Once every few days, people in Syria tremble from the sounds of explosions, usually during nighttime. Loud booms indicate attacks and unsuccessful attempts to foil them using Syria's air defense systems. Unlike the first bloody years of the civil war, today, these attacks are mostly attributed to the Israeli Air Force. In almost all cases, the targets are Iranian: weapons smuggled into Syria, or through it, to Lebanon, as part of Iran's efforts to establish militias in Syria and arm Hezbollah in Lebanon.
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In Israel, in contrast, people sleep well at night. Only in rare cases do Syrian anti-aircraft missiles penetrate Israel's airspace, but these incidents are hardly newsworthy and rarely make headlines.
One can see this as an achievement since people's routines are preserved, and the goal is achieved: the disruption and prevention of the transfer of Iranian weapons to the northern arena. This can also be seen as ungratefulness: if the public were even slightly aware of the efforts made to achieve this goal, it would applaud and certainly refrain from severely harming the Air Force's and the Intelligence Directorate's brand name as it has done in the past several months.
Above all, these attacks reveal the intense competition taking place, almost covertly, between Iran and Israel. The former seeks every possible means of arming its proxies to threaten Israel; the latter seeks every possible means of thwarting this threat before it becomes imminent.
In this competition, Israel mostly maintains the upper hand, requiring tremendous intelligence and military efforts, a fraction of which is being revealed here for the first time – including details of the Iranian targets and routes and the mechanisms and individuals behind them, and of the attacks and operations Israel carries out to disrupt them.
At the center: The airports
According to data from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Israel carried out 32 airstrikes in Syria in 2022. Several of the airstrikes targeted multiple targets in different locations. Eighteen of these strikes were in Damascus and its surrounding area, five were in the Quneitra region in the Golan Heights, four were in the Hama area, two were in the port city of Tartus on the Mediterranean Coast, two were in Aleppo, two were Homs and one was in the Dei ez-Zor region in eastern Syria.
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Since the beginning of 2023, there have been 22 documented Israeli airstrikes in Syria, often hitting multiple targets in each attack. None of these strikes were in Damascus and its surrounding area. Six were in Quneitra, three were in Aleppo, three were in Homs, three were in Al-Suwayda, two were in Dahara, two were in Tartus, and one was in Hama.
These attacks' details paint a similar picture of a fierce struggle within the Iranian arms smuggling industry. For instance, on February 24th, 2022, rockets hit positions and weapon depots of Iranian-backed militias near Damascus International Airport. Similarly, on April 27th, 2022, several targets, including weapon depots, were struck in the same airport area, as well as on May 20th. On June 10th, 2022, the northern route of the airport, the control tower, old arrival halls, three hangars, and storage facilities were attacked. These hangars served as reception areas for senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah and as temporary storage for Iranian weapons.
On August 31, 2022, an arms depot near the Hama International Airport was attacked. Weapons depots near this airport were also attacked on September 6th of the same year, temporarily disrupting operations after missiles damaged the runways. On September 17th, targets near Damascus International Airport were hit once more. On October 21, equipment used for assembling UAVs was attacked near the military airport of Dimas, located near Damascus. The Dimas Airport is directly managed by Hezbollah and was targeted again three days later on October 24, along with other nearby targets. On October 27th, the Israeli Air Force struck. On November 13th, militia warehouses and Iranian air defense systems at the Al-Dabaa Airport near Homs were struck.
On January 1st of this year, the Israeli Air Force struck Damascus International Airport, destroying weapon depots and rendering two runways unusable. On March 6th, the Aleppo International Airport was closed following an Israeli attack, and again on March 21st in an attack that destroyed Iranian weapons depots. On April 1st, A-Daba Airport, located near Homs and under Iranian militias' control, was attacked. On May 2nd, the Aleppo International Airport was again attacked and closed temporarily. This incident repeated on August 28th when the airport was attacked and closed once more.
The targeting of these airports was not arbitrary. The aerial corridor was and remains the main route for transferring weapons from Iran to the northern arena. Before the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Iran used this corridor to transfer arms to Hezbollah: flights would land primarily in Damascus, in broad daylight, and the weapons were loaded onto trucks and transported to Lebanon in convoys. Israel watched with unease as Hezbollah's capabilities grew but chose to keep its hands tied: it was deterred from attacking Syria to avoid starting a war with a nation that possessed a large, well-armed military and a massive arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. It also refrained from attacking Lebanon as part of the deterrence balance constructed against Hezbollah after the Second Lebanon War.
With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the situation changed. Iran committed to preserving President Bashar al-Assad's regime and enlisted Hezbollah in its efforts. As part of this strategy, Iran expedited its weapons shipments, which grew even more after a strategic decision was made in Tehran to establish heavily armed militias in Syria that would operate under the supervision of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, responsible for exporting the revolution beyond Iran's borders. The idea was to create a Hezbollah-like force that would take advantage of the internal chaos in Syria and challenge Israel from the Golan Heights border.
Israel closely monitored these developments and also took advantage of the chaos of the Syrian civil war and the fact that Syria had become a failed state where everyone pursued their own interests. Israel used this environment to initiate the Campaign Between the Wars. Thousands of operations and attacks of various types were carried out within Syrian territory to combat both the Hezbollah arms buildup and the establishment of these militias.
Israel's achievements in both areas were not insignificant. The establishment of these militias was considerably delayed, and they certainly did not become a formidable force that challenged Israel. The transfer of arms to Hezbollah was disrupted, too. However, the organization managed to strengthen itself further because, among other reasons, some of the production processes were moved to Lebanese territory to avoid Israeli airstrikes. This was done with the knowledge that Israel refrained from attacking Lebanon to prevent the start of another war with Hezbollah.
"A Continuous Learning Competition"
"Iran and Israel are engaged in a continuous learning competition," says Major 'A', head of the Strengthening Department in the Research Division of the IDF Intelligence Directorate. "The Iranians aim to transfer as many various types of weaponry to the northern arena as possible so they can threaten Israel in times of routine and emergencies. These transfers are carried out in every possible way; for them, there is no possible way that is not legitimate. Our job is to stay at least one step ahead of them, which requires us to adapt alongside them. This is an ongoing learning competition."
The main activities of both sides are conducted in the airspace, with Iran transferring weapons and Israel intercepting them to foil Iran. Until the beginning of the Campaign Between the Wars, the weapons were openly transported, but since then, Israeli airstrikes have forced Iran to employ various methods and means to evade Israeli attacks.
The initial target for the flights and transfers was Damascus International Airport. Iranians sought to utilize it for their purposes, taking control of an entire facility, constructing warehouses and accommodation halls, and effectively taking control of the airport. The most famous structure on the premises was the "Glass House," which served as the headquarters for the Quds Force at the airport and was first attacked in November 2020, suffering multiple hits since then.
This intensive Iranian activity forced Israel to respond. Damascus International Airport was targeted several times, and each time, Israel escalated its response, even striking runways to hinder the airport's activity. While Israel tried to avoid causing harm to non-combatants during these attacks as much as possible, apparently, there were cases where Israeli strikes deliberately targeted members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or Iranian militia fighters. The attacks were sometimes meant to send a message to Tehran, while in other instances, they were direct results of the presence of various combatants at the attacked sites.
The emphasis on avoiding casualties as much as possible served a twofold purpose: first, to prevent harm to innocent civilians, and second, to avoid escalation, which would happen primarily due to the potential harm of Hezbollah operatives. Hezbollah has previously retaliated to attacks on its members in Syria, and Israel seeks to reduce friction with Hezbollah as much as possible to avoid a possible deterioration on the Lebanese front as well.
As part of the effort to avoid civilian casualties, the Israeli Air Force uses various methods. In some cases, a "warning" was issued before the attack, involving firing missiles near the target to allow civilians to evacuate before the main target would be pinpointed and attacked.
As mentioned, the primary avenue for both sides' activities is in the air. "Until mid-2022, Iran primarily used cargo flights. Each such aircraft could carry about 100 tons of weapons to Syria," says Major "A". The weapons were diverse and included advanced missiles and rockets (or their parts), air defense systems, and various components used in such systems, UAVs, and numerous other weapons.
The succession of airstrikes by the Israeli Air Force, some of which were reported here, led the Iranians to change their methods about a year ago. Cargo flights were no longer used, and the Iranians began using passenger flights instead. Passenger flights offer both a clear advantage and disadvantage for Tehran: The advantage is that they allow Iran to evade Israeli threats, as they know Israel will not attack a passenger plane. The disadvantage is that passenger flights can only carry a relatively small quantity of weapons, and there is always the constant risk that the explosion of weapons or materials can cause damage to the plane or its passengers.
The weapons themselves are sometimes transported within the planes' holds, while, in other cases of small or unique components, they're smuggled in as carry-ons. The destinations of the flights also vary as part of Iran's efforts to avoid detection. After a succession of Israeli airstrikes disrupted flights to Damascus International Airport, the Iranians began attempting to smuggle the weapons through the Aleppo International Airport and other locations in Syria, all of which have suffered damage from airstrikes in the past year.
A quick online check reveals the frequency and diversity of civilian flights between Iran and Syria. On Sundays, Iran's "Mahan Air" operates regular flights to Damascus. On Mondays, "Meraj Airlines" operates regular flights to Damascus. On Tuesdays, there are flights by "Cham Wings" and "Caspian Airlines" to Damascus. On Wednesdays, Mahan Air operates flights to Al-Nayrab Airport in Aleppo. On Thursdays, Cham Wings operates another flight to Damascus. On Fridays, there are Caspian Airlines flights to Damascus, and on Shabbat, Cham Wings operates another flight to Damascus.
These regular flights allow frequent transit of members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and their proxies, as well as the transfer of the weapons and other materials they or their proxies carry. The IRGC maintains regular contact with these airline companies, and they either directly or indirectly control several of them. "The Quds Force purchases baggage space on these flights," says Second Lieutenant "C", head of the team responsible for foiling weapons smuggling from Iran. "In some of these air flight companies, they even have representatives on the board of directors, and their presence is particularly prominent in Mahan Air. Some of these companies operate only passenger flights, while others, like Caspian Air, also operate cargo flights."
In general, cargo flights are used to transfer completely assembled weapons despite the risk to the aircraft. Passenger flights are primarily used for transporting various components. The vast majority of these flights are bound for Syria, and some of them are bound for Lebanon. "The Iranians prefer to operate in Syria to avoid putting Lebanon at risk," says Major "A".
In February of this year, a devastating earthquake struck Syria, serving as the aftershock of the massive earthquake that hit Turkey. In Syria, about 7 thousand people were killed, and 15 thousand people were injured. The world hastened to send humanitarian aid to the earthquake's victims, most of which arrived from the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Iran took advantage of the opportunity: on the flights carrying humanitarian aid it sent to Syria, it loaded weapons and various components as well, primarily those for precision-guided missiles and rockets and the production of UAVs.
This cynical Iranian exploitation of the Syrian disaster did not escape Israel's notice. In the Aleppo area, a series of airstrikes were carried out, storage facilities for weapons and other various resources. Alongside the focused effort to strike weapons precisely without harming humanitarian aid supplies being sent to Syria, several of the attacks purposely incapacitated the airport to signal to Syria that Israel would not tolerate Iran's continued activity in the area. The message was received, but Iranian activity continued, and the airport was once again incapacitated. Ultimately, the weapons smuggling only stopped after the Pentagon released a report exposing Iran's immoral use of the humanitarian route.
"The moment the humanitarian route was closed, the Iranians reverted to their use of passenger flights," says "C". "Simultaneously, they are always searching for new routes. Among other methods, they use the smuggling of weapons to the Syrian Army to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah and their proxies in Syria as well.
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