In recent days an interesting debate has raged on social media: Is Israel winning in Gaza? As is often the case with debates, it quickly turned into a personal and political fight with occasional ad hominem attacks, but it's an important debate because beyond the usual Left/Right squabbling, it raises the pressing question of where we stand in the war, where we are heading, when it will end and with what result.
The answer, as always, is complex and depends on the observer's viewpoint. Still, if we try to make an objective observation to the best of our ability, we can produce a fairly accurate assessment of our situation four months after the October 7 atrocities. The bottom line is that Israel is winning tactically but in over its head strategically. This is also the gap between the soldiers in the field demanding (rightly) to keep going "until victory," and the leadership which understands (in part) how complex and challenging the situation is.
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Tactically, the IDF is scoring a huge victory. It has been winning every battle, and methodically dismantling parts of Hamas's capabilities. The group entered the war with 24 battalions, of which 6.5 remain active (the Nusseirat Battalion was hit but not destroyed). Four in Rafah, where the IDF has not yet operated, and another two in the refugee camps of central Gaza, mainly in Deir al-Balah, where about half a million Gaza residents are concentrated.
Some will argue this is hardly a balance of power: the IDF arrived with a tremendous mass of fire, intelligence, and technology that few armies can withstand. This allows not only significant achievement against Hamas' military formations but also fewer casualties than originally estimated. On the other hand, it takes precious time. The modus operandi and nature of the forces – integrated brigade combat teams of infantry, armor, and engineering – means that their full prowess is being used, but it just takes time to be fully used.
Time is a precious resource, and contrary to statements in Israel, it is not infinite. The only ones with all the time in the world are those with nothing to lose, chiefly anyone responsible for war failures. All others – the captives, reservists, economy, Israel's standing in the world – live on borrowed time. For them, each passing day takes a toll, requiring at minimum optimal exploitation. It's unclear if Israel is doing that, and worse – unclear if the people in the operational headquarters fully grasp the implications for the evacuees, businesses, and the hundreds of thousands of families under unbearable strain to keep households from falling apart.
Those who think we can fight in Gaza down to the last Hamasnik and last tunnel are living in La La Land. Israel has always fought in Gaza and will continue fighting there in the future. Even when the IDF held it before the 2005 pullout, there were terrorist attacks. It will be required to keep operating there, but differently than now.
What has happened in northern Gaza this past week is an example: the 162nd Division commander, Brig. Gen. Itzik Cohen recounted that at the start of the fighting it took him 2-3 days to reach deep into Gaza City from Israeli territory. The route was fraught with intense resistance requiring massive force and tight air and artillery support to advance.
This past week Cohen's division is again operating in Gaza. This time it took just 2.5 hours to reach Palestine Square in central Gaza City from Israel. Along the way, three localized incidents didn't challenge or delay forces. This shows two things: First – that the main Hamas force in the area was defeated, leaving remnants operating in "guerrilla mode." And second – that Hamas still operates in the area, so absent an alternative. the IDF will need to act more frequently and intensely.
Hence the need to address the day after. Only through it will an alternative emerge. As long as Israel avoids the issue for political reasons, it remains stuck with Hamas. The simplest example is food. Currently, Hamas controls incoming aid and distribution, meaning it holds the key to residents' survival. Israel has a clear interest in severing this so residents develop reliance on another actor.
This is precisely the gap between tactical and strategic. Unfortunately, Israel's government deliberately chooses to only deal with tactics. That's not its job: the IDF is managing the battlefield capably. It has significant challenges, some of which should be raised, as understanding them is vital for continued fighting. The biggest knowledge gap is the tunnels. However much we knew about them – we didn't know enough or grasp enough. Their quantity, size, depth – unfathomable. In Khan Younis alone there are some 170 kilometers (100 miles) of strategic tunnels for senior usage. Time after time the IDF reaches a Hamas command center only to discover those present – senior members, captives – have already moved on.
The IDF won't succeed in destroying all tunnels. It is trying to hit key ones, sealing or rendering them inoperable in various ways to hinder the movement of Hamas leaders, and especially to try to reach the captives. The best forces are devoted to this task, which has a significant component of frustration and luck. Well-prepared senior Hamas figures have so far survived, chiefly by strict separation and constant movement. In Israel, they estimate Yahya Sinwar has already walked dozens of kilometers underground since the fighting began. Presumably, he too knows that at some point he will make a mistake enabling Israel to reach him.
Israel believes Sinwar and his crew are still in Khan Younis. Therefore, a decision was made to deepen operations in the city in the coming weeks rather than proceed as planned. To facilitate this, the IDF enabled Khan Younis residents to leave the city. This is occurring via two crossings – funnels in military jargon – checking and, if necessary arresting, and transferring to Israel for interrogation anyone who passes through (this has already seen hundreds, including military operatives disguising themselves as civilians to flee).
So far about 130,000 of the city's quarter million population have left. They have joined the 1.4 million Palestinians concentrated around Rafah south of Khan Younis and al-Mawasi west of it. This enables greater IDF freedom of action in Khan Younis to acquire important capabilities and findings. The quantities of information collected will supply analysts for years. The IDF and Shin Bet have already called up a copious amount of analysts, some veteran retirees, to grapple with heaps of material requiring analysis not just for immediate achievement but also to understand the apparatus Hamas built – military, economic, social, and international.
It won't happen without Egypt
In Israel, they believe Sinwar and his people are still in Khan Younis. Therefore it was decided to continue deepening operations in the city in the coming weeks rather than proceed as planned. Part of this involves enabling Khan Younis residents to leave the city. This has a problematic aspect: it complicates future action in Rafah which remains unresolved. If there is one clear mistake Israel made in the fighting, it was the decision not to pounce on Rafah and the Philadelphi Route at the start. There were reasons: needing to first defeat Gaza City and remove the population required keeping areas clear in southern Gaza, and mainly – constraints on forces since many divisions were required northwards fearing war with Hezbollah. Still, time passed only complicated matters, making planned Rafah operations a complex military and diplomatic matter with implications reaching beyond tactical maneuvers.
Foremost among them are relations with Egypt. This week we exposed in Israel Hayom that Egypt threatened to suspend (or by another version – cancel) the peace agreement if Palestinian refugees entered its territory. Egypt's concerns about a flood of hundreds of thousands of "Muslim Brotherhood" refugees hostile to the regime destabilizing its already shaky socioeconomic fabric must be taken seriously. Cairo also does not trust Israel not to push them there to rid itself of Gaza's problems. By their account, the government contains enough reckless ministers dropping dangerous hints to suspect at least this, and Netanyahu's failure to publicly contradict them raises suspicions.
Action in Rafah is critical to complete defeating Hamas battalions. For it to happen, Israel needs two things: first – clear understandings with Egypt, permitting both current operations and mainly handling future developments. The IDF cannot remain forever on the Philadelphi Route, but since most smuggling occurs underground or through the Rafah crossing, Egypt must act on its territory to dry out Gaza. Most of our politicians are too shallow or messianic to grasp this so instead of strengthening ties with Egypt they endanger them.
The second issue is refugees. The IDF cannot effectively fight amidst millions of people. It needs to evacuate them. It can evacuate them northwards back into Gaza, southwards to Khan Younis, or set up additional tent cities around al-Mawasi. Since return to Gaza is not currently permitted, and operations in Khan Younis continue for now, the third option is the most realistic. For it to happen, Israel again needs coordination with Egypt (and other international actors) mainly regarding humanitarian issues like food, medical supplies, and fuel).
The IDF hopes to reach Rafah in the coming weeks. Delays are possible due to the need for political understandings. Hamas understands this and will try postponing it including via captives exchange negotiations. Anyone claiming this week that the organization closed the door on talks under its stated terms does not understand negotiations or Hamas. What Israel received are very tough opening conditions, signaling Hamas seeks a lifeline.
People will interpret this as they wish. Some will argue military pressure must continue until defeating them, hoping it also brings the captives issue closer to resolution. Others will argue this will only make the release of captives less likely as they die in harsh captivity or as Hamas realizes the end is near. Essentially this is the dilemma Israel must resolve. The price derived from it is a matter for negotiation, rising or falling based on the sophistication and pressure applied on both sides.
Many in Israel believe the ongoing captives affair is a minor issue, an appendix to the war. They are wrong, not just because securing their release is one of the fighting's two core goals (alongside defeating Hamas). It is the most basic contract between citizen and state, violated on October 7 and again endangered now. That contract says citizens fulfill requirements – serve in the military, study, work, and pay taxes – and the state provides basic services, chiefly security. This is precisely what Hamas tried undermining; this is precisely what the State of Israel must restore.
It would be no exaggeration to state this is not just an internal Israeli matter. The whole region is watching us, in fact, the whole world. One can argue until the cows come home that we are winning in Gaza – our surroundings see things differently. They see a strong state that after four months cannot defeat a small terror organization that put it to shame on Oct. 7 and continues existing and even dictating terms for how things are to unfold.
From equation to deterrence
Complacency in Israel over tactical achievements – including in the north – is mistaken. The high morale is important of course, but anyone wanting to fundamentally change the long-term strategic picture must act differently in two respects: First – organize supporting political action legitimizing continued fighting but also setting an end game. Thanks to the Americans Israel has such a horizon, also guaranteeing normalization with Saudi Arabia and possible solutions regarding future Gaza rule. Unfortunately, Israel's government chooses to avoid it; its isolation will complicate matters in Gaza and possibly other spheres.
The second is preparedness to take risks. For the past 20 years Israel has done precisely the opposite: Avoided risks whenever confronting them. The Hamas leadership assassination is an excellent example. Time and again Shin Bet directors asked Netanyahu to kill Sinwar and his cronies. Time and again they were refused on various strange pretexts as Israel convinced itself Hamas was deterred and weak, essentially wanting quiet. This cost us dearly on Oct. 7.
Another example is Hezbollah's force buildup. UNSC Resolution 1701 ending the 2006 Second Lebanon War restricted weapons transfers to Hezbollah and prohibited its south Lebanon operations. Days after fighting ended initial signs arrived of Iranian weapons being smuggled to Hezbollah from Syria.
The IDF proposed striking convoys to create deterrence. The government avoided this then and avoids it now. Here too, the outcome is known. In Lebanon, a military monster was built with 150-200 thousand rockets and missiles, alongside fortifications in south Lebanon aimed at hindering Israeli maneuvering and enabling a launching pad for attacks on Israel.
Days after the 2006 Lebanon war ended, indications arrived of Iranian weapons smuggled to Hezbollah. The IDF proposed striking convoys to create deterrence. The government avoided this then and since, and in Lebanon, a military monster was built with 200,000-150,000 rockets and missiles.
Israel had opportunities to bolster deterrence vis-a-vis Hezbollah but chose to pass them up. So when terrorists penetrated Gladiola outpost and avoided death or capture, and when a tent erected on Israeli Mount Dov was not removed or dismantled for weeks on end.
Worst was last March's Hezbollah-directed terror attack in Megido, which miracle alone did not end up with dozens of casualties. Israel pointed to Hezbollah as directly responsible but did not exact the requisite price, insisting it remains deterred and essentially uninterested in war.
This mindset requires changing now. Israel need not jump instantly into every war but also must not be deterred from one. The Gaza and Lebanon lessons are that avoiding low prices risks paying far higher prices later on. There will be implications of course, even though border areas won't be fully quiet as localized fighting occasionally erupts (as in the past). But from a comprehensive national security perspective, Israel must clarify, primarily to itself, that with October 7, the age of equations ended and the age of deterrence has come back from the dead.
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