After yet another failure in the ongoing negotiations between Israel and Hamas regarding the release of captives, it's clear that there is a fundamental disconnect between the two sides' perceptions of reality and their expectations for the aftermath of any potential deal.
Since the outbreak of hostilities on October 7, Hamas has been aiming for strategic gains, evident in both its military actions and its tough stance on prisoner exchanges. Prior to this date, Hamas typically demanded the release of imprisoned terrorists in exchange for captives; now, the group is seeking far-reaching concessions that go beyond massive prisoner swaps.
Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar's minimum demand is a guarantee of continued Hamas control over Gaza following any ceasefire, a scenario that would be seen as a resounding victory in the eyes of Palestinians and the Arab world at large. Such an outcome would solidify Hamas' popular support and potentially pave the way for the group to seize control of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank in a Velvet Revolution.
Sinwar himself has drawn parallels between the current conflict and Algeria's bloody struggle for independence from France, revealing the scale of his aspirations for Palestinian statehood. Many in Israel seem reluctant to acknowledge the link between the recent escalation and Hamas' overarching strategy of independence.
Israel is once again building a paradigm based on ending the war while leaving Hamas in control of Gaza. This concept assumes that it will be possible to "engineer" the Palestinians in the West Bank and establish popular support for the faltering Palestinian Authority, backed by Saudi Arabia and others, while Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar sits idly in Gaza's tunnels. Sinwar reads the Israeli fantasy and scoffs, saying, "Israel is exactly where we would want it to be." It seems that Hamas has never been in a more comfortable position to take over the West Bank without firing a single shot, as it will be after a deal that meets its conditions.
Faced with Hamas' desire for a historic strategic achievement, Israel must make it clear that it will not be willing to pay strategic prices as part of an agreement with the group. Therefore, Israel has no choice but to update its war objectives.
An update is required
The alternative to destroying the guerrilla force is proving to be ineffective and has brought us to the current point in time with its many challenges. The defense establishment estimates that defeating Hamas, in an optimistic scenario, will take only two or three years. The numbers of uninvolved individuals losing their lives in the war are increasing international pressure and posing an unprecedented legitimacy challenge for Israel, while Hamas refuses any prisoner exchange deal.
In such a situation, Israel must realize that the idea of "collapsing Hamas" needs to be translated into an updated practice that includes real costs of defeat for the Palestinians. First, stop the fighting and declare a third of Gaza's land as an Israeli combat zone, from which Israel will not withdraw and to which residents will not be allowed to return until an agreement is reached – an agreement under which Sinwar and his 25,000 fighters will remain alive, but not in Gaza. They and terrorists released from Israeli prisons will be exiled from the Gaza Strip in the manner of the removal of PLO forces from Beirut in 1982.
The demand to remove the heads of terrorist organizations, led by Hamas leaders and members of its military wing, outside Gaza is the maximum compromise Israel can make without incurring a strategic cost. A gradual withdrawal from the Gaza Strip will take place in parallel with the release of living captives, the return of bodies, and the deportation of military wing members and terrorists who will be released.
This is the only realistic strategic goal that can divert Sinwar's strategic plan from its course, drive a wedge in the growing popularity he enjoys among the Palestinian public, save the Palestinian Authority, allow minimum conditions for the growth of an alternative force to Hamas in Gaza, form a broad and significant international coalition, and lead to the release of captives in the difficult path to victory.
