On January 17, 2023, Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi will complete his billet as IDF chief of staff and will begin the process of discharging from the military. That day, Israel's prime minister and defense minister will place the rank insignia on his successor, Herzi Halevi.
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He started as a paratrooper, continued to the elite intelligence commando unit Sayeret Matkal and back to the Paratroopers Brigade, followed by the appointment as the head of the IDF Intelligence Directorate and the GOC of all three regional commands. This path primed him for this new position he is about to undertake. Although some have tried to torpedo his appointment and impeach it, nothing has stuck: Halevi's record is beyond reproach, and has all the qualifications necessary to perform well.
As he prepares to assume his new role on the 14th floor of the IDF General Headquarters in the Rabin Base in roughly two months, he will continue a long onboarding process. Although he knows the IDF in and out, he wants to learn and hear out those who may have views he does not share. He is also very much engaged in thought over what to do with various issues that he would have to address upon becoming the chief: operational issues and the organizational structure of the military; the processes that are underway or need to be launched; and the personnel matters. A man who knows Halevi well said this week that he was unlikely to radically change things on day one. "Unlike others, he doesn't talk the talk; he walks the walk; he will not just enter the Defense Ministry and expound on his agenda - he will just implement it. It may take several months, but the change will be noticeable."
Halevi will have to marshal a lot of skills when he starts: assertiveness, aggressiveness, common sense, diplomatic and political acumen, as well as some mischief and good negotiating skills. He will need to go soft even as he hits hard so that he can manage such a complex organization and navigate Israeli political chaos, which is as convoluted. He already has those skills and he will have to fine-tune them. "He has the necessary skill set to succeed," one of his predecessors says. "He will just have to have no fear of anyone or anything and be true to his convictions and that he is on the right path."
A traditional childhood home
Halevi will be 55 in December, making him the first IDF chief to be born after the 1967 Six-Day War. His name is a nod to his later uncle who was killed in that war. He grew up in a traditional Jewish home in Jerusalem. His father, Shlomo, owned a consulting business in the city and was a right-wing local politician who served in the city council for 10 years. Shlomo died from cancer 22 years ago, at 59, and was later memorialized when a street was named after him in the city. The mother, Tzila, was born to a family whose roots in Jerusalem can be traced back 15 generations. She worked as a physical education teacher in a high school, creating a crop of talented Israeli women athletes. Today she lives in Tel Aviv, not far from her eldest, Amir, who until recently was director general at the Tourism Ministry. Halevi visits her often, usually straight after wrapping up things at work.
In his early childhood, he lived in the capital's German Colony's high-rise buildings. His family moved when he was four years old to the northern part of Jerusalem, Ramat Eshkol – a neighborhood built after the city was expanded following the Six-Day War. He studied in a religious-Zionist school and high school; the Israel Scout's local religious chapter was the center of his life at the time, with his parents being members as well.
Halevi is married to Sharon. Their friends describe them as a loving couple that has many people over for dinner. They have four children: The eldest, Klil, is a professional swimmer who has excelled in that field, focusing on long races and open-water swims; Lia, who has completed her studies at the Ein Prat preparatory school and now serves as an intelligence non-commissioned officer; and two other boys, Itay and Yoav, who are still in school. Halevi has been described by those who know him as a very-involved parent who attends his children's events. He has often found himself spending all of a Saturday at the Wingate Institute to root for Klil in an important race until sundown so that he won't have to violate Shabbat. Although he doesn't wear a kippah and has often said that he wears a "transparent" one all the time, he can be considered the first religious IDF chief of staff.
Halevi is a sports fanatic himself. He swims, goes on biking trips, and mostly jogs. When he is out on a run, he arranges so that his driver meets him somewhere on the route and joins him. Each morning starts with some form of physical activity, regardless of where he is on the globe. Even when he visited Qatar several years ago, as the GOC Southern Command (alongside then-Mossad Chief Yossi Cohen), some claim to have seen him run on the Doha seafront, with his security detail struggling to catch up.
He lives near Modiin in central Israel, where many other high-level security officials live, including some of his friends. Halevi has a wide social network the majority of whom served alongside him in Sayeret Matkal, but only a handful of them enjoy his complete confidence. One of them is Gaby Portnoy, the Director General of the Israel National Cyber Directorate, who served as the IDF Head of Operations in the Intelligence Directorate.
When he was offered to serve in that position he was torn. It was a high-ranking and influential position within the intelligence community - having been created as a lesson from the 2006 Second Lebanon War - with the overarching responsibility for amalgamating information from all the other intelligence agencies as well as streamlining operations within the IDF. Portnoy consulted with Halevi, who was then the head of the IDF Intelligence Directorate and his would-be predecessor was to take the job. Portnoy recalls that he was awed by how Halevi, who truly wanted him to take up the job and serve under his command, sat with him for hours and explained at great lengths not just the pros but also the cons of accepting the offer.
"Herzi will always tell you the unvarnished truth, even if it does not serve his interests," a close friend says. "He will do a deep dive into the situation to explain its various elements and then reconnect all the fragments once again into a larger picture. Few people know how to do this like him." Former Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, whom Halevi served under as intelligence chief and then as GOC Southern Command, also concurs that Halevi is a great explainer-in-chief. "American officials were always impressed by him; from his professionalism, his focus, and the fact that he has no bullshit."
Halevi began his service as a conscripted soldier in 1985, joining the Nahal Brigade's paratroopers, and soon climbed up the ladder. After becoming an officer, he was a platoon commander, battalion operations officer, and platoon commander in the 101st Battalion, before becoming the commander of the Orev Antitank Unit in the brigade. At the time there was daily combat in Lebanon, and the platoon was deployed in one of the forward operating bases in the eastern part of the Lebanon frontline.
In 1993, having completed his billet, he moved on to Sayeret Matkal, becoming the commander of its training squad. "In Sayeret Matkal, usually this post goes to someone from the outside," recalls Nitzan Alon, who commanded the squad before Halevi took over. "It's not good to have a unit grown only within its own domain; it's better to have an infusion of new blood from the outside with officers who can serve from its future command echelon." Many other senior IDF officials who went on to become part of the top brass pass through the same path.
Yuval Rachmilevich, who was the deputy commander of the elite unit when Halevi joined, said, "I didn't select him but it was immediately clear that he was a highly professional officer; as the head of the training squad, Halevi worked closely with the deputy commander, so we got to spend a lot of time together, Later on, I had him join operational activity, which was the first time he partook in such combat experience as part of the unit."
When Rachmilevich took over as unit commander in 1996, Alon became his deputy, while Halevi began pursuing his academic degree. "After a year in university I called him back; I told him to cut his studies short and become my second deputy. I worked hard to persuade him, but he ultimately agreed."
In his new role, Halevi would go on to command operations, including one that was highly complex on the northern front. "These three years were very intense, I got to know him up close. He is one of the more talented officers I have ever met; one of the most noticeable when it comes to professionalism, and his ability to lead and grasp the situation at hand. We usually assess commanders based on their ability to command and lead, but Herzi also has a high intellect, which allows him to make the right decision in sophisticated and challenging situations where you have to marshall all of your resources and skills. This was very clear in his case, especially when he faced challenges that no one had had to deal with previously, which is what the unit's core job is."
In 1994, the unit botched an operation to rescue then-IDF hostage Nachshon Wachsman. During the raid, the unit encountered unforeseen challenges, which resulted in the terrorists killing the soldiers. Nir Poraz, one of the commandos who took part in the raid as a team leader, was also killed. Halevi would later describe the raid as a failure. He added that although such operations usually have very slim chances of actually succeeding, the IDF would have to learn the right lessons from what went wrong as part of the fight against terrorism.
Halevi would go on to become one of the most prominent figures in the unit. "He spread his wings impressively and quickly when it came to the command and operational aspects," Alon says. "He always brought things into a wider perspective; he was involved in all things. You could pick his brain on something – be it on the combat worthiness of the forces, the operational risks, or new ideas. Commanders are always very lonely, especially in such units, and it was important for him to have someone as a sounding board. I would often have him join operations so that he could serve in a senior command role next to the younger commander on the ground."
Nerve-racking decisions
During one of those operations, there was a dilemma that the troops unexpectedly had to deal with only a very limited window. A foreign soldier suddenly appeared out of nowhere, and a decision had to be made. "This was a nerve-racking situation," said one of those who were present there. "It is one of those cases in which the wrong decision can ruin the entire operation. Not doing anything would have also had ramifications. Herzi engaged in a very agile and logical analysis of the situation and took the right decision. It was amazing to see his ability to disengage from the situation and act with such cool and calmness, despite being under duress."
After ALong completed his billet as the head of Sayeret Matkal, Halevi made a bid to replace him, facing two other contenders who had served in the unit: Oded Razor (who commanded it after Halevi and died in 2014 from cardiac arrest) and Yoram Yaffe. Halevi, who was the outsider, managed to beat both. He got command of the unit in 2001 and served for three years in that job. During his tenure, the unit made new inroads, but also came under criticism for not pitching in like other special forces (mostly the naval commando) in the fight against Palestinian terrorists during the Second Intifadah, specifically during Operation Defensive Shield.
Upon completing his service at the helm of Sayeret Matakal, Halevi left for Washington, DC, where he completed his Master's Degree in National Resources Management at National Defense University (he completed his Bachelor's in philosophy and business administration at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem). When he came to Israel, he was appointed as the commander of the Menashe Brigade, which operates in the Jenin area, and two years later was tapped to become the head of the Paratroopers Brigade. He led the brigade during Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009, with his troops taking up positions in the northern part of the Gaza Strip.
Aharon Haliva, who currently serves as the head of the Intelligence Directorate, succeeded him in that position. The two had an acrimonious relationship due to the fact that Halevi did not begin his service as a paratrooper and hence was not part of the clique. This was not the only bad blood he has seen in his military service. Major General Amir Baram, who replaced him two weeks ago as deputy chief of staff and will also serve as his second in command, had tense relations, to put it mildly. As far as is publicly known, Halevi preferred to have someone else serve as his right-hand man, but he will now have to find a way to collaborate in a rather challenging era in national security.
Another major spat he had was with the head of the IDF Intelligence Research and Analysis Division chief, Eli Ben-Meir. "It began with professional disagreements, the things you see all the time between the head of the directorate and the research chief, but this ultimately spiraled into a personal feud," one senior official who was in the know at the time says. "Neither one was a saint in this saga. Halevi adopted a my-way-or-the-highway' approach, and Ben-Meir refused to accept his authority as commander." Ultimately then-chief of staff Eisenkot had to settle things and decided to give Halevi the upper hand. Ben-Meir did something that was then unprecedented: He resigned. Eisenkot later said that he was still convinced he made the right decision. Halevi may have had a rough start, but he grew into the job and became a great intelligence chief.
"Herzi never itches for a fight, but he also is never afraid to fight," a close associate, who served next to him in a variety of roles, says. "When he believes in something, he goes all the way. There is no doubt that he is very brave on the battlefield, but those who have worked with him know that he is also very brave in speaking his mind to his superiors, even if his views don't align with theirs. He is a very stubborn person in his overall perceptions; very much convinced that he is right. This has created a lot of clashes in his career and I worry this could continue in the future, especially in a government where some are going to be very contrarian to the IDF and him personally."
Knows Gantz for a long time
Even before he had reached the IDF Intelligence Directorate Halevi was the head of the Operations Division and then the head of the 91st Division, which is responsible for the Lebanese theater. Toward the end of that billet, in November 2013, The New York Times ran a lengthy profile piece on him in which he was crowned as the future chief of the IDF. This was an educated guess on the Gray Lady's part: Halevi was then much more prominent than other commanders in his orbit, and that is why it was decided to make him the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, which is usually given to experienced major generals. He got it as the first assignment in that rank, after a small stint as the head of the IDF Command and Staff College
Before Defense Minister Gantz, who was the chief of staff, decided to tap him to be his chief intelligence officer, he first asked Halevi to join him for a run near the Yarkon River. While jogging, Gantz informed him that he had decided to give him the lucrative position. The two know each other for a long time: they met when Halevi was a paratrooper and again when he commanded Sayeret Matkal. Gantz once said that Halevi was the commander in a mission that required rapid advancement toward the target in highly challenging terrain. Even though he was 20 years older than the rank-and-file soldiers, Halevi got there first.
When he was intelligence chief, he made sure to expand his horizons. He would insist that his schedule on visits to the US – however busy – include academics so that he can get a deep dive into a host of issues. From energy and demography to economic and global affairs In Israel, he would always find time to meet with high school students to make another pitch for combat service.
During his time at the helm of Israel's intelligence community, four main challenges preoccupied decision-makers. First, there was the Iranian nuclear program and the nuclear deal that emerged in 2015; second, the civil war in Syria, the war against the Islamic State, and the intense activity Israel carried out in the so-called "War between Wars"; the third, is the ongoing battle against Palestinian terrorism, including lone-wolf terrorism, but also against Hamas networks in Gaza and the West Bank; the fourth - internal processes in the military. During his time in intelligence, he thwarted the effort to create a cyber directorate, making sure that it remained under the auspices of Unit 8200, famous for its signal intelligence capabilities. Halevi went to war over this - and won.
Under Halevi, the Intelligence Directorate saw a flourishing relationship with Mossad and the Shin Bet, which culminated with a new arrangement that put an end to the disputes over jurisdiction and resources. He did it while sticking to his guns over what he truly believed. "He had quite a few disagreements with Yoram Cohen, who was then Shin Bet chief," Alon recalls. "I told him to bury the hatchet because it was destructive, but he stayed the course, and ultimately this produced something good. I believe that with Ronen Bar as the head of the agency he will have a better time dealing; they go a long way back, they are from the same cohort."
Yossi Cohen was the Mossad director while Halevi was the intelligence chief, including during the famed operation in which agents stole the Iranian nuclear archive. He says that it was a challenging experience to work with Halevi. "Herzi is very different from other generals in how he thinks and exercises his command. He is a very good person, with the right stamina, is extremely bright, and he knows how to read and analyze the situation. I very much welcome his appointment as chief of staff. We worked many years together, including on overseas trips, and he was always willing to listen and collaborate, even when we were in disagreement. We could always talk about the things at hand; we put everything on the table."
Halvei headed the intelligence directorate for 3.5 years, and then became GOC Southern Command for 2.5 years, until March 2021. This was a relatively calm period in the Gaza theater, with the most dramatic incident being the targeted killing of a senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist by Israel in November 2019, which led to a major flare-up that lasted several days. Halevi was one of those who advocated separating Hamas from the other groups so that it does not get involved in the hostilities. Just recently, in August, Israel adopted the same posture when it managed to target the senior leadership of the PIJ without having Hamas get dragged in.
On the front, next to the fighters
During his time as GOC Southern Command, Hamas led the weekly riots on the border fence. Halevi would regularly arrive at the scene to be next to the commanders and their subordinates. "He made sure not to upstage the local commanders, including the division commander. He did not sit where they would sit and did not take authority away from them," a person who worked closely with him recalls. "At the same time, he also made sure to get down to the minute details, such as how many shots each sharpshooter fired and how many were successful, and then cross-checked this information with a media report from Gaza. He carried out after-action reports to get as much certainty as possible as to how things unfolded. This did exact a toll on the troops deployed, but he was adamant."
Halevi sought solutions that would avert the resumptions of hostilities in Gaza. That's why he joined Mossad chief Cohen on his visit to Doha to convince the Qataris to increase the monthly aid they send there. For the same reason, he promoted the defense ties with Egypt and had the entire operational focus shift to the Gaza theater while ensuring that there would be an economic-diplomatic component to every plan, as he saw those aspects as crucial for the success of the overarching effort. During that period he also invested more time in media relations. Although he had been holding occasional briefings with reporters even before that (he was not keen on background conversations and unauthorized leaks), he believed that as GOC Southern Command it was crucial to explain what was unfolding in the Gaza theater to both the Israeli public and the world. He was convinced that this was critical to avoid friction and find solutions. This posture was also what he adopted upon becoming deputy chief of staff. He also waged a losing battle to convince economic reporters that the Finance Ministry was wrong in the ongoing budget wars surrounding defense and the salary of career officers in the IDF.
Two events that took place under his watch as GOC Southern Command made headlines. The first is when an Ethiopian-Israeli Solomon Tekah was killed accidentally by police fire (due to a ricocheting bullet). The ensuing protests by his community over alleged police brutality against them had the IDF address the situation as well. Col. Dr. Avi Yitzhak, the most senior Ethiopian-Israeli officer in the IDF, who was then the Southern Command's chief medical officer, asked Halevi to discuss the matter with him. After their conversation, Halevi wrote a letter to every officer in the command. "I write to you on a topic that is neither operational nor professional, but it deals with who we are. We have witnessed a protest for the past several days due to the tragic death of Teka. There are no bad guys and good guys here, there is only justifiable frustration and an incident that should have not occurred ."
"We have the ability to effect change. The IDF offers an opportunity to do things toward the unity of Israeli society, even though we make mistakes as well when it comes to the treatment of Ethiopian Israelis. I would like each and every one of you to talk to the Ethiopian_israelis in their unit and in light of the past several days, do so with the proper sensitivities; tell them that you think that it was wrong to have this incident reach such a tragic conclusion, and point out to them that we believe we can be better in the future when it comes to accepting them. We believe and we will work to make it happen. Together we carry out important tasks regardless of color or other traits. Together we risk our lives and pay the ultimate price in blood whose red color is shared by everyone. Together we will try to emerge better from these intense days. You are the commanders, your subordinates are looking up to you. Speak with them and listen to them; embrace them."
According to a source close to Halevi, the decision to send the letter was made amid concern that Ethiopian-Israeli soldiers might refuse orders. "Herzi was very worried over that scenario and also shaken to his core by the Teka incident, viewing it as an opportunity to upgrade the treatment of the community."
The second event was less successful. Halevi arrived at the Hatzerim Air Base, from where he was to fly to a Givati Brigade battalion-level drill on the Golan Heights. Halevi brought his personal secretary with him, but when it turned out she didn't have proper identification, she was refused entry. Halevi ultimately ordered the guard to let her in but she refused because she had standing orders that prohibited that and the two engaged in heated debate. The saga reached then-Israeli Air Force chief Amikam Norkin and the press, with Halevi taking a beating. Several days later Halevi returned to the base to speak with the soldiers about this incident, and the details of those conversations also leaked.
"This was not a good story," a source who was involved in this saga told me. "Herzi was his classic straight shooting self, and technically the facts were on his side: As a major general he has the authority to order a guard to let someone in and this means this overrides her standing orders. She and her superiors were just being obnoxious, and that's too bad. But on the other hand, she should have not engaged in such a clash with them, it was beneath him. Things could have been quickly resolved with a phone call to the Israeli Air Force chief's bureau, and this would have averted the big brouhaha."
On the table: Crises
As deputy chief of staff, Halevi has dealt primarily with budgetary matters, manpower, and military acquisition. He has been on good terms with Kochavi and some have even gone so far as to suggest that the latter had not endorsed Halevi for the top job before he got it. Kochavi refutes that, saying he did in fact recommend Halevi for the position.
Halevi bested the other finalized, Major General Eyal Zamir, and despite what the media portrayed, they were never on an equal footing. Halevi was tapped because he was the obvious choice; it was almost self-explanatory that he would get the job. Even Zamir assessed that he had almost zero chance of landing the job.
"Herzi has been blessed with quiet leadership skills and a wide grasp of strategy, along with a versatile military experience and the ability to lead real change," Gantz said recently when he explained why he chose Halevi. "I am certain that he will know how to preserve the IDF as the people's military, a force that has an operational mission but also an important role in Israeli society as a whole and the values it espouses. Herzi will know how to build the next echelon of commanders who will continue to take the IDF forward and renew its capabilities, but also remember the foundation it rests on: the people, the battle heroism that has been built over the past 70 years."
All these qualities should help Halevi navigate the whole gamut of complete challenges. The ones that look simple to the public are actually the most concerning: the operational aspects. Halevi knows all theaters and served in all of them. He was a brigade commander in Judea and Samaria, a division commander in the north, a GOC Southern Command, and as the head of intelligence who saw the entire picture. He will of course be able to influence things but he knows full well that his clout is limited and depends on a whole host of variables: global, regional, economic, and of course – political, as a new government is about to take office, which could see changes in Israel's overall security. This is particularly true on the Palestinian front, which has been simmering with tension over the past several months and could burst, according to the warnings that have been sounded by the IDF Intelligence Directorate and the Shin Bet for a long time.
The most complex problems are going to be the internal front: The IDF has had to contend with a variety of crises, each of them more complex than the other. This includes the erosion of public trust, the declining motivation (in both combat and non-combat units), and the difficulty in personnel retention when it comes to high-quality officers, especially in the mid-level echelons – because of the compensation and salaries, as well as the ongoing struggle over what the values of the IDF rare and its overall characteristics, including on service of women and the pressures by external elements with their own ideology or political agenda.
Judging from his past experience, it is likely that Halevi will not tolerate such meddling. Although he is traditional, he is a great proponent of integrating women wherever that is possible in terms of needs and capabilities. Even though he was raised in a home that is ideologically on the Right, he will not let political forces impose their agenda at the expense of the IDF's above-the-fray values.
"Herzi comes from a religious background, but he will know how to incorporate it well. I believe he is the role model for how to combine the two worlds," Rachmilevich says. "I have never witnessed him trying to distinguish the two, he only builds bridges. I am sure this will also be noticeable in the way he conducts himself as chief of staff. He is a superb human being and commander. Had he not been appointed as chief of staff, this would have been a missed opportunity on a historic proportion."
Alon echoes that. "He is a stubborn man, he won't make it easy for the politicians," Along says. "He will have to deal with a political environment that will not be too helpful, but he is not one for buckling under pressure. He can withstand criticism, he is sensitive, and takes things to heart, but this will only sharpen his defenses. But he will have to choose which hills to die on so that he won't be fighting a constant war."
Eisenkot concurs that the most challenging part facing Halevi in his new role is the triangle of society-military-people. "He will have to constantly ask himself what kind of military we want. In a reality where only 48% of would-be draftees get inducted, and the military is a punching bag, he might have to contend with a big problem inside the military. Luckily for him and for us, we have an ironclad echelon that knows how to stand firm rather than cut corners."
Alongside the permanent challenges regarding Iran's nuclearization and its support for terrorism in the region, when it comes to the Palestinian arena and northern border, Halevi will have to make far-reaching decisions regarding the structure of the ground forces, there are even those who believe that it is time to make a bold move by dismantling this disposition and reassembling it. For this, he will have to get the government's backing, especially its three main power foci: prime minister, defense minister, and finance minister.
A not-so-smooth appointment
Halevi's appointment may look like a normal event, but it was not a smooth ride. Defense Minister Benny Gantz picked him after the coalition had already called an election. This made any such high-level appointment by a caretaker government questionable under Israeli law. Ultimately a green light was given by the attorney general, who had been convinced by Gantz that making an appointment during the transition between governments was essential and that any delay could hurt state security. Later the special nominations committee tasked with vetting high-level appointments convened but only after the High Court of Justice prevented its chairman from being appointed for a full eight years because under Israeli law making such long-term appointments during an election should be avoided.
As a result of the limited approval from the High Court of Justice, former Justice Elyakim Rubinstein agreed to be appointed on an ad-hoc basis so that Halevi could be vetted and approved. Halevi passed with flying colors, despite one member saying it would have been better to delay the appointment until the elections were over.
Halevi enjoyed good relations with the incoming prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who even sought to have Halevi serve as his military secretary but the latter preferred not to veer off his track. When Halevi was tapped as the next chief of staff, some of Netanyahu's allies said that the outgoing government pulled a fast one on the future government, and some said the actual appointment should be undone so that a new government decides once the elections are over. Netanyahu did not make a statement on the issue, so one could hope that he would find a way to embrace the appointment his predecessor made. A prime minister that has the back of the IDF chief is critical if the military is to successfully perform its whole range of missions.
This is of course just as true when it comes to the backing from the new defense minister, whoever it may be. Halevi will have a difficult adjustment period, which could see the new minister demand that more religious soldiers get promoted or that various processes relating to Judaism be stopped. "Defense ministers have usually been hands-off on those issues, giving their chiefs of staff a free reign on this. But things are different now," a senior official says. "If Halevi blinks at the start of his relationship with the defense minister, he will turn himself into a lame duck for the remainder of his term as chief of staff. He must stand firm and remember that the chief of staff is the most popular person in Israel."
Q: That is a dangerous thing to say. After all, a chief of staff is not a politician and is not elected.
"That is true, but the popularity the IDF and its chief enjoy plays a critical role in having them do their job successfully."
The goal: new blood for the general staff
Halevi will oversee a whole host of changes, not just in the ground force disposition. Some believe he will have to rebuild the IDF by letting go of many high-level officials and promoting younger and talented brigadiers generals so that there is new blood in the system. "Today the general staff is dogmatic, weak, and is plagued by groupthink that speaks in one voice," says one official. "This may look like a good thing for the incoming chief of staff but that is a big misperception. In fact, it is a recipe for disaster. Halevi must make sure he has a pluralistic general staff, including contrarian officers. He should surround himself with people who tell him every morning that he is wrong; it will serve him well."
One such move could have already taken place when Halevi appointed a highly qualified intelligence colonel to be his personal aid without knowing him prior. "Usually chiefs of staff appoint to this job people who are their close confidant. Halevi did the exact opposite, he appointed the most qualified person. That means he has no fear."
And still, Halevi will have to be more open than he is used to. He is usually open as a commander, but as a person, he is an introvert. He will have to learn how to handle the media as well. He does give media briefings but in his new role, he will have to learn how to give interviews and do so without being so tense in his body language. At the same time, he will also need to show more ruthlessness. A chief of staff is where the buck stops. The lower echelons will try to push things up the command chain when they don't want to make a decision, but he will ultimately have to call the shots. In many cases, from decisions on medals and dismissals to various statements and clashes with politicians – he will ultimately have to step into the line of fire by making a decision one way or the other. And no matter what he decides, he will come under criticism.
"Herzi has all the skills necessary to succeed in this job," Eisenkot says. "He is very clever, very opinionated, and creative, as well as knows how to keep cool. He knows how to take risks and make decisions - including those that are unpopular. He is a hard worker and expects a lot from himself before he asks the same from others. I have no doubt that he will challenge the people around him, including his superiors.
Another challenge Halevi will have to address is the rehabilitation of the special operations disposition, which he knows well from his time as a commando, and as a senior officer in the Operations Division as director of intelligence. He knows full well that this disposition has been essentially stagnant since the botched operation in the Gaza Strip in which a senior officer was killed. This stagnation is also a result of various changes undertaken in the units involved. "Herzi has all the necessary qualifications to lead this change in this field," says a senior official who worked with him in the past. "He must not shy away from taking risks. He has to think in an offensive and operational posture and pursue that goal. His red beret is not for decoration, it makes him duty-bound."
Ehud Schneorson, who was the head of Unit 8200 when Halevi was chief of intelligence, says that his leadership would be tested in what he calls "extreme moments" and on value issues. "He is a complex person, but he has a backbone comprising some of the best values I have ever seen. He is one of those people that you want to see in those positions making decisions, whether in battle or in the command center. His analysis in moments of crisis and his ability to enter a battle and win is a great advantage in my view. This will help him in the complex political battles that lay ahead as chief of staff.
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