As Operation Shield and Arrow enters its third day, we can already draw with three takeaways: The first – the PIJ has suffered once again a major blow when its senior leadership was taken out and its operational combat worthiness was crippled after the IDF targeted its operational apparatus and arms-manufacturing capabilities; the second – the organization has not been able to exact a price from Israel, not in the south and not with long-range rocket fire toward Israel's main population centers. the third – Hamas has stayed this one out and by doing so prevented the flare-up from expanding, essentially leaving the PIJ to its own devices and making it deal with the consequences of what it has unleashed. This could allow the operation to draw to a conclusion rather quickly.
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This is the first time Israel manages to do a hat-trick. The first was in November 2019, when a senior member of the PIJ was taken out in a quick flare-up. The second was this past summer, in Operation Breaking Dawn, when Israel took out the senior regional commanders of the PIJ. And the third was this week when Operation Shield and Arrow was launched with the triple assassination of PIJ commanders. In all three cases, the PIJ tried to take revenge against Israel but failed miserably. What's worse (for the organization) – it could not get Hamas to join the fight and make the conflagration that much worse.
Israel should not shy away from a confrontation
The success Israel has garnered should lead to three conclusions. First – while Israel should not be itching for a fight in Gaza, it doesn't need to shy away from it, especially when a small and brazen organization like the PIJ is the provocateur. The organization has tried to create linkage between Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip so that any deadly Israeli raid against terrorists in the West Bank would automatically lead to rocket fire from the Gaza Strip. Israel has now put a big flashing sign over that idea, sending the message that if it does not disabuse itself of that idea it will have to pay a price.
Israel has seized the opportunity by taking out various PIJ assets and operatives (from weapon factories to launching pits), while making sure that no Hamas operatives or non-combatants get hurt (except in the first strike at the outset of the operation), with the hope that the Gaza rulers don't join the fighting and have it escalate.
Key actor
The second conclusion is that Israel is almost fully dependent on its air force, which has recently made headlines because of the judicial reform and the opposition by some of its members. Israel has preferred a ground invasion (especially between major operations), making the Israeli aircraft the dominant player in its offensive toolbox and a key player in the defensive posture (alongside ground operations to monitor the border fence and the Israeli civilians' discipline in taking the necessary measures). In terms of sheer numbers, as of Wednesday, there has been a 96% interception rate of all the engaged rockets; over 100 PIJ assets were struck using more than 130 types of ordnances that hit with impressive accuracy.
The third conclusion is that despite the inflammatory rhetoric, Hamas seeks to avoid a confrontation at present. To be more precise: It doesn't want to be dragged into one by the PIJ. Hamas, if and when it decides to enter the fray, will do it for its own reasons and at an opportune moment. This could happen sooner than we think – perhaps in response to the upcoming flag march to celebrate Jerusalem's reunification next week. This depends on whether it pick
s up a sense that the Palestinian street and the Muslim world want to rail against Israel's actions. If Israel acts wisely by defusing this, as it did in 2022, Hamas will prefer to keep things calm in the Gaza Strip and to continue building up its capabilities rather than be consumed by warfare.
Bolstering relations with Jordan
The fourth conclusion is that Egypt remains the most effective and chief mediator when it comes to Gaza. The funds that enter the Gaza Strip may be from Qatar (with PIJ being funded by Iran) but in times of crises, it is Cairo that becomes the go-between. Israel must maintain this channel of communication, which also serves the Palestinians' interests (and the terrorist factions in particular). But at the same time, Israel must move to mend fences with Jordan and the Gulf states as relations frayed a bit recently, and of course, Israel must build ties with Washington, which is necessary for rainy days when Israel will need international legitimacy to carry out more extensive attacks.
The fifth conclusion is that overall fundamentals will have not changed even after the operation is over. Those on the Israeli side who gloated that we have managed to change the equation are advised to think again: This is the third time in three years that Israel carries out this type of operation against the PIJ. This means that any deterrence effect on it is short-lived and needs routine maintenance. Without a clear agenda that would solve the situation in Gaza on a fundamental level (as well as address the overall predicament with the Palestinians), Israel will continue to treat Gaza as a place where it conducts short-term operations to achieve long periods of calm. The government should explain this to the residents of the south before they wake up to the sounds of sirens several weeks from now.
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