A few weeks ago, when news articles were published about Russia's attempts to undermine the government of a certain European state, by chance I met with the ambassador of that particular country. After having expressed my disdain with these events, he responded by telling me that Israel is the one that really should be concerned. "We at least are aware of the problem and are adopting measures to contend with it," he said earnestly, "you simply prefer to turn a blind eye."
But not everybody here in Israel is turning a blind eye to the situation. Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Daniel Rakov, an analyst at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), recently published an illuminating study on the manner in which Russia, from early 2023, has been operating an entire setup to influence public sentiment and intervene in Israel's domestic scene, as well as the ensuing threat that this poses.
"During 2023, I began to receive screenshots of posts on Facebook, which at first sight appeared to be nothing more than an interesting anecdote: the posts were written in rather poorly-worded Hebrew and were seasoned with graphic language that the average Israeli would find it difficult to relate to, with the common denominator in them all being the attempt to promote pro-Russian messages. The longer this went on, the more it became clear that it involved an organized campaign, and then a growing number of indications showed that this campaign was not limited to Hebrew alone – it was being conducted simultaneously in an additional 12 languages. In late 2023, one of the European intelligence services that had decided to 'get to grips' with this issue, exposed the original documents used in the planning of the Russian campaign. An obscure Telegram channel then leaked another document, and this led to the uncovering of the Russian modus operandi and the scope of the entire operation."
Rakov, who served for 20 years in the IDF's Military Intelligence Directorate and is a former research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies' (INSS) Russia program, was naturally interested above all in the Israeli aspect of the Russian influence and disinformation campaign and just how it forms part of Russia's overall strategy in relation to Israel. He is now uncovering them for the first time, and these exposures should be of prime concern to both the public as a whole and the policymakers in particular.
The Russian campaign is based on the clone or doppelganger system – whereby they set up dummy websites that mimic websites of familiar Israeli media outlets (Walla, N12, Jerusalem Post, etc.) or those that do not exist at all, but whose names have a strong genuine ring to them ("Jerusalem Herald Tribune", for example) and then publish articles in them that are designed to promote the Russian agenda, on occasions these appear to be signed by renowned Israeli journalists and writers. The innocent reader, who has been led to these impostor websites via links or other forms of bait, probably has no idea that he was visiting a fake website rather than the genuine thing. He will then have read refined Russian propaganda in relation to the war in Ukraine, wrapped up in the apparent opinion of a highly esteemed Israeli columnist.
'Turning the screws' – applying forceful influence in Hebrew
In a similar vein to the dummy websites, the most popular social media in Israel – Facebook and 'X' (formerly Twitter) – were inundated with short posts, which were also allegedly written by Israeli users, accompanied by eye-catching graphics, usually involving a caricature. All of these used sophisticated methods to portray Russian messages, but obviously without any noticeable Russian signature. The Russians bought the posts via Facebook's online publicity shop, and an army of chatbots reverberated and shared them in order to afford them authenticity, Rakov explains. Due to Meta's transparency policy, it is possible to uncover this scheme, but only in retrospect. In real time, the posts appeared to regular web surfers to be authentic posts of other Israelis who simply sought to express their concern about our country, and so it is not surprising that many of them shared them and even helped some of them go viral, precisely in accordance with the plan concocted somewhere in the dark depths of the Russian security services' misinformation campaigns.
"The Russians' expectations of profiting from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's return to office were not met. They really hoped that the Right would be an easy target for them, this however was not the case. Netanyahu even failed to phone Putin for two months to hear the Russian president congratulate him on being re-elected, and this was clearly an intentional move. Even later on, until after October 7, they did not speak to one another. Moscow had now come to grasp the fact that the golden era of the flourishing relations with Jerusalem had come to end, and so they decided to exert pressure on Israel via their aggressive influence and disinformation campaign. This will not stop and it will only expand and grow."
"They really do operate according to an orderly, detailed plan," Rakov stresses, and points out that he managed to lay his hands on the plan, or more accurately the proposed plan of action. The three campaign objectives, listed below, that appear in it constitute blatant intervention in Israel's internal affairs: to drive a wedge between Jerusalem and Washington, to cause Israel to adopt a policy that is more palatable for Moscow, and to force it to refrain from providing Ukraine with any diplomatic or military support.
Rakov admits that as a regular Facebook user, he himself was not subjected to the publicity of the Russian campaign by the algorithm. He imagines that his internet profile, as it is reflected on social media, is not appropriate for the target profile defined by whichever Russian figure is behind the campaign. Who then is an appropriate figure for being targeted? For example, marginal groups such as conspiracy aficionados. "These are groups that tend to believe in sensational news, and so they are much more gullible and prone to be influenced," Rakov claims and reminds us that during the Covid-19 pandemic, the Russians were involved in a relentless effort to promote opposition to the inoculations and they stirred up anti-vaccine feelings, with a view to increasing the sense of discontent and chaos in those countries singled out by them as rivals.
"Even prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russians were busy spreading conspiracy theories designed to create and intensify the opposition to the vaccines, and once the pandemic was already underway, this became much easier, as COVID-19 aroused genuine concern and strong emotional responses," he explains, "I began to take an in-depth look at the issue of the Russian influence on the web and its ability to spread disinformation some years ago already. At that time, I came across a number of figures who appeared to be pro-Russian influencers par excellence, but there were no unequivocal signs of an organized campaign, certainly not in Hebrew. The new element now is that they are exerting relentless pressure via the influence campaign in Hebrew: somebody is taking the trouble to operate it in a language that does not boast masses of users globally, to say the least. This might be the result of a combination of the need and the accessibility of the modern technology, the AI tools, which have made this subversive activity in foreign languages, such as Hebrew, into a much easier and mainly much less expensive method.
"The overall idea is to take advantage of the rapidly changing news agenda in Israel, both in relation to domestic and foreign issues – mainly pertaining to Israel's relations with the USA and Europe, and to fraudulently plant propaganda messages in the news. To forcibly forge a link between burning issues in Israel and the line that corresponds with Russian policy, so as to explain that it is worthwhile for Israel to engage in conduct that is in line with the Russian interest, and all of this is to be attained without even mentioning Russia at all."
Q: What are the messages being put forward by the campaign?
"One of the key messages, even prior to October 7, was that the entire world is against Israel, that everybody has abandoned us, leaving us to our own dire fate, and so we should concentrate our efforts on our own affairs alone rather than looking farther afield, in other words, Ukraine. Additional, supporting messages were added to this: 'Providing aid to Ukraine will cost Israel a lot of money,' 'Ukraine is a backstabber,' 'the Ukrainians are Nazis,' and so on. Following the October 7 attacks, the Russians began to strike on the most sensitive chords of Israel's raw and wounded soul, with a great degree of cynicism. For example, they used the campaign to disseminate a completely fake 'news item', claiming that the weapon systems supplied to Ukraine by the West had been or were to be transferred from Ukraine to Gaza, and in the initial days following the horrific October 7 massacre, they ran with this fake news story, pushing it extremely hard. The result of this concerted effort was so successful that it managed to ensnare many believers and was even echoed on the broadcasts of Israel's national Kan 11 channel, even though it didn't contain one iota of truth."
In other cases, the Russian campaign did actually base its stories on a grain of truth, but it distorted it to such an extent for its own needs that nothing remained of that original minutely small grain of truth. Rakov: "Take, for example, the popular grievance in Israel against the current US administration of President Joe Biden, that it is not providing Israel with sufficient support and thus in effect placing obstacles on Israel's path to victory over the enemy. This is a genuine claim and many Israelis share that view, and it is precisely because of that the Russians have 'jumped on the bandwagon' and are trying to exploit this as far as possible. Their message is both extremely Machiavellian and infuriating: it calls on Israel not to build any partnership with the 'double-dealing' Washington, that the Americans are 'betraying Israel and support the Palestinians,' thus subtly implying that Israel would do well to align with Moscow's interests – this is the very same Moscow that stands by Israel's bitterest enemies, arms them to the teeth, promotes staunchly anti-Israel resolutions in the UN Security Council and is continually trumpeting the false accusation that Israel is perpetrating genocide. The same Moscow that hosted the Hamas leadership, even after the October 7 massacre, and refuses to consider either Hamas or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) as terrorist organizations. If the Biden administration is two-faced, then the 2024 model Putin regime has only one face – an extremely ugly, anti-Israeli face."
Playing on the rifts
It is important to demonstrate just how the Russian campaign deftly maneuvers between the Right and the left in Israel, skillfully tailoring for each political camp those messages that it will readily identify with. "Prior to October 7, as long as the judicial reform and the attempts of its opponents to stymie it were still occupying pole position on Israel's national agenda, the Russian influence campaign compared the demonstrations in Israel with Kyiv's central square, Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square), in other words, it ostensibly picked sides and elected to support the Right," explains Rakov.
However, this is only an apparent, facade of support, as the main component of right-wing ideology in Israel – the Jewish people's absolute right to the land – is completely opposed to Russia's stance, and it is actually constantly working at full throttle against this, which should really define it as an ideological partner for Israel's left wing. Following October 7, this gap became substantially wider: The right wing in Israel is demanding to continue with the war effort until total victory is achieved over its enemies, while the Russians demand and are trying hard to stop the war and to save Hamas.
Rakov provides an explanation: "The Russians do not actually support any political camp, but they are simply seeking to increase and intensify the existing rifts and discord in Israel in order to exploit them for their own benefit. They did not seek to promote or prevent the judicial reform in Israel, but just hoped to push Israel further down the slope towards the abyss of internal conflict, so that it would not be able to adopt a foreign policy that is opposed to the will and whim of the Kremlin.
"This is how the influence campaign works – the Russians identify the genuine issues that are preoccupying Israeli society, and they then cunningly use these issues to promote the Russian interest, which is completely detached from Israel's affairs. Increasing internal schisms and fragmentation and fanning the flames of discontent are a typical mode of the subversive operations conducted by Russia in other places around the globe too. They fully appreciate that when a specific country is plagued by polarization, and there are significant rifts, the government of that state is forced to focus its efforts on addressing those rifts and thus finds it difficult to make any decisions that are subject to broad dispute, it then develops into a feeble government, which is always a valuable positive for the Russians. The overall atmosphere in a country torn apart by such strife turns it into easy prey for external intervention. Israel is thus a location that almost automatically invites such intervention, as we are a society dogged by dispute and strife, so that a foreign power has absolutely no need to make any effort to invent any rifts, all it has to do is to exploit the existing, authentic divisions, which generate strong authentic emotions. It is precisely these emotions that Moscow is trying to capitalize on in order to address its own needs."
It is in this context that Rakov presents his key scoop – the precise timing at which the Russians decided to begin their disinformation campaign in Hebrew, and the explanation for that timing: "The Russians' expectations of profiting from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's return to office were not met. They really hoped that the Right would be an easy target for them, this however was not the case. Netanyahu even failed to phone Putin for two months to hear the Russian president congratulate him on being re-elected, and this was clearly an intentional move. Even later on, until after October 7, they did not speak to one another. Moscow had now come to grasp the fact that the golden era of the flourishing relations with Jerusalem had come to end, and so they decided to exert pressure on Israel via their aggressive influence and disinformation campaign. This will not stop and it will only expand and grow."
Q: What are the metrics for the influence campaign's success as far as the Russians are concerned?
"The exposure of the original dashboards used by the organizers of the influence campaign by the European intelligence service gives us a rare glimpse into the Russian way of thinking. These dashboards portray, week after week, the real data that are of interest to them and which are measured on a permanent basis. First and foremost, these are the parameters that any marketing manager of a publicity campaign would be measuring and monitoring: exposure data and the number of visits, shares and clicks on links. On the next level, as is the case in any enterprise or plant – and as far as the Russians are concerned this is a plant that 'manufactures' influence – the quantitative results of production are measured and monitored: how many posts have been manufactured by one department, how many graphics have been manufactured by another department, and how any websites has an additional department built. We should not underestimate the seriousness of this overall apparatus, which includes a dedicated creative team, a team in charge of statistical data collection, and even a team whose job is to conduct research and polls.
"In addition, the Russians have displayed an extremely robust ability to learn, as they regularly check which posts work and which don't. The campaign is becoming more and more sophisticated and responds to changes or attempts to block it. Thus, for example, the Russians now prefer to use fewer caricatures, as the mechanism employed by Facebook succeeds in identifying them and thus turn them into suspect posts. In place of caricatures, they have opted for other graphic means. They are constantly improving the language they use and are perhaps even employing somebody here who is helping them with their efforts to write content. At least according to the document that I have, they are supposed to employ Israeli field correspondents.
Q: Dry quantitative data do not necessarily tell us whether an influence campaign has actually attained its political objectives.
"Correct. It is very difficult to isolate and measure the specific effectiveness of foreign influence. But the Russians firmly believe in this tool and they are convinced that it works when employed en masse and over the course of time. In a certain sense, this might make it easier for the designers of the Russian campaign and their managers to report mass successes up the chain. They can present the increasing viewing data and thus take pride in the fact that the campaign is achieving its goals. Is Israel supplying arms to Ukraine? The fact is that Israel is not doing so. Are the relations between Israel and the USA not at their best? That is indeed the current situation. There you are – we have succeeded, they will be able to tell their superiors."
Q: Who are those superiors?
"The Russian influence campaign is headed by an extremely powerful individual – the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia, Sergey Kiriyenko. Kiriyenko is a representative of the most powerful group in Russia today, which comprises both oligarchs, such as the Kovalchuk brothers, and the controlling figures in the security services, the atomic industry and the business world. Another representative from this group was recently appointed Chairman of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, a position akin to our State Comptroller. In slightly less diplomatic terms, via this mechanism they have both senior government officials and the business elite over a barrel."
They like to take risks
The damage incurred by Israel as a result of Russia's propaganda activity is often invisible, but it is definitely felt. Rakov: "Firstly, from my conversations with colleagues in other locations where Russia's disinformation machine have been put to work, we know that after they operate over a prolonged period of time, they tend to undermine the local population's trust in their state and its institutions. They become accustomed to not believing the official line at all. If this is not sufficient, then part of the Russian influence campaign across the international media is really capitalizing on Israel's tragedy. When the Russians daub the Holocaust Memorial in Paris with graffiti depicting bloodied hands in the style of the terrorists who conducted the lynch against Vadim Nurzhitz and Yossi Avrahami – may God avenge them – in Ramallah in 2000, or they mark houses in France with the Magen David, as if this were in preparation for carrying out a pogrom, and then the influence campaign reverberates this, it could easily lead to attacks on Jews. Beyond that, it is important to remember that the current influence campaign is not a lone-standing, isolated tool. In addition to it, there are numerous other weapons available in Russia's arsenal of subversion, and Russia is not afraid to use them.
"For example, they operate a number of TV channels in Russian and other languages, and millions of people in other countries watch them and are highly susceptible to the disinformation broadcast by them, which may shape their way of thinking and their view of reality. I, for example, can see my father-in-law and mother-in-law, both of whom are Israelis of Ukrainian descent, opposing the Russian invasion, but avidly continuing to consume the propaganda broadcasts of Russia's state TV channel as part of their cable TV package. Something from these broadcasts certainly manages to permeate and take root. Finally, we know from other spheres that the Russians are perfectly capable of working together with organized crime in order to generate provocations. This is currently a clear and present danger, as the Russian security services feel extremely confident and perhaps even untouchable after two years of upheaval and restructuring."
Q: What are Russia's other MOs?
"There are a multitude of them. One of them is the tendentious use of statements made by well-known senior Israeli figures. The Russians take clips of retired senior IDF commanders, they then subject these clips to 'heavy editing', they remove parts that are either irrelevant to the context or even oppose the overall context, and thus in effect they create a propaganda product under the compelling title of 'Israeli general recommends that Ukraine should surrender.' Another trick is to phone Israeli experts and ask to supposedly interview them. In this case too, the 'interview' is edited to provide a 'slanted' or 'loaded' product and is then later presented as an authentic clip of the interview in support of the Russian stance. The editors of these interviews are usually investigative journalists working for Russian media outlets, and alongside their day job they also work for the Russian influence and disinformation campaign.
"Many have fallen into this trap: a reserve IAF brigadier general who participated in the strike on the nuclear reactor in Iraq back in 1981, Israel's former ambassador to Moldova, another former security official who appears on the media on numerous occasions. You would expect that such people, with their experience and background in the security establishment, would be equipped with a heightened sense of caution as second nature, but such an expectation is clearly too much. Afterwards, go and look for the person who interviewed you. By the way, on more than one occasion these clips have turned up in Russian campaigns in other theaters and countries too, as a statement made by a senior Israeli caries considerable weight. On the whole, the Russians invest efforts to study the Israeli theater – if and when they elect to expand their operations and to intensify them, they will readily be able to do so."
Q: When is this likely to occur?
"If and when we carry out actions that the Russians are particularly not fond of, especially if Israel is in a crisis that makes it much more vulnerable. If we decide to wage war on Hezbollah in the north and we hit the Russians, then their entire influence and disinformation mechanism will be turned against us. Israel is not currently at the focus of the Russian campaign, and only 5-6 percent of its products are directed at the Israeli population. Based on our experience in other locations, election campaigns tend to lead to a rise in Russian intervention. This doesn't mean that the Russians are necessarily constantly trying to promote a candidate or a party list. The very fact that they are engaged in this effort causes damage to the country that they have chosen as a target. Just take a look at the USA: former President Donald Trump was forced to spend the four years of his term of office under constant investigation and with a large cloud looming over the legitimacy of his administration, only because the Russian influence and disinformation machine, which was then headed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of the infamous Wagner Group, who has since died, and the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, the SVR, leaked the documents of the Democratic Party, creating the impression that the Russians were aiding the Republicans.
"The Russians take clips of retired senior IDF commanders, they then subject these clips to 'heavy editing', they remove parts that are either irrelevant to the context or even oppose the overall context, and thus in effect they create a propaganda product under the compelling title of 'Israeli general recommends that Ukraine should surrender.' Another trick is to phone Israeli experts and ask to supposedly interview them. In this case too, the 'interview' is edited to provide a 'slanted' or 'loaded' product and is then later presented as an authentic clip of the interview in support of the Russian stance. The editors of these interviews are usually investigative journalists working for Russian media outlets, and alongside their day job they also work for the Russian influence and disinformation campaign.
"Having said that, we cannot rule out the possibility that under certain scenarios, they will try to help whatever political party they deem to be of use to them, and then all the resources will be channeled into that particular objective. They like to take risks, for example, to have somebody run who is sufficiently desperate to accept their help. I have come across an individual who made aliyah about six months prior to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, after working in the Kremlin in the field of political influence. He was traveling around Israel, captivated by the dream of establishing a list here that would unite the entire 'Russian street', and he became obsessed with the idea that this would be able to either throne or dethrone a government."
Q: Why has Israel not yet opted to take action to curb these Russian attempts to sow disinformation?
"The security authorities did approach the Russians with a demand to cease their activity, but the Russians ignored this and they continue to operate here full steam ahead. Although Facebook does remove the Russians' propaganda posts, as this in breach of its policy (the paid publisher of the post must declare its political content, which of course the Russians fail to do), but then new posts reappear in no time at all. The Chinese, the Iranians, Hamas and other Sunni groups too are all engaged in efforts to operate propaganda machines, but countries such as Russia have greater power and resources. In Israel, in contrast to other countries, the authorities have yet to attribute the appropriate degree of gravity to this threat. In France, for example, there is a dedicated government agency tasked with fighting against disinformation, and in other countries too this issue is afforded priority treatment by the local security establishment. In Israel, unfortunately, this is not yet the case."
