With Israel and the US once again in a diplomatic spat, and against the backdrop of increased criticism in America even among Jews, perhaps it is time to go back in time and see how one episode in the bilateral relations in the 1960s when hope and expectations from the new ties were sky-high. Looking back at the moment, one cannot avoid the wish that we could replicate this special magical moment where so many in Washington showed affinity, empathy, and solidarity with the young Jewish state, which in turn allowed the newly founded state to secure strategic benefits. Some of the methods used in this process are revealed here for the first time.
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The protagonists of that episode are two men – Abraham (Abe) Feinberg and Myer (Mike) Feldman – who never held any official leadership role in America's Jewish community but were nevertheless key players in the shadows whose contribution to Israel's security is invaluable. Their relentless efforts to bolster Israel's security had them come close to the highest echelons in the US capital during the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lindon Johnson. Over time, their position allowed them to influence crucial decision-making moments when Israel's wellbeing was at stake, culminating with the successful efforts they led to finalize the sale of US-made arms to Jerusalem, including fighter jets, missiles, and advanced tanks, all the while contributing to a US decision to a accept Israel's nuclear ambiguity
The two resolved to dedicate their time and efforts to bolstering Israel, not for financial reasons or vanity, but primarily so that they could advance what they considered shared interests by the two countries. Feldman was a successful and wealthy lawyer from Philadelphia when he was tapped by President Kennedy to be the liaison officer between the White House and the Jewish community. Feinberg was a philanthropist and a businessman from a family that made its wealth in the textile industry. Although he had been wielding influence in Democratic administrations since 1948, capitalizing on his ties, he became a real mover and shaker under Johnson, when he turned into a secret envoy for Israel, enjoying the blind trust of the president.
Both were the very definition of the "special relationship" between Israel and the US and acted solely because of solidarity with the Jewish state and their commitment to it. The discreetness of the communications channels they led had them gain the trust of all sides, and this allowed them to contribute immensely to Israel's standing in Washington in a way that could positively impact the relations between the two countries long after they left the stage. Now with Israel celebrating its 75th anniversary, their dramatic tale can come to light.
Kennedy's liaison officer
Felamdn was first summoned to the White House after Kennedy narrowly won the 1960 election. The young leader wanted to boost his credentials with the Jewish community, whose support he considered to be a game changer if he were to win reelection in 1964. For this, he believed he needed a "liaison officer" for the community. For Feldman, this was akin to an emergency deployment straight into the heat of the political world that included lost income. But he nevertheless agreed because he was concerned for Israel's vital interests.
His first action, which he did together with Feinberg, was in arranging the unofficial meeting between then-Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and Kennedy in New York in May 1961. This was not just a logistical matter – it was complicated due to fierce opposition by some circles in the administration. Feldman ultimately wielded his unique influence on the presidential decision-making process in the run-up to the procurement deal with Israel for Hawk surface-to-air missiles: For the first time, a US administration agreed to transfer sophisticated weapon systems to Israel. This created an important precedent on the path charted by Ben-Gurion as he sought to make Washington Israel's main arms supplier.
Feldman became a key player in the fierce intra-administration battle that saw the State Department wage a losing battle against the Pentagon and the National Security Council to scrap the deal. The efforts by Foggy Bottom to derail the shipment were aimed at nipping in the bud any strategic relationship between the two countries while the president had still not made up a final decision on whether to attach any strings to their sale.
This clash reached a boiling point in the summer of 1962 when the issue of the Hawk issue got intertwined with another matter that ostensibly had nothing to do with it. At the time, the president wanted to find a way to settle Palestinian refugees, which had eluded him since he took the oath of office. Kennedy considered this to be a top priority because he wanted to stop having the US bear the brunt of the budgetary costs for UNRWA, the UN agency dealing with displaced Palestinians. He viewed a diplomatic deal to be the best course to achieve that goal. Some 18 months earlier he appointed a special representative to the UN's Palestine Conciliation Commission, Joseph Johnson, and now the moment of truth had arrived. That moment ultimately boiled down to the question of how the administration would go about bringing Israel on board to the deal Johnson had drafted in the commission even though its main tenet stipulated that it allow back 100,000 refugees. The dilemma facing Kennedy was immense because Ben-Gurion was adamant that he would not allow even a partial implementation of the so-called "Right of Return."
Against this backdrop, newly released documents from the archives show, Feldman played a unique role in approving the Hawk deal without having Israel commit to real concessions on refugees. Even though Kennedy initially wanted to demand Israel make a clear statement that it was adopting the Johnson Plan in full before he signs off on the sale, Feldman's lobbying efforts ultimately had the president backtrack and soften his stance.
Although Feldman was not the only person who wanted to have the missile deal go through without linking it to progress on other matters, his meetings with JFK in August 1962 at the White House were what ultimately made the difference in Israel's favor. During those meetings, Feldman laid out a series of arguments that convinced the president to back his position.
Feldman's first argument was that any attempt to create a direct linkage between the deal and the refugee plan was doomed because Israel, being the young and proud nation that it is, will interpret such a condition as an infringement on its sovereignty and an attempt to extract concessions on its overarching national security concerns. However, what ultimately swayed the president was Feldman, who had been appointed in order to deliver the Jewish vote for Kennedy. He told the president that if he were to give immediate approval for the deal he will get a significant boost politically. Feldman showed the president that fast-track approval would culminate with the actual delivery of the systems as early as October 1964, when the presidential campaign would be in full throttle ahead of the crucial vote the following months and the footage of the shipments would provide great optics that demonstrate his support for the Jews and secure their backing. In other words, supplying the missiles with much pomp and circumstance on Israeli soil just weeks before voters cast their ballot would be the ultimate proof of his pro-Israel credentials and that his commitment to Israel's security is ironclad and go beyond just rhetoric.
The rest is history: Not only did Kennedy fully endorse Feldman's arguments, but he also sent him directly to Ben-Gurion to inform him personally about the historic decision, telling the Israeli prime minister that there were no strings attached apart from an "expectation" that Israel would review the Johnson plan in good faith.
The plan was soon forgotten. Israel rejected it even after it was tweaked at the last moment, and the Arab world similarly said "No" outright. But this did not stop the administration from delivering the missiles in 1964, and neither was the fact that Kennedy was assassinated almost a year earlier and the Jewish vote had already been secured by Johnson without the deal. But all this does not diminish the credit that should go to the quiet mediator Feldman over his role in finalizing the deal.
A back channel to Johnson
Feldman did not do this all by himself, but in tandem with Abe Feinberg, who was an unofficial envoy to the Jewish state: Abe Feinberg – a businessman, philanthropist, and a prominent member of the Jewish community. Some credit his many funds to the Harry Truman campaign in 1948 helped him convince the Democratic president that year to recognize Israel 11 minutes after it had declared independence on May 14.
Feinberg reached the zenith of his career under the Johnson administration, but his contribution to the relationship between the two countries was much noticeable even during the Kennedy years. Ben Gurion's request to meet Kennedy soon after the Democrat took office was met with opposition from administration officials, including from within the White House. But after intense lobbying efforts vis-a-vis the US and the Israelis – which involved convincing Ben-Gurion to let inspectors visit the reactor being built near Dimona, the famous – yet unofficial – meeting took place in New York in May 1961. Only in 1964 was an Israeli prime minister invited for the first time to the White House.
During the Johnson administration, Feinberg became a key go-between for effective and discreet communications with Israel and from it, won the full trust of the president. Shortly after he was sworn in, the new president met Feinberg and even consulted with him on whether he should purge anti-Israel officials at the State Department and replace them with more pro-Israel personnel in order to bolster ties.
During the Johnson years, Feinberg played key roles in the processes that bolstered and deepened the relations between the two nations. These processes laid the foundation for the strategic ties that continue today. His ability to convey messages succinctly, delicately, and reliably, especially in the Johnson-Eshkol axis. The fact that the two forged a close bond during Eshkol's visit in June of 1964, was also very important in that regard.
One of the most dramatic episodes in this context happened in late 1964 after the administration decided to give Jordan arms. Washington needed Israel's tacit approval so that it could sell the deal to the US public – which was mostly pro-Israel – as something that Jerusalem could live with. By getting such an OK, the administration hoped that it could avoid an embarrassing public firestorm. The US envoys that arrived in Israel – W. Averell Harriman and Robert Komer – were given instructions to make tough statements that would link the future supply of arms to Israel with immediate approval on providing arms to Jordan. They also made demands that Israel allow inspection of the Dimona nuclear reactor and an Israeli pledge not to launch a pre-emptive war to secure its water supply on the northern border. Their Israeli interlocutors pushed back forcefully.
Feinberg's involvement as a back-channel envoy (after all, he was a private citizen) between the US president and the Israeli leadership allowed the two sides to appreciate the rules of engagement, the various interests at play, and the degree to which both sides could compromise. Feinberg's rapport with the president allowed him to pick up what Johnson truly thought rather than the views that would go through the filter of the State Department. As a result, he was better equipped at describing what the US strategic interests are in his engagement with the White House on Israel, and this ultimately brought about a major softening in Johnson's stance on the linkage for the deal.
Indeed this effort by Feinberg behind the scenes helped reach the secret memorandum of understanding between the US and Israel, signed on March 10, 1965, in which Israel agreed that the administration sell arms to Jordan, while the US for the first time expressed a willingness to sell offensive weapon systems to the Jewish state. Moreover, the MOU was the first time Israel's nuclear ambiguity was put into writing.
"The Government of Israel has reaffirmed that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Arab-Israel area". Later on, the MOU was followed up by new deals to supply Israel with Patton tanks and Skyhawk fighter jets between 1965-1966.
On the way to a Phantom deal
In January 1968, some six months after the Six-Day War, during the meeting between Eshkol and Johnson in the latter's ranch in Texas, Israel made a request to get PHantom jets, which was at the time the crown jewel of the US weapons industry. The request was greenlighted that October.
During the talks between the two sides on the terms of the deals, the US made far-reaching decisions linking the supply of the deal to Israel making concessions on the nuclear issue, its development and deployment of missiles, and essentially anything that had to do with Israel's national security. Against this backdrop, the talks between then-Ambassador to the US Yitzhak Rabin and the State Department representative Paul Warnke became heated. Since it appeared that the US bureaucracy was trying to pull a fast one without the president, Feinberg got into the mix and intervened on behalf of Israel by contacting Johnson, circumventing the State Department and the Pentagon. And indeed, eventually, this resulted in the White House issuing a presidential order to supply Israel with the aircraft without forcing it to change its nuclear ambiguity formula.
The discreet back channel of communication Feinberg proved to be invaluable. It allowed both sides the ability to gauge the other party's vital interests, assess their delicate political situation, and get an understanding of the rules of engagement as to the understandings that could be reached. All the while, it also included a direct line to the president and prime minister of each country respectively.
With the benefit of hindsight many decades later, the contribution of the two shadow men Feldman and Feinberg is an impressive feat that contributed to upgrading Israel's stature in Washington. This upgrade picked up pace later on. Their efforts on behalf of Israel – which they believed also advanced the US interests – were carried out with determination and sound judgment. It is all the more impressive because it took place behind the scenes without seeking public glory or having their names appear in the media headlines. Thanks to their work, Israel could whisper directly into two presidents' ears during a period that is critical to its national security. The covert nature of the backchannels they provided, alongside the desire to truly serve both parties, earned them the trust of both leaderships. This is what made them so powerful figures.
Professor Abraham Ben-Zvi heads the dual degree program in international relations offered jointly by the University of Haifa and the University of Warsaw. Dr. Gadi Warsha teaches political science at the University of Haifa. Their upcoming book, published by the Open University, is called "Key issues in Israel's foreign policy 1948-2018".
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