Just hours before the Oct. 7 attack, when the intelligence came in showing that Hamas was activating dozens of Israeli SIM cards inside Gaza, potentially indicating an invasion, this piece of data arrived through the usual Shin Bet channels to the IDF sometime around midnight between October 6 and 7. However, over at the General Staff headquarters, the IDF Intelligence Directorate's high-level officials were not taken aback by that development. Over at the Southern Command, for example, the feeling was that the directorate's response to the warning is somewhere on the border of complacency.
"The Intelligence Directorate was disengaged," says an IDF source. "The head of the Shin Bet jumped into action along with the head of the Southern District in the agency, the GOC Southern Command cut short his vacation – but the IDF Intelligence Directorate could not be bothered. They said it's an exercise and that routine can resume."
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According to the source, if orderly situational assessments had been conducted by the directorate that night, things might have looked very different. "A situational assessment is not just a meeting and discussion between different elements," the source explains, "it's a process in which, ahead of the assessment, people talk, gather information, make phone calls, and try to connect the dots. But there was no situational assessment in that body throughout the night."
Video: 160 packages of food and medical equipment were airdropped into southern Gaza / Credit: X/@idf
The directorate rejects the claims of "complacency" and says it responded to the warning, and as proof, it managed to obtain additional intelligence, which was analyzed by its Research Division, presumably referring to the intermediate ranks who were on duty that night.
According to an IDF source, situational assessments at the intermediate ranks did take place during those critical hours, for example in the Research Division and in Unit 8200, the directorate's prestigious intelligence gathering unit.
But what does not take place throughout the night is an inter-departmental assessment headed by the head of the directorate, Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva, who was on vacation in Eilat.
At Unit b8200's listening base not far from the Gaza Strip, it also did not appear that anyone was taking dramatic action during those critical hours. The night shift, which at that time – between Friday and Saturday nights, on the eve of the holiday – is small to begin with, and does not get reinforced.
A former Unit 8200 source, who recently received a briefing on the events of that night, claims that "people in the unit made phone calls and shared information among themselves during those hours, but to my understanding, they did not upgrade the threat warning level."
Around 3:30 a.m. the head of the IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Col. Matan Feldman, decided to wake up IDF Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Herzi Halevi. Even before he manages to update him on the details, Halevi, understanding that this is an intelligence warning that requires his attention, asks him to stop.
Halevi demands that the bureau chief organize a phone conference in a few minutes. Halevi does not specify which entities need to participate in the call. In the situational assessment that the chief of staff held – the heart of that chaotic night – the participants ultimately include, in addition to the Halevi, GOC Southern Command Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman and Head of the Operations Directorate Maj. Gen. Oded Basyuk.
According to a source familiar with the details, Halevi asks why there is no Intelligence Directorate representative on the call, but does not insist on it. Most of the talking during the call is done by Finkelman based on the data he receives from the GOC intelligence officer of the Southern Command. Finkelman lays out the details for Halevi and Basiuk.
The call with Halevi took place sometime between 3:30-4:00 a.m. The situational assessment that night likely did not last more than 15 minutes. It is reasonable to assume that the short call was also recorded in the Chief of Staff's bureau. It will be one of the main exhibits that the investigative committee on the war will want to review when it is established.
At the end of the situational assessment with Finkelman and Basyuk, one of Halevi's directives is to operate without exposing the moves to Hamas. The rationale behind this measured move is the desire not to burn intelligence sources.
The full article, to be published in the weekend magazine, is based on conversations with current and former sources in the General Staff, IDF Intelligence Directorate, the Shin Bet, and Southern Command – the four bodies that were involved in trying to understand the intelligence picture of October 7 and respond to it.
The IDF said in a statement in response to the revelations: "The military is currently engaged in fighting and has not yet begun to investigate the events of October 7, including the events of the night preceding them. The investigations will begin in the coming days, and upon their completion, the findings will be presented transparently to the public."
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