Professor Meir Litvak is a historian and chair of the Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University.
Q: The surprise attack by the Hamas terrorist organization on Oct. 7th has proved several Israeli assumptions wrong. As an expert on the Middle East, would you say the concept that Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah is cautious and does not wish to engage in war with Israel has also been shattered?
"As strange as it may sound, the concept still stands because Nasrallah has not yet launched a full campaign against Israel, and his activity on the border is also considered to be below the threshold of war, seemingly cautious."
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Q: Isn't it absurd that this is the definition of relative caution? We see more and more terror acts and threats in the north and already have casualties.
"Nasrallah is nearing that boundary and constantly pushes the limit of provocation without forcing Israel into a complete war with Lebanon, at this time. But it does necessitate Israel to turn its attention and resources there. What I am describing may change at any moment, if the circumstances change for Nasrallah. If he decides that Israel is weak or ineffective, he may act differently."
Video: Hezbollah trains for possible confrontation with Israel / No credit
Q: On the other hand, if a war does break out with Lebanon, Nasrallah must understand that the damage of the 2006 Lebanon War will pale in comparison.
"He understands this very well, but if he concludes that Israel is sinking in the mud of Gaza, exhausted, and the IDF worn out, he may be tempted to act, and this is a very dark scenario as far as we are concerned. Another option is that the situation in Gaza will become catastrophic, Hamas will collapse and the Iranians will order Nasrallah to save what is left. In such a case, he may be forced to act against his will."
Q: Is there a scenario where Nasrallah will not comply with Iran, assuming that the price for him will be too high?
"When foreign media reported in August that Israel struck a drone factory in Iran, Nasrallah was quick to announce that revenge would come from Tehran. That is, he removed from himself the responsibility to respond. Is that what will happen now too? It depends on the circumstances, and making predictions in the Middle East is a very dubious business."
Q: Either way, the strategic surprise he aspired to, an ideological victory, he won't receive.
"Then he will have to settle for a tactical surprise. There are still forces at the border, and it is possible to surprise them. After what happened in Gaza, anything can happen, even when we are on high alert."
Q: What do you think Nasrallah wishes for strategically? He said he wanted to conquer the Galilee. And what then?
"Such an occupation, even for a short amount of time, would be a tremendous strategic blow to Israel. If we compare it to what is happening in the Gaza periphery, are we sure it will return to normal? That the kibbutzim will be restored? The same is true in the north. A strategic defeat for Israel is part of a long and historical process, which for them includes the decline of Israel and its collapse. If tens of thousands of Israelis leave the country because of the war, that too they view as a step toward Israel's collapse. And they are convinced it will happen, as are Hamas and Iran."
Q: They had a once-in-a-century opportunity on Oct. 7. Why did they not go all the way?
"I don't think they were aware yet of the magnitude of the achievement on the first day. War is also not something that you can start in half an hour, and activating the missiles takes a certain amount of time. Moreover, it is quite possible that they feared the magnitude of the blow that Israel would retaliate with. Hezbollah is still cautious."
Q: From the outside, Nasrallah is cautious, perhaps deterred. From the inside, is Nasrallah's position as secretary-general of Hezbollah strong and stable?
"He is the undisputed leader of Hezbollah. In the Shiite group, his position is strong, he is admired, successful, and sophisticated."
Q: He is less revered in Lebanon.
"True, the Lebanese people are angry at him and hold him responsible for the country's devastating economy. But in Hezbollah, his position is strong."
Q: Hezbollah is a separate economic entity from Lebanon. A Hezbollah fighter earns as much as the Lebanese chief of staff. Does Nasrallah care about Lebanon at all?
"He created this myth that he is the defender of Lebanon. Nasrallah was portrayed as the one who restored Lebanon's sovereignty after the IDF withdrew from the security zone in 2000. He does not want to go down in history as the destroyer of Lebanon if another war breaks out against Israel.
"It's true that Hezbollah operates as an independent economic system, and to a large extent damages the Lebanese economy and destroys it, but it still wants to appear as the savior of Lebanon. That's why Nasrallah is walking a tightrope between promoting Hezbollah's interests and protecting Lebanon."
Q: And how would you describe the relationship between Hezbollah and Syria?
"As far as Syria is concerned, when [former President] Hafez Assad was still alive, Nasrallah reported to him. But today the relationship between Hezbollah and Syria is more like that of equals. Bashar Assad listens to Nasrallah's advice and wisdom. The relationship between Syria and Hezbollah has changed a lot in Nasrallah's favor, and this is part of his achievement."
Q: Does Nasrallah really understand Israeli society, as he claims?
"I think his 'spider web' theory is wrong. He thought that if we were given a small blow, we would collapse. But even in the face of the failure of state institutions, we see Israeli society, and its strength. At the same time, he understands well the psychology of Israelis. He knows how to play on our fears, and he is taunting us by inciting fear."
Q: If you had to guess, what do you think is going through Nasrallah's mind at the moment?
"He wants to see how the Israelis act, how strongly we react. He watches with curiosity to understand how this event will end and remains vigilant. He raises the threshold of provocation all the time, and it is always possible that he will take one step too far."
Q: And what do we know about him as a person?
"He came from the lower class and studied in Najaf, Iraq. Although he was not a student of [former Supreme Leader of Iran] Ruhollah Khomeini, he certainly absorbed the radical spirit. He returned to Lebanon, stood out as a very talented person, and what's interesting is that when it was decided to replace the first leader of Hezbollah, Subhi al-Tufayli, they wanted Nasrallah to be the one to replace him, but he refused. He was in his early 30s then and said that he was too young, not mature enough, and decided that he did not want leadership. In the end, Abbas al-Musawi took office, and chose Nasrallah as his number two."
Q: And what does that tell you?
"That Nasrallah is not an obsessive honor seeker, he is cautious and relatively modest. Furthermore, he sent his son to fight in Israel, and he was killed in one of the encounters with the IDF. That is, he not only sends others to die but also endangers his family and is ready to pay a personal price. It increases his prestige."
Q: You mentioned al-Musawi, who was assassinated by Israel. What do you think the repercussions would be if the IDF assassinated Nasrallah?
"Because he is so talented and dangerous, it's unlikely that we'll get a worse replacement."
Q: And what can be said of Nasrallah's relationship with the Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei?
"Iran sees him as the leader of Hezbollah. Khamenei appreciates him and even likes him, while Nasrallah sees Khamenei as his supreme leader, and he is also subordinate to him. Let's not forget that Nasrallah ranks low in terms of his position in the religious hierarchy, he is a member of the Shiite religious establishment. When Nasrallah meets with Khamenei, he kisses his hand. It is a sign that 'I am subjected to you'. In other words, Hezbollah does not start anything strategic here without an order from Khamenei."
Q: What about the interesting dynamic we've seen since the beginning of the war: Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh's meeting with Iran's Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, or for example, Nasrallah's meeting with him? What is the nature of the communication like these days along the Hezbollah-Iran-Hamas axis?
"Let's not forget that Saleh al-Arouri, the deputy head of Hamas' political bureau, is in Beirut, and he maintains close and daily contact with Nasrallah. Just a few months ago, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad established a joint headquarters in Beirut, and it is clear that such a headquarters also includes members of the IRGC.
"That is, it is clear that the Iranians are considering a scenario of the convergence of the arenas, and it is clear that the Hezbollah-Iran-Hamas triangle is very active, and even more so in times of war. We can assume that Hamas hoped Hezbollah would enter the war much faster.
"But Iran is not necessarily eager to use Hezbollah, unless as a last resort. Iran has always maintained Hezbollah as the arm that would act against Israel if Israel attacked Iran. But now the chance of Israel attacking Iran is zero, and then Iran may decide that it is possible to use Hezbollah."
Q: Why is the chance of Israel attacking Iran now zero?
"It would be a bad idea to attack Iran. Look at how we dealt with Hamas, and the amount of resources we will have to invest there is still far from over. So going to war with a country 1,500 kilometers [932 miles] away, a country with 2,500 ballistic missiles that can reach any point in Israel, sounds like a far-fetched idea. We can't handle our weakest enemy well, so how do we handle our strongest enemy? We need to stop with this arrogance, according to which we can do anything, and recognize the limit of our power."
Q: Given your in-depth knowledge of Khamenei, what do you think is going through his mind at the moment? What are his red lines?
"Khamenei detests Israel with all his heart and wishes for its destruction. He also did not hide his great joy at what happened to us. However, he is cautious. He does not want direct Iranian involvement, and it is very important to him that there be no Israeli hit inside Iran. That is why he is determined and sophisticated in using his proxies, Hezbollah for example, who will do the job.
"Khamenei had an opportunity on Oct. 7th, but he also has a historical vision, so he is not in a hurry to destroy Israel right now. His ideological view is that Israel's blood must be shed, brought to its collapse so that it will submit to Iran's demands and no longer exist as a Jewish state. Then, according to his vision, we will all return 'home' – some to Morocco and some to Ukraine. Along the way, it is important to him that Hamas does not collapse, and there is a danger that he will try to push Hezbollah to intervene, but without Iran itself bearing responsibility for the results."
Q: What else do we know about Khamenei as a person?
"He is a cunning and sophisticated politician. He is not a great light from a halachic point of view, but completely mediocre. He nurtured the Revolutionary Guards, which is the focus of his main power. He is also suspicious because every president who served under him in Iran was failed by him. He is obsessed with his hatred for America, and especially for Israel.
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"A research analysis revealed that Israel appears in his speeches 90% of the time, while in Khomeini's it appeared only about 40% of the time. Khamenei is also modest. He makes sure to dress modestly. [Former President of Iran] Hassan Rouhani, who by the way does not drink coffee without the supreme leader's permission, posed for a photo with an expensive Rolex watch. You won't see such mannerisms in Khamenei."
Q: We know he is Israel's nightmare, but it turns out that his successor is equally worrisome.
"He is grooming his son to succeed him, and this is a very problematic move in Shia Islam. His son is worse than him. He is close to the most extreme circles in the Iranian system. Khamenei may hate America and Israel, but he also has an inherent caution and fear. His son has no fear. He belongs to a generation that is used to seeing a powerful Iran. It does not have the past memories of a weak, pre-modern Iran, and this may bring it to a state of lack of caution, even lack of restraint. On the face of it, he seems more worrying than Khamenei."
Q: In conclusion, what do people not really understand about Hezbollah, about Iran?
"Both Iran and Hezbollah are rational and pragmatic entities, but not moderate. They do not wish to commit suicide and die for the sanctification of God, and perhaps that is why we have not seen them join the war until now. They consider their actions in a measured and cold manner. At the moment, it seems that they are reluctant to take extensive action against Israel, due to a series of considerations. On the other hand, Iran threatened to intervene if Israel destroys Hamas. What will the Iranians decide at a given moment? As I said - it is not smart to make predictions about the Middle East.
