights, even if they've made significant errors, but they should acknowledge at least those errors. In a reality where the Prime Minister, the Chief of Staff, and the head of the Shin Bet continue to serve as though nothing happened, scrutinizing security experts who appear on television may seem secondary. Yet, watching individuals, whose professional failings are evident to us all, continue to offer advice without reflecting for even a moment on their role, is a deeply troubling experience.
It's gaslighting, dressed in leather jackets and spoken in authoritative tones. In the media world, even rambling football commentators receive more backlash than those discussing matters of life and death. If they continue to be invited to studios without being challenged, we should at least attempt to track their inconsistencies.
