Brigadier General (res.) Yoram Laredo is the head of the National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA). He served as the Home Front Command chief of staff as well as well as the commander of the Rescue and Training on Duty Brigade and as well as the head of the command's central district. In 2015 Laredo headed the IDF rescue mission to Nepal after the earthquake there.
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Q: Yoram Laredo, head of the National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA), you have been out in the field many times in the war. Have the difficult sights and incidents also touched you on a personal level?
"Not so long ago we held a tour to Kfar Aza. This is where I started my military service, and where I also met my wife. It was frightening. Over and above the destruction and the devastating stories, this kibbutz is also part of a formative experience in my life. The combination of all these things together tore my heart apart. This emotional impact sharpened my desire to be even better and more professional in the field that I am responsible for today."
Q: As part of your position, and as someone who, among other responsibilities, is entrusted with assessments of possible scenarios for national emergency events on the home front, were you surprised on October 7?
"I think that everyone was surprised. It didn't matter that I have already experienced difficult and complex events and I work in security, military, and emergency – nothing compares to that."
Q: Did your assessments consider the extent of the evacuees we saw?
"We do not deal with intelligence assessments of the situation, and write possible scenarios together with the authorized agencies, but the scope we saw in real time was not considered in our assessments. The war assessments considered two arenas: the evacuation of tens of thousands of people in the north to public facilities and for this purpose, the 'Safe Distance' program was built, for evacuation in the north of the country. But, for example, Kiryat Shmona was not included in the planning, just as the city of Sderot was not included. After all, we have no plan for the evacuation of all cities in Israel. I can say with a sense of satisfaction that we did not evacuate a single person to any public facility, and all evacuees were housed in hotels. This is an unprecedented achievement, also on an international level."
"Last year my parallel position head in the USA visited Israel. They have huge budgets, but their entire principle of evacuation is based on public facilities. I have been dealing with emergencies for many years and I have never come across a situation where so many evacuees were accommodated only in hotels."
Q: What will you do if the hotels are fully booked?
"The current evacuation to the hotels was made possible because of their occupancy, of course, and thanks to the Ministry of Tourism that made sure that all the evacuees were housed in hotels. But in extensive plans for an earthquake or a widespread war, we understand that at least 300,000 people will be homeless. Therefore, these plans are based, of course, on public facilities".
"The evacuation? Well, it wasn't perfect"
Q: In 2021 you said that you are stable, and the civil space is ready to deal with an emergency. On October 7, many felt that this was far from the truth.
"NEMA was established from lessons we learned during the Second Lebanon War, to produce a national methodology for emergency preparedness, in addition to training and drilling of relevant officials. In the case of Swords of Iron, we ensured that the tools for managing the civil campaign were activated, and we formulated a picture of how the entire country would continue to function while anticipating disruptions. We set up forums to prioritize the entry of goods and refined products, a joint workforce with the Ministry of Economy to fill the shortage of personnel, a regional response by the IDF to the gap in security guards in infrastructural facilities, and conducted work to raise the possible implications of cyber attacks.
"In answer to your question, the overall recovery and response were reasonable. One can criticize and complain, but the event was unprecedented and so was the response after it: to organize the education system, to manage tens of thousands of evacuees, to preserve medical care, and to deal with welfare care. I am not speaking from above – but as a professional. I felt that we created an entire infrastructure and tools that resulted in control and coordination. Ultimately, in all modesty, the system we established at NEMA for monitoring the situation and understanding the gaps in the functional continuity – worked as expected. The national production and supply chain was not dramatically challenged. Beyond that, thanks to assistance from the Home Front Command, we also monitor the quality of service that residents receive from government ministries and the scores are high."
Q: The scores are high, but NEMA activated the evacuation plans both in the north and the south - which were delayed. Why did this happen?
"It worked well in the south. On October 7th, we began the evacuation of 25 settlements that had been infiltrated and residents were murdered, and the IDF rescued them from the combat zone. The immediate response in Sderot was given about three days later, with the evacuation of 4,000 residents from the western neighborhoods that were exposed to fire from Gaza. On October 14th, the entire city was evacuated, and on the 16th, settlements at a distance of 4-7 kilometers from the border were evacuated, following intelligence alerts. From the moment the decision was made, the evacuation was carried out quickly, thanks to the regional councils around the Gaza Strip and the Sderot Municipality, which functioned in a professional and admirable manner. In addition, contacts had already been made with travel agents and hotels in the south, and the system began to operate immediately."
Q: Don't you think it should have happened earlier?
"Nothing is perfect, but I think the decision to evacuate the residents was in good correlation with the changes on the ground. There was dynamic decision-making here, as there was not a predetermined script. There were 70,000 residents in Ashkelon, who were without protection for about three weeks from the start of the campaign, and then were given the possibility to evacuate from the city and move to alternative housing for a month. This is not something trivial."
Q: What was the problem in Kiryat Shmona?
"As I mentioned, Kiryat Shmona was not part of the evacuation plan in the north. In addition, part of the issue was that the evacuation was conducted also on the Sabbath, and people did not want to evacuate then. The evacuations were not forced. Then it took more time to find hotels for people who wanted to be relocated with their family members. As there was no immediate danger, we complied with many of the requests. It is important to say, also in regard to the north, that three weeks after the start of the war we updated the assessed scenario and sent government offices our updated assessment, and the strategic inventory levels were adjusted."
Q: NEMA also coordinated the provision of services to the evacuees from the government ministries, but, at the beginning of the war, the Ministry of Finance did not allocate sufficient funds, and payments to hotels were delayed, evacuees complained to the Ministry of Tourism of disorder in the hotels – and it was your responsibility to organize all this.
"A government ministry, by nature, functions in routine times, but emergency events disrupt this routine. For this reason, the government ministries need to be structured differently, so that emergency situations will be given more significant status. This should be one of the lessons that we have learned on a national level. Providing services to citizens during routine times is important, but we must enhance the ability to know how to act during an emergency. Whoever does not have emergency capabilities ready in advance, will not survive in times of chaos."
Q: The criticism is that various ministries were required to undertake immediate tasks, while they were still trying to make head or tail of the situation. Emergency or no emergency, our elected officials are expected to come to their senses in times like this.
"There is a need to coordinate expectations with the public regarding the level of service and state abilities. Today, the national emergency services are not sufficiently developed. The public complained to the government offices. I watched from the sidelines and thought 'To make a decision in the public service, you need an accountant, lawyer, etc.' The army has a procedure for shifting from routine to emergency, but the procedure in government offices remains the same. I don't think it's fair to come to them with complaints. They are simply less structured for an emergency."
Q: Part of the structure of the government ministries is also connected to you, that is, in the ability to set up the forum of district government ministries. A district is an extension of the central government, and its role is to enable the effective implementation of its policies. If these districts had been more operative, things might have been different.
"We must improve on this point. Every government ministry has a district branch, and I have an employee who manages the district emergency committee. We have to make it more operative. Among other issues, they are not a significant factor because the governmental structure in the ministries sets the policies and has the resources to implement them. As NEMA, we must understand how to create processes with a close connection between the district heads and processes of forming a situational report, alongside operative influence in the region. The government ministries also need to strengthen their districts. In the flurry of events, a ministry's ability to maintain centralized control is almost hopeless."
To protect the production chain
Q: We spoke about the north before, but it seems appropriate that we should delve deeper into the subject. A flare-up in the north will be completely different. Only in the last few days, have we encountered a rather alarming document from the Ministry of Justice, which deals with preparation for complete darkness.
"A war in the north is a different story and is expected to significantly challenge the national production and supply chain. We understand that the issue of energy and regular supply of electricity will be the focus, so we will be holding a war game in the near future on this issue, under the auspices of the Minister of Defense."
Q: Just to make things clear, the assessed scenario considers a situation where about half of Israel's population will be cut off from electricity for a day, and maybe even longer.
"True. We need to prepare here for an extensive blackout, a power cut, in addition to the development of a full scope military event in the north. Almost everything is based on energy and electricity. Together with the Ministry of Communications, we activated AM receivers that will allow continuous radio transmissions even in the absence of electricity, even in a bomb shelter or a residential secure space. I advise everyone to buy, among other things, a transistor radio, batteries, and bottled water. We are also working on an energy solution for several cellular endpoints that will function during prolonged power outages. Medical ventilators and breathing support machines are another example of needed devices, and the Ministry of Health has already approved ways to help patients on ventilators during a prolonged power outage. Time is precious and plans must be ready."
Q: You emphasized the importance of the supply chain. How do you ensure the supply of food without the supply of energy and electricity?
"We have, for example, analyzed potential threats with the Ministry of Economy. The Ministry has designated supermarkets from Hadera and North with energy backup, which will continue to provide service during prolonged power outages. This is called the 'Super Iron' program. The Ministry will practice a war game with the large retail chains to rehearse the procedure. The Ministry of Economy also stocked up on 20,000 food rations, to distribute to citizens in shelters with issues of accessibility, via the local authorities."
Q: In the case of applying the assessed scenario in the north, what are the most important things that you have to undertake?
"Beyond the demand for energy management, it is important to make sure that we have a correlated picture of the situation with the government ministries. That is why we purchased satellite phones for use in emergencies. It is also important that the decision-making process is not compromised. Another issue is people's ability to self-evacuate. Those who are in their own homes, in a protected area, have lower chances of being injured. We have statistics that back this up. If there are people who nevertheless decide to evacuate independently, the state will have to provide an appropriate response."
Q: All the plans we discussed are important, but in the end, your main weakness is that you cannot force the implementation of your emergency plans. This is a problem.
"This is the crux of the difficulties, and we are pushing for legislation, the Home Command Law, because without it any government ministry can say 'I'm not doing this.' To me this is ridiculous. I am delighted that in recent events there has been a voluntary commitment by government ministries. Beyond that, NEMA is the liaison between the government ministries, a joint entity that connects them to the situation, sets priorities, and is also connected to the intelligence corps and the development of the situation. But in other emergency situations, it is not certain that the commitment will be similar."
Q: So, you believe that the state would be better prepared for an emergency if procedures had been anchored in legislation?
"Yes. If we had the authority to guide and instruct the implementation of the plan we constructed – the procedure would work more smoothly. Legislation would make everything more harmonious."
Q: What is important to emphasize in such legislation?
"Among other issues, creating a mechanism that will ensure proper preparation by the state institutions and economy, so that they function properly in an emergency; determining roles and authorities of the state institutions, local authorities, rescue agencies and other entities; having a national master plan for the home front, with statutory status, formulated by NEMA and approved by the government; the obligation to report annually on the state of the home command's preparedness for an emergency; determining an earmarked emergency budget for each government ministry and local authority; declaring of a 'state of economic emergency.' We must not have a situation where a certain ministry assumes the powers of other ministers. In an emergency, NEMA will provide the appropriate response. NEMA is the one that will guide organizations and ministries, both formally and legally, during an emergency. If situations are anchored in legislation, Israel's preparedness for emergencies will soar."
Q: Besides legislation, you still haven't talked about increasing the budget. Your budgets dropped by approximately 60% within a decade.
"Maybe this will surprise you: I don't feel that we have an unusual budgetary problem, but the issue of legislation is much more crucial."
Q: In conclusion, you have been in this position for more than three years. Did you imagine that during your term the Covid-19 pandemic would seem like a distant, almost relatively minor, event?
"Absolutely not. I did not think that in retrospect, relatively speaking, the COVID-19 virus would be regarded as a seasonal flu. I did not expect this, and everything must be done so that such incidents do not happen here again."
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