"I found it very difficult to say what I said the last time," Ari Harow concedes right at the start of our second meeting. The truth is that it could be seen in him. He fell silent for long seconds and searched for words, his face really reflected the struggle. Yet, "I stand by what I said," he emphasizes.
Q: The heart says one thing, and the mind says another?
"Exactly like that."
For many years, he was the closest person to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. To the Israeli public, he has been largely unknown, mainly because he has never been interviewed, never made a public speech, and practically avoided the limelight in the Israeli media. The only instances in which his name did capture headlines were when the police launched investigations and when he testified in Netanyahu's trial. These are the tough chapters in his life, which we will touch upon.
Now, after more than 20 years of behind-the-scenes public activity, he is releasing a book about his years alongside Netanyahu. He is the first among the dozens of people who worked alongside Netanyahu as prime minister to write such a book. "My Brother's Keeper: Netanyahu, Obama, & the Year of Terror & Conflict that Changed the Middle East Forever" is the title. It is for an American audience and currently only in English. Alongside his inner discussions with Netanyahu, Harow describes how things unfolded in the fight against terrorist groups and diplomatic battles, especially against President Barack Obama. For anyone who wants to understand what happened here over the past decade, it is a must-read.
The book was completed in January 2023 – before the Oct. 7 war that also changed what Harow thinks about the man who is still, in his eyes, a great leader. "I have never been in the anti-Bibi camp. I still love and admire him," he says as we sit in his home in Ra'anana. Today, he dedicates his time to business and advocacy for Israel. Our chat gets interrupted when he has to go on air to be interviewed by Sky News and when he has to take a call from The Wall Street Journal.
The war and the unity that followed brought him back to Israeli public life, and he is also working to establish new organizations for the day after.
The book shows tremendous respect for Netanyahu. However, this personal alliance, which stood the toughest tests of time, changed after the Hamas attack. Those were the words that were so difficult for him to say in our first meeting: He believes that in the aftermath of the battles, Netanyahu should step aside, along with the entire political and security leadership.
"There cannot be a situation," he starts the sentence then stops to search for the right words, "where the person who has set Israel's security policy – who has been Mr. Security throughout his entire political career – says after that very system fails that, 'It's not only my fault'. All the chiefs of the security establishment failed, everyone agrees on that, but as a leader who took upon himself the title of Mr. Security – once the system fails, there can be no doubt about his central role in this failure."
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Despite distancing himself from Netanyahu and despite all that has happened as a result of his relationship with him – years of exacting work, investigations, the trial, negative media portrayal, and divorce – Harow is not resentful or angry. Unlike most of Netanyahu's associates who turned against him in anger, Harow looks back with satisfaction and pride.
"My childhood dream was to contribute to the State of Israel and the Jewish people. I had the privilege to do it in the most important place, the Prime Minister's Office, alongside a man who is still, in my eyes, a historic giant leader. Ask me if I would do it all over again, knowing it's the price I'll pay. My answer is yes."
Los Angeles – Golani – Likud
Ari Harow was born in Los Angeles in 1973 to a Jewish family with strong Zionist views. "Around the Shabbat table in my home, as a young member of the Bnei Akiva camp in California, stories about brave young Jews sacrificing everything to establish a Jewish state in the ancient homeland filled me with pride," he says in his book.
When he was 12, his family moved to Israel and settled in Samaria. After completing high school, he joined the Golani Brigade. Later, he earned his bachelor's and master's degrees. Concurrently, he began to engage in public life, starting with the newspaper Makor Rishon and later with the Israel advocacy organization Honest Reporting. His first encounter with Netanyahu was in 2002 when he ran against then-Prime Minister Sharon for the leadership of Likud. Ron Dermer, who knew Harow from the Israeli baseball league, recruited him; it's easy to understand why.
Harow is quick-thinking, assertive, and goal-oriented. He is gentle and discreet but knows how to be forceful and speaks fluent English – essential qualities for working with Netanyahu. In that 2002 round, Sharon won the contest. Netanyahu became finance minister and Harow returned to the US.
"Regardless of Netanyahu and Dermer, I was offered to lead an organization, quite minor at the time, called American Friends of Likud.' My goal was always to return to Israel, contribute, and shape policy here. I understood that building a power base in the US, with a deep understanding of the political landscape there and of pro-Israel and Jewish organizations, would help. So, I went for it. One of the first calls I made was to Netanyahu to understand how he saw my work abroad. He was still the minister of finance at the time."
Q: Why did you reach out to him and not to Prime Minister Sharon?
"I approached all Likud members, from Prime Minister Sharon downwards, and also hosted them when they visited. But I was among those who read all of Netanyahu's books. I heard his speech at AIPAC. There was great admiration for him. As a native of the US and someone experiencing American life towards Israel, his explanatory skills were unmatched. His ability to stand against hostile forces and the media and present Israel in such a way brought great pride to the majority of American Jews."
Managing the organization certainly solidified the connection between the two. Harow organized Netanyahu's visits to the US, arranged meetings with influential figures, and accompanied him to various events. "He understood he had someone to rely on in the US," Harow summarizes that period.
Q: Is the person you saw from a distance on screens the same person you met in person?
"You see a very impressive person. Unlike most Israeli politicians who come to the US, he feels at home there. It's not a foreign game for him. Traveling with him to different places, sitting beside him in forums and others, made you proud as an Israeli and Jew. Even in those meetings, his messages were sharp, very Zionist, and unapologetic. There was the feeling of sitting next to a Prime Minister, even though he wasn't one at the time."
Q: Did you have any misgivings about his politics and his personal conduct?
"In those years, my influence was educational, promoting the ideology of Jeb Jabotinsky and Menachem Begin. That was the perspective. I had no connection to Israeli politics, and I didn't like dealing with it later."
Q: In the days of the police investigations, some journalists claimed that your organization was a conduit for transferring funds to Netanyahu.
"It's an American educational organization; it has never transferred money to him or any other Knesset member. Technically, it couldn't happen. In the US, there are very strict rules about what a non-profit organization can and cannot do, where it's allowed to invest, and where it's not. Therefore, donations to public figures are something that never happened and could not have happened."
Q: If so, what do you think when you see these accusations?
"That it's not the first time that the media writes untrue things. You have to understand, at least in those years – I know less about what's happening today –every pro-Israel organization that would host leaders from Israel, from both the right and the left. AIPAC, ADL, FIDF, etc., these are well-known things in Israel. Even former IDF chiefs of staff, security ministers, and Knesset members flew at the organization's expense. My organization complied with all the required laws in this matter."
In 2006, when Netanyahu was the opposition leader of a party that had only 12 seats, he asked Harow to join his closely knitted team and appointed him as a foreign affairs advisor.
"That period was his nadir. My role was to write speeches, work with foreign media and diplomats, and plan foreign visits. At some point, Ayelet Shaked and Naftali Bennett joined. After they left in 2008, I got their roles. That's how we got to the 2009 elections."
Q: One cannot easily skip over their departure.
Harow evades: "I am not a person of gossip, and I don't know exactly what happened. Especially in the political system, there are constant changes. In the Israeli media, when someone leaves, they make a big deal out of it. As if it's a juicy story. In the White House, the chief of staff changes almost every year or two. The positions are very demanding. So, at some point, you move on to the next thing."
Q: But it wasn't just a departure. It was a personal rupture with Bennett and Shaked, who had significant national implications.
"When they left, there were no immense ramifications yet. They were part of the team. Later on, they became central figures. The goal was to bring Netanyahu back to power, and that seemed distant at the time."
Q: Were they insubordinate?
"There was nothing beyond what I told you."
Q: In 2009, you win the elections after years in the political wilderness in the opposition.
"It had been exactly ten years since his defeat (Netanyahu lost to Ehud Barak in 1999). There was great joy, but also an understanding that we were entering a very challenging responsibility now on his shoulders. The first operation in Gaza (Operation Cast Lead) had just ended, and Obama had just been elected president. He understood that challenging times were ahead. He was no longer young and knew what the job meant."
Q: With what lessons did he come from the first term?
"Politically, he understood that everything starts with the base. The base starts with Likud and expands to the right. He realized that his ability to implement policy begins with remaining in office. So, preserving the political and ideological base was significant for him to implement policy."
Q: One of the accusations against him is that over the years, due to the desire to preserve his political survival, he neglected policy.
"I think there is a fundamental problem in the parliamentary political system in Israel, where your ability to implement policy in any area depends on the coalition, which can bring you down at any moment. In the US, the president is elected for four years, and at the end of his term, his policy is evaluated, and he stands for re-election. In Israel, everyone knows that a vote of no-confidence or a government collapse can happen at any moment. Therefore, political considerations have much greater weight here."
Q: So the problem is not with him but with the system?
"Right. Everyone knows the example of Ariel Sharon, with the dramatic change he made in the Disengagement Plan. It gave him broad political support in places he didn't have before. It means that the ability to survive politically influenced his diplomatic outlook. When talking about Netanyahu – he learned that he needs to stick to the base. Sharon and Bennett left the base and received short-term mandates. With Sharon, we cannot know what would have happened (since he became incapacitated due to a stroke), but with Bennett, we know how it ended."
Q: So what do you think about the statement that Netanyahu does everything for survival?
"The political system in the country is structured in such a way that the political considerations of most MKs and ministers significantly influence their policies."
Q: And it's more evident with him than with others?
"We are in a period in which people are looking for a unifier, so I don't want to express a position beyond what I said. The problem is the system. The critical issues that were at the top of his agenda did not change over the years. He was not flip-flopping with his principles. Iran was always at the forefront, followed by economic issues, etc."
Q: Is there a smear campaign? Dirty missions?
"It's not something I know."
Q: Does it not exist, or are you not aware?
"In the years I was there until 2015, I didn't see such conduct, and I would have known if there were. He's a politician, and every politician operates in networks and mobilizes supporters."
Q: How did you cope with his credibility issue? You're supposed to work day-to-day with someone who sometimes, delicately put, deviates from the truth?
"In my dealings with him, I didn't feel that."
Q: How can that be?
"Maybe it's the nature of our relationship. I didn't sense a credibility issue, and I didn't see it personally. Netanyahu is a very goal-oriented person, and he does what it takes to achieve it. If he needs to use certain methods, he does. In the 2015 elections, he said, 'There will be no Palestinian state,' and after the elections, under international pressure, he backtracked. I don't think he intends to be untrustworthy, but he changes direction when he concludes it's necessary."
Q: You left after the 2015 elections. Why?
"I felt it was the right departure point. I had been doing it for several years. I had been with him on the campaign trail. He asked me to join the coalition negotiation team, and I understood that I would be drawn back into a full term. I decided it was time to retire. With Netanyahu, to end on good terms, there are exit points. You don't want to give the impression that you're jumping ship. Between terms, there is a more understandable exit route in personal relations. As I explained before, it's very common to change staff. To resign in the middle of a term is less pleasant. It's not just a professional matter. You're part of a small group that lives and breathes together 24 hours a day through the prime minister. These positions are demanding in a drastic way. You are disconnected from family, friends, and everything outside of work. These were intense years, so I felt it was time to move on."
Q: According to many, myself included, something else happened in 2015. His victory in those elections removed all his restraints, the start of hubris.
"There were two things there. In the domestic political arena, the public and the polls gave Herzog and Tzipi the victory. After he won big, it changed his political perspective. It was the third election campaign in a row that he won. There was a belief that 'we discovered the formula, that there was a formula, and as long as we stay on the same course we won't lose.' It was a kind of wow moment. When all the odds were against us and all the pollsters predicted defeat - we won. So apparently our formula is stronger than the polls."
Q: In other words, a feeling that we are here forever?
"Yes, as long as we stick to the formula. The second thing was foreign policy, which the book focuses on. At the end of 2014 and early 2015, the masks came off vis-à-vis the Americans. After the election victory, these two things came together."
Q: I remember from that period an episode you were involved in, which was his desire to abolish the presidency to block Reuven Rivlin. That was already a kind of megalomania.
"I don't really want to get into that. But let's just say that the rationale for the move at the time was to put someone in the President's Residence who is more facing the Jewish world, and less of a political position. So there was talk of changing the institution of the presidency, not abolishing it. Me, all my years there, I tried to escape politics as much as I could. There's the verse where Joseph's brothers throw him into a pit and Rashi explains that 'the pit is empty, there is no water in it– but there are snakes and scorpions in it'. That's how I saw the political system. There are always additional considerations and other interests, and you always have to be careful of the pit. That was one of the things I did not connect with. My approach was the opposite. My ability to deal with people was because they knew I wasn't playing games but telling the truth. That way they also knew they could deal honestly with me."
Q: Many who left in the first circle of Netanyahu usually left in anger and a slamming door. Why does it always end like this?
"I don't want to talk about others, only about myself. I highly appreciated his abilities and the person, and I felt he allowed me to contribute to Israel. That there are conflicts in a political system and a ministry that works so hard and in such an active system – people understand that. In my case, the positive recognition was more than any other emotion. My only question was whether I could contribute or not – so there was no room for emotions of anger or injury. I had an opportunity, and I am grateful for it."
Q: Those who left with a slammed door usually did so because of Sara and Yair, right?
"I don't want to talk about his family."
Q: Why? Their involvement is known, and I'm sure you witnessed it.
"I am talking about the period I worked with him, not with his family. I also have a family, and I saw how it went through a not-easy period, so I respect the need to keep the family out of the discourse."
Q: Is it unfair to his family?
"I don't want to talk about his family."
Iran, Iran, and again Iran.
Q: Your book begins with the kidnapping of the three boys in 2014 and deals extensively with Operation Protective Edge. Why, actually?
"The year 2014, in my opinion, was a turning point where the masks were removed, especially between him and Obama. Since 2009, the approach was to try to give something to the Americans regarding the Palestinian issue, so that they would do what is needed regarding Iran. I remind you of the settlement freeze in 2009 and the process led by then-Secretary of State John Kerry in 2014. In June 2014, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was the one who blew up the talks, but Kerry assigned responsibility to both sides. It agitated Netanyahu. Livni, who then led the negotiations, was initially completely on Netanyahu's side, but then, for political reasons, she criticized him. In the same month, the three boys were kidnapped by Hamas. Meanwhile, the US advancing towards an agreement with Iran, which was reached in 2015. These two things (shifting responsibility for the Palestinian issue to Israel and the American approach to Iran, accordingly) resulted in a breakdown of trust between Netanyahu and the Obama administration The Israeli government found itself in a situation where we paid a lot, but we were also blamed, and we got nothing on Iran. The feeling was that the Americans didn't have our back, and I remind you also of the delay in delivering missiles to helicopters during Operation Protective Edge. Therefore, he decided that there were no more games on the Iranian issue. It continued when he went to speak before Congress at the beginning of 2015. Regarding the Palestinian issue, note that since 2014, there have been no longer any talks. It was a dramatic change."
Q: Let's go back to all this, but did the Schalit deal, which ran against Netanyahu's outlook, happen because it was an opportunity or due to social protest?
"Because it was an opportunity. As I explain in the book, as early as 2009, he instructed the mediator then, Haggai Hadas, to pursue a deal due to the consideration that if Israel wanted to attack Iranian nuclear sites and several pilots fell captive in Iran, (they would know) that the State of Israel would do everything in its power to bring them back alive. He went for it despite the base not being with him."
Q: And does this raise questions about whether Netanyahu acts according to his convictions or survivalist political interest?
"There is no contradiction between the two. It's easy to sit in a research institute and write about policy; it's much harder to implement it. There are many considerations and constraints that change the utopian reality. This is true for all heads of government, and this is the power of democracy. If he went against the voters, they wouldn't come back and support him."
Q: Those five years, from the Bar-Ilan speech in 2009 to the collapse of the Kerry process in 2014, were they a strategic deception and a way for Netanyahu to divert attention from the Palestinian issue, or would Netanyahu have really signed an agreement if Abbas was responsive?
"Netanyahu is a person who likes to keep options open and make decisions at the last moment. Always. He taught me that it's related to his days in the unit. Making progress in talks with the Palestinians is not an end in itself. And if it promotes the higher interest, which is Iran – it's okay. Maybe he would have come one day to a point where there were no more options. But it's not that he comes with a malicious intent to work against the Americans. There was definitely an understanding that there was a dance with the Americans. You help us with Iran – and we help you with the Palestinians."
Q: Let's go back to Operation Protective Edge and the current situation. Netanyahu, who allowed Hamas to grow, defines himself as "Guardian of Israel."
"True, but there is blame across the board. The security system did not push for action. Moreover, I tell in the book about a moment when then-head of IDF Intelligence Directorate, Aviv Kochavi, pulled me aside at the end of one of the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet meetings of Protective Edge and told me, 'You need to get the Prime Minister to end the operation.' So, the heads of the security system also failed. Everyone agreed to it. But the one at the top of the pyramid is responsible. It's very hard for me to say this. He will be remembered as a great leader. But quoting my friends, the bereaved fathers, Dedi Simchi and Yehiel Leiter, who said, 'We need to replace 150 people – the leadership responsible for the biggest failure in the history of the State of Israel.'"
Q: In hindsight, as someone who was there in those years, where is the root of the failure?
"What I saw in the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet was groupthink. It is crucial to intellectually challenge the system, and that did not happen. Second, let's call a spade a spade, there was arrogance here. It connects to the Iranian issue. When you see our leaders talking about us being a regional power, who will cause us problems? A small organization digging tunnels for us? We are advancing technologically,' and so on – this outlook needs to change. In hindsight, the Iranian issue was so central to Netanyahu's policy that we paid prices on the Palestinian front, and the fact today is that it was a mistake."
Q: Meaning?
"To promote a more aggressive policy towards Iran, Netanyahu's governments traded the Palestinian issue. In the grand scheme of things, it was a mistake to ignore a close threat that the system believed was 'small' in favor of a 'bigger' threat that was far away. Second, the ability to garner much deeper support... Everyone today talks about the Palestinian educational system and how they raise generations of terrorists – it's not new. It was also there. A decision was made then to turn a blind eye."
The reason for turning a blind eye, explains Harow, is the same cynical tradeoff that Netanyahu believed in, between the Iranian issue and the Palestinian one. "A few months before, he called for the destruction of Hamas," he recalls.
Q: Was he committed to that statement?
"Turns out that he was not. The focus was thousands of kilometers away, not a few meters. If there were an understanding of the size of the problem, it would certainly have been treated differently. And I think it's a mistake of the entire system."
Q: Tell me, what plagued the relationship between Netanyahu and Obama? After all, you describe in the book how in 2008, when they met at King David Hotel before entering their roles, there was a good meeting, and they agreed to work together.
"The problem was the lens through which they saw the region; each had a different view. Obama believed that it was possible to embrace the Islamic world, including the radicals. Netanyahu saw them and Iran as the biggest threat to Israel. We understood this immediately. The world understood it when he traveled to the region, skipped Israel, and delivered a speech in Cairo. Netanyahu genuinely wanted to build a personal relationship with Obama, but his goals were different. When we left the first meeting in the White House in 2009, I was the only one with him in the car, and I saw that something happened. He didn't want to talk and signaled with his finger upwards, fearing someone was listening in."
Q: Some claim that these are Netanyahu's paranoias.
"These are facts; he didn't invent that statement. Obama had a clear policy, and he tried to advance it. What happened was not Netanyahu's fault."
Q: Let's jump five years ahead to 2015. The invitation comes from the Republican speaker of the House of Representatives to speak against the nuclear deal. You supported accepting the invitation. In hindsight, was that the right decision?
"I think so. Netanyahu saw the nuclear deal as an imminent threat to Israel. He thought that even with our friends, we need to stand up for ourselves, even if it negatively affects certain groups in Congress, and we knew we would pay a price. But, and this is a big but, our friendship with the US and any external actor is built on promoting our interests as an independent state. During those years, Western policy towards Iran caused significant damage to Israel. On the other hand, I am convinced that this speech strengthened Israel's position and eventually led to the Abraham Accords. Feelers from Arab states began to arrive while we were still in Congress."
Q: So, would you recommend him to do it again?
"Yes. From a historical perspective, we saw the results of the Western handling of the Iranian issue in the October 7 attack. The ability of Hamas and Hezbollah to build such a large terrorist infrastructure on our borders, and to build militias in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq – is a result of the failed policy of the US and the West in dealing with Iran. In our attempts to oppose the agreement, we brought up the issue of the Iranian proxies. Israel's duty was to sound the alarm in every forum."
Defeaning silence
Six hours of conversation with Ari Harow leave no doubt that he is an honest man, but the Israel Police and the State Attorney's Office somehow missed that. A year after leaving the Prime Minister's Office, the police opened an investigation against him. Eight years later, the legal proceedings still have not ended, so Harow therefore refuses to answer my questions. "The prosecution has forbidden me and all the witnesses from speaking until the end of the trial," he says, and refers me to his testimony in the Netanyahu trial as a state's witness, and earlier publications in the media about what was done to him.
He was arrested when he got off the plane on the eve of his daughter's bat mitzvah and underwent four rounds of interrogation. His property was confiscated, and according to the transcript presented in court, the investigators told him, "It's like a bazaar here: give us something, and get yourself out of trouble." The something, although not explicitly stated, was supposed to be Netanyahu.
At one point, the investigators even presented him with a letter supposedly signed by him, in which he allegedly confessed to a criminal offense. Harow recalls that he had never written such a letter, and amid the investigation, he identified a spelling mistake in his own name. That's how he recognized it was a forgery and escaped the trap.
"Did you understand that they are tightening the noose around your neck, hoping you'll spit something out about Netanyahu?" he was asked on the stand by Netanyahu's lawyer, to which Harow concurred. The police investigation shattered Harow. He went through a divorce and had to rebuild his life from scratch. Today he is married again and together they are parents to six children.
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