The highly professional and critical activity undertaken by the IDF in Jenin was an unavoidable eventuality. Though it should be able to put a stop to the ongoing process of replicating to northern Samaria the modus operandi of the terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip, it will not be sufficient to generate a change in the nature of the overall situation in that area.
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The trend of escalation in the shooting incidents and in the activation of explosive devices against IDF forces operating in that sector, in addition to the recent (failed) launching of rockets at the Jewish communities on the nearby Gilboa mountain range, have clearly underscored the significance of the processes being adopted by the terrorist organizations in that area to gain military strength, leaving the IDF with no other choice than to engage in action in the heart of Jenin. Israel cannot allow the development in Judea and Samaria of a similar process to that which has occurred in the Gaza Strip.
A region with a history of violence
Jenin is a region with a history of intense violence. This is an area that is well and truly a geographical, political, and socio-economic periphery. The central government has always had an extremely loose grip over Jenin. This was the case way back in the 1930's, during the British Mandate era, when the British police forces killed Izz ad-Din al-Qassam near the village of Yabd in this sector. Al-Qassam's name subsequently became a source of inspiration and a symbol of resistance for Hamas terrorist cells.
Video: Reuters
During the Second Intifada, this area came to be renowned as a stronghold of Palestinian resistance. The fierce battle in the Jenin refugee camp is considered to be one of the most painful incidents of Operation Defensive Shield, during which the IDF forces incurred heavy losses. Just like today, then too the strong cooperation among the various groups in the refugee camp was a salient point, together with the use of improvised explosive devices and booby traps, and the cynical exploitation of the loc civilian population and civilian facilities to hide and to store weapons. The ethos of resistance associated with Jenin soon became a symbol for the terrorist organizations, providing inspiration for Palestinian terrorists from all over.
Twenty years after "Defensive Shield", this area has once again been established as a stronghold of terrorism in Samaria and a focal point for exporting terrorism across Judea and Samaria, and into the heart of Israel too. The objective of the IDF operation was to strike a blow at the underlying terrorist networks there, to arrest or kill terrorists and their supporters, to capture weapons, to expose and destroy the workshops used to manufacture arms, and to reverse or at least curb the process of the terrorist organizations that have taken root there, bolstering their military capabilities.
Maximum damage at minimum risk
The key objective of the defense establishment is to cause maximum damage to the terrorist infrastructure at minimum risk to our forces and while avoiding any spillover of the violence into additional fronts, not to mention of course damage limitation with regard to criticism on the diplomatic front. Having said that, the IDF must be aware that: With all due respect to the importance of these considerations, the prime consideration is that of the safety of our forces. An additional challenge facing the defense establishment, as we have seen, is of course to monitor and counter any attempts to carry out revenge attacks elsewhere. The aim to preserve and maintain the daily routine in those areas not in the immediate combat zone, including the entry of Palestinians into Israel for work, clearly increases the risk of lone-wolf attacks inspired by the events in Jenin, as we witnessed in Tel Aviv on Tuesday.
Consequently, the Israel Security Agency, or Shin Bet, will have to be on the alert and closely monitor the situation vis-a-vis Israeli Arabs and Palestinians (especially from northern Samaria), who have settled down in Israel as part of the process of family unification.
The PA will not do the job
Ultimately, however, the big question pertaining to this operation still remains related to its underlying political-diplomatic purpose: What will happen now in Jenin, following the end of this operation? The current definitions of the operation do not herald any strategic change on this issue. Now that the operation has come to an end, control over the area will be handed over to the PA (Palestinian Authority) security forces.
Will the PA adopt a more proactive approach in order to preserve the new situation? The simple two-word answer to this question is "highly unlikely". The fact that the PA security forces even allow the IDF to engage in such activity is considered by much of the local population to be an act of treason. It's safe to assume that Hamas and the PIJ will continue to chide it for this, ramping up the bad feelings against it. In such a state of affairs, it is far from certain that the PA will elect to engage in any activity to remove the remains of terrorist activity there.
It may come as no surprise that we will have to continue to do this ourselves.
If we add to this the inbuilt weaknesses of the PA (some of which have been a contributory factor to the creation of the current situation in Jenin) and the impact of the ongoing inheritance battles, as various rivals look to replace the aging Mahmoud Abbas, it is extremely difficult to be the least bit optimistic as to the chances of the Palestinian security forces preserving the counter-terrorist achievements made by the IDF during this current operation.
The most plausible option is that, even in the aftermath of Operation Home and Garden, we will have to continue to root out any potential terrorist activity ourselves, in what might be termed "lawn mowing" activity. The contribution of the current operation to that will take the form of the somewhat more favorable operational conditions that it should provide for any such future operations to be undertaken by the security forces.
Meir Ben Shabbat is head of the Misgav Institute for National Security & Zionist Strategy, in Jerusalem. He served as Israel's national security advisor and head of the National Security Council between 2017 and 2021, and prior to that for 30 years in the General Security Service (the Shin Be security agency or "Shabak").
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