In the wake of the recent tragedy that has befallen the State of Israel, it becomes increasingly evident that the severity of the dead, the wounded, and the abducted is just one aspect of the catastrophe. What is equally alarming is the depth of the ineptitude among some of Israel's most critical agencies, which were caught off guard when they were put to the test.
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Over the past two days, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have faced significant challenges on multiple dimensions: constructing a comprehensive and clear operational picture; cleansing hostile forces to secure defense lines that would allow a counteroffensive; evacuating civilians from the Gaza border communities so that the area can become easy to maneuver; and sealing off the border between Gaza and Israel. Unfortunately, these tasks proved to be more challenging than expected.
As a result, improvised military operations were taken, some of them on a local basis. Reserve Major Noam Tivon, who went alone and joined the Maglan forces to rescue his family from Kibbutz Nahal Oz, is just one example. A pair of Shin Bet security officers who went south armed and found themselves in various confrontations during the night, sometimes alone against terrorists, are another example. There were dozens, maybe hundreds, of similar cases and stories, where alongside the displays of bravery and resilience, there was also a glaring absence of clear leadership in event management, a factor that contributed to the terrible outcome.
Just for the sake of illustration: On the first day of the current conflict, the air force commando unit Shaldag lost more soldiers this weekend than in its entire history; the Sayeret Matkal intelligence commando unit suffered major casualties, as did the Israel Police's special counterterrorism unit and other elite units. They all showed bravery and initiative but found themselves deep in the battle, sometimes for long hours, without any significant advantage in manpower and resources.
And that, perhaps, is the heart of the matter. Even before touching on the erroneous conception and the lack of intelligence, the massive and total breach of the defense line is a colossal failure. Beyond the basic understanding that the defense line will always be breached, the IDF may have been surprised by the timing, but not by the method.
For years, Hamas has practiced infiltrations into settlements, killing civilians, and abducting soldiers into Gaza, and for years, the IDF has precisely practiced how to deal with this scenario. In real-time, it was caught off guard: the border was easily crossed in several places, and Hamas quickly overcame the entire surveillance system (and captured all the surveillance personnel), took control of the Gaza Division's headquarters, and continued to implement its plan in settlements and communities.
Hamas exploited the situation on the ground to the fullest. It acted on a Saturday, a holiday, in the early morning when most forces were resting, and when the border area was bustling with people, including many hikers, as well as thousands participating in the massive rave that turned into a deadly trap. It also took advantage of the significant redeployment of forces and resources to the West Bank, which had been sent to beef up security there. But this is the nature of the attacker: It finds the soft spot and strikes. The IDF, which was supposed to be alert to all these, was in a slumber when the formidable defense line it had built imploded.
The IDF also failed to launch an effective offense. Its attention was also focused on small, local battles that took place in border communities, rather than a systematic plan for taking on the enemy through the area. The responses made were mostly more of the same as if it were just another round to be followed by negotiations with Hamas through carrots and sticks.
At the top of the political-security echelons, they failed to understand, or understood but failed to translate into action, that the Israeli public (and also in the region and the world) was closely following what was happening with a combination of anxiety, anger, and a clear demand for a course of action that did not resemble what had been done before. Unlike the Yom Kippur War, where Israel suffered a shock but immediately regrouped, this time Israel could not pick itself up from the floor after being knocked out.
But what happened started at 06:30 on Saturday morning has two parents. One is the misconception that Israel was wedded to, and the other is the intelligence agencies. When the dust settles and the investigations begin, it will become clear that there were countless signs of preparation, training, fortification, and provocation on the Palestinian side, but all of these will not translate into one clear flashing light that says "caution."
Instead, Israel continued to buy into the illusion that Hamas is deterred, afraid, worried about the economy of the strip, and avoids action. This narrative was also adopted by the media and the public. As a result, intelligence forces and resources were diverted to Judea and Samaria, which was marked as the urgent hotspot that had to be handled. Gaza, they insisted, was under control, and nothing was brewing, so one could sleep peacefully.
The bottom line was a direct continuation of the thought that nothing is urgent; that things could be kicked down the road; that the Palestinian problem has been solved because the Emiratis, Bahrainis, and Moroccans signed normalization agreements with us (and that soon Saudi Arabia will do the same), and that we were admitted in the Visa Waiver Program. During all this time, Israel chose to ignore the fact that the Palestinians are here and are not going anywhere. That they won't show up in Washington, London, or Riyadh in the morning, but in Gaza and Kibbutz Nirim. And that whoever doesn't solve the problem will eventually have to deal with a much bigger problem.
This policy (or more accurately, absence of policy) has accompanied Israel facing the Palestinian arena for 56 years and Gaza for the past two decades. Worse than that, Israel chose to weaken the Palestinian Authority and strengthen Hamas. It saw it as a partner, refrained from crushing it, and ensured it received money, workers, and status – all just so it wouldn't act. The result was worse than anyone could have imagined: Hamas got what it wanted and attacked; Israel gave it what it wanted and suffered.
This vacuum of strategic decision-making enters the political chaos of the past few months in Israel. The chief of staff and the top security officials had to invest many more hours in persuading reserve soldiers to stay in service than in strengthening defense and planning attacks. All of this, while government ministers are badmouthing the servicemen and when the government is signing coalition agreements that will exempt yeshiva students from service and even pay them a salary equivalent to that of soldiers.
Any reasonable person could see that disaster was imminent and sound the alarm. The defense minister did it and was fired (and then reinstated with street protests), and the chief of staff and the heads of security organizations did it, but the prime minister didn't want to hear. He is held hostage by extreme politicians. It is worth noting that none of them have shown up lately in uniform to help Israel save itself from itself. Anyway, most of them do not distinguish between a unit and a brigade, between an M-16 and an F-16, between Nachal Oz and Kfar Aza. But if Israel wants to live – it would be best if they are now removed from decision-making centers.
In addition to that, Israel needs to wake up and act. Gal Hirsch was appointed to deal with Israeli captives (After a year of this position being vacant); Israeli hasbara (public diplomacy) is not functioning (and television channels that are constantly attacked by the government are the only conduit for citizens to get information and save themselves), and even in the security establishment, there are still more question marks than answers.
Some 50 years later, Israel needs to rise again and prevail. Without politics, without ego, with maximum strength, intelligence, and determination, knowing that it has no other alternative. It is possible, but for this to happen, it requires determined and courageous civilian and military leadership. If there is such leadership, it must appear immediately."
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