The security cabinet convened on Monday with one central issue on the agenda: the possibility of an Israeli ground operation in Lebanon.
After weeks of operational success, the Israeli military wants to take advantage of Hezbollah's weakened state and deepen its gains along the border. The aim is to dismantle Hezbollah's operational infrastructure, including tunnels built for infiltrations and attacks, as well as houses and areas used to hide weapons and terrorists. Clearing these threats is vital to reduce the danger to Israeli communities and ensure displaced residents can safely return home.
On Monday, The Wall Street Journal reported that in recent months the Israeli army has conducted numerous special operations to pave the way for a potential ground offensive, including actions inside Hezbollah tunnels on the Lebanese side. The IDF is particularly concerned about Hezbollah's anti-tank threat, which the terrorist group has been preparing for since the Second Lebanon War in 2006, having stockpiled large amounts of launchers and missiles.
The IDF is weighing three main options. The first is a limited maneuver near the border to destroy key Hezbollah infrastructure. This targeted operation would be confined in scope and time and could be wrapped up in weeks. The second option involves advancing up to the Litani River to hit infrastructure further from the border. The third option would take Israeli forces north of the Litani to inflict deeper damage on Hezbollah's capabilities and personnel.
The decision will likely depend on three factors: the level of damage inflicted on Hezbollah, the toll on Israeli soldiers' lives (including the risk of captives), and the potential for a prolonged engagement in Lebanon.
These considerations suggest that Israel may lean toward the first option, limiting its actions to the border area and a short timeframe. This approach would help reduce international pressure stemming from the invasion of Lebanese territory while still preserving Israel's sense of achievement and Hezbollah's perception of defeat.
Psychology plays a significant role in these decisions. The past two weeks have been pivotal – not just in terms of the operational success of eliminating Hezbollah's General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah and most of Hezbollah's military leadership, and severely damaging its missile, weapons, and infrastructure systems – but also in shaping the psychological outlook on both sides.
Hezbollah is now a battered and demoralized organization, facing command-and-control issues that make it difficult for them to execute even small parts of their operational plans. Surviving senior leaders are focused on staying alive, often struggling to communicate orders effectively to their fighters on the ground, hence the reduced number of rocket launches into Israel.
A prolonged IDF presence in Lebanon, with casualties, could shift this dynamic. For that reason, Israel is likely to favor limited victories over the ambitious goals voiced by some ministers, such as the complete destruction of Hezbollah (which is not one of the war's objectives). Nonetheless, Israel will likely seek to maintain the freedom to act even after the ground phase ends, allowing it to strike Hezbollah's attempts to smuggle weapons into Lebanon or reestablish itself near the border.
Attacking Iran
The impressive military successes against Hezbollah open the door to significant changes in Lebanon, and possibly Syria. These changes would require the involvement of leading Sunni nations (mainly Saudi Arabia and the Emirates), the US, France, and Britain, as well as Lebanon's non-Shiite communities. This shift would also need some level of coordination with Russia, which has shown a surprising lack of interest in recent events in Israel's northern border, despite several of its allies being impacted.
These successes are also expected to reignite the debate: should Israel seize this opportunity to strike Iran? Several senior Israeli officials have recently made statements directed explicitly at Tehran, starting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's UN speech warning Iran not to attack Israel, followed by his direct appeal to the Iranian people, and Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi's remarks that anyone capable of reaching Yemen (reffering to the IDF's strike on Hodeidah port) can reach other similar targets in the region.
Several factors make an attack on Iran more likely at this moment. First, Iran is disoriented and has lost significant assets in the region, especially Hezbollah, which was supposed to be its primary defense against an Israeli strike on its nuclear sites. Second, Iran's ability to directly retaliate against Israel is limited, as seen in the April 14 attack. Israel can thwart most of Iran's efforts by relying on its defense systems and regional allies.
Third, Iran's defenses are inadequate against Israel's superior air power, which has been freed up following the completion of its objectives in Lebanon. Fourth, Iran is nearing nuclear capability (possibly a test explosion), which would present the world with a fait accompli. And fifth, Israel's operational freedom may be affected by the outcome of the upcoming US elections.
On the other hand, several factors argue against an attack. First, there is concern about Israeli overconfidence and the temptation to take on too many fronts at once, especially with unresolved issues like the hostages in Gaza.
Second, Israel cannot act alone in this scenario (unlike in Lebanon), and the Biden administration has not indicated it would give Israel the green light or offer any direct support for such an operation. Third, a strike on Iran would likely spark a prolonged conflict. Fourth, it remains unclear how much damage Israel could inflict on Iran's nuclear program.
This final point is perhaps the most critical. Israel completely destroyed Iraq's nuclear facilities in 1981 and Syria's in 2007 with single strikes. However, Iran learned from both cases and has dispersed its nuclear program, making a successful attack far more challenging. For an attack to be worthwhile, it would need to significantly delay Iran's nuclear progress for years. If this cannot be achieved, Israel may need to pursue other strategies – a combination of deterrence, diplomacy, and perhaps much-needed American pressure – to stop Iran from obtaining the bomb.
