From time to time, we might succeed in eliminating terrorists, but there's no security without a military presence on the ground. While those responsible for the impressive operation against Hezbollah deserve praise, we mustn't see it as a substitute for controlling southern Lebanon. Without ground control, our lives hang in the balance, subject to the whims of deranged terror leaders. We must abandon this flawed concept.
Kudos to the planners and executors of "Operation Beeper," which dealt a severe blow to the terrorists. However, even in light of such a remarkable achievement, it's worth noting the limitations of remote warfare. Brig. Gen. Guy Hazut said last week that for thirty years, Israel has relied on defense supplemented by "fire from afar" – remote attacks using cutting-edge technology – and it's never enough. Each time, we're told: next time, we'll have better intelligence, we'll improve the technology, we'll use more firepower; but even the next time, it's not sufficient. While the IDF and the Mossad deserve commendation for the impressive operation in Lebanon, we must not view it as an alternative to ground control in southern Lebanon. Terrorists in the West Bank operate with a much lower profile than their counterparts in Lebanon and Gaza because in the West Bank, the IDF doesn't operate from batteries, but from armored personnel carriers (and outposts, checkpoints, positions, and command centers).
For a year now, everyone has been talking about "the concept," but what exactly was the concept that brought this massacre upon us? At its most basic level, the concept was the belief that we could be protected without a physical IDF presence. We learned in the bitterest way possible that we can't rely on intelligence, can't rely on deterrence, can't rely on technology, can't rely on our high and fortified walls in which we trusted, as this week's Torah portion says. On another verse from the portion, "Your life shall hang in doubt before you," our sages interpreted: "He who has no land" (Rashi). They spoke of an individual, but this observation is also true for an entire nation: when the IDF has no control over the ground, all our lives hang in the balance, dependent on the whims of deranged terror leaders.
The history of Israel since the Oslo Accords reveals a clear, sharp, and simple pattern, an iron law of the Middle East: when the IDF leaves – hell enters. We left the cities of Samaria – and they became terrorist nests. We left Gaza – and Gaza came to us. We fled Lebanon – and Lebanon chased after us. We canceled the security zone in southern Lebanon – and Hezbollah created a security zone in northern Israel. One can argue about theories for a hundred years, but the greatest Jewish statesman of the Middle Ages, Rabbi Don Isaac Abarbanel, taught us an important rule in matters of state governance: "Why should we bring logical arguments? Experience overcomes conjecture." And our experience – bitter as it is – is unequivocal.
A few days ago, media outlets published the words of Northern Command chief, Maj. Gen. Ori Gordin: Israel needs a buffer zone in southern Lebanon. I was reminded of a story my late father loved to tell: Once, a committee of experts was invited to Israel to investigate why the water quality in the Sea of Galilee had deteriorated. When the experts completed their examination, they opened a map, pointed to the Hula Valley, and said: You need to create a small lake here, where all the dirt in the Jordan River will settle before reaching the Sea of Galilee. The Israelis answered awkwardly: We had a lake there, and we drained it. Well, a "buffer zone in Lebanon"? We had such a zone, and we drained it.
The massacre in the Gaza periphery could have easily expanded to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, God forbid. It's hard to imagine the scale of atrocities such a scenario would have spawned. Such a chilling mega-massacre was prevented thanks to the settlements, which serve as the security zone for the central region. The settlers insisted on continuing to live in the West Bank, despite everything. Because the settlers remained – the IDF remained. Because the IDF remained – the murderers stayed away. It's a simple formula that reality teaches with almost mathematical certainty.
That's why the IDF's fear of military rule in Gaza is so frustrating. Instead of this simple solution, which should have been adopted on the first day of the war, the defense establishment is searching underground for false solutions: neutral clans to rule the Strip (Hamas quickly killed their leaders, to clarify in its subtle way where this idea would lead); control by Arab states (who hurried to make clear: "We won't be Gaza's South Lebanon Army"); distribution of aid through civilian merchants (who transferred tens of millions of dollars to Hamas – surprise!). All to avoid the simple and necessary solution.
All this doesn't mean that in ten years, a soldier will stand at every junction in Rafah. Indeed, in the years before the Oslo Accords, when soldiers stood at all the important junctions in the strip, our security situation there was incomparably better; but after the severe strategic mistakes we made in Oslo and the Disengagement, it will be difficult to return to our position then. Nevertheless, it's hard to believe that in the long run, we can give up any hold on Gaza's ground. We need to talk, for example, about renewing Jewish settlement in the enclave, which even according to the distorted logic of the Disengagement, it's hard to understand why it was destroyed, along with military control at strategic points throughout the rest of the strip. The details can certainly be discussed, but the principle must be emphasized: in the short term, we'll occasionally succeed in eliminating terrorists in a spectacular and joyous feat; but in the medium and long term, there's no security without a military presence at terrorist hotspots. This is true for Samaria, it's true for Gaza, and it's also true for southern Lebanon.
