On Nov. 1, Israel will choose its future leadership, but regardless of whether the Netanyahu bloc will return to power, or the Lapid camp will keep its positions, the next government will have to tackle a series of challenges.
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Iran
Israel's greatest security challenge. The source of all immediate and long-term, direct and indirect, evils and dangers. From nuclear bombs, through regional and global terrorism, to products of the Iranian military industry which are exported to many countries – even though Russia takes the lead in the headlines, Iranian warfare also stars in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon; from cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles to precision rockets and advanced technology.
The new government will be required to make dramatic decisions in regard to Iran. If a nuclear agreement is signed – it will postpone any confrontation with the potential of an Iranian bomb for several years, but if not, Israel may be forced to take independent action (and possibly quite soon, if the Iranians decide to create a breakthrough of the bomb or move to a 90% military level enrichment). For this purpose, Israel will have to define its red lines, form coalitions, formulate validity, and above all – complete military readiness and maintain a reliable and available military option, which, when activating, will keep the Iranian nuclear project at bay for a considerable period of time.
The Iranian challenge will keep the next government occupied on numerous fronts: from the decision on the scope and nature of the secret attacks on Iranian soil (including cyber activities), through the formation of a regional and international front that will make the situation difficult for Iran, to the strengthening and expansion of ties with the countries that signed on the Abraham Accords, which have also been threatened by Iran (and have less abilities than Israel of protecting themselves).
The northern front
It is anticipated that the economic water agreements will calm the Lebanese zone, and might even form a future barrier against escalation, but the challenge posed by Hezbollah is only intensifying. The organization is amassing its arsenal of precision rockets, which threaten to become a genuine strategic threat. The next government will be forced to decide when the organization is approaching a critical mass, requiring counter-action. Many sources believe that this should happen as soon as possible, before mutual deterrence thwarts any practical possibility of Israeli action.
The gas agreements might also be the beginning of a process that will help pull Lebanon out of its economic crisis. Contrary to popular belief (1) a weak Lebanon is not good for Israel, because it may tempt extremist elements, mainly the Hezbollah, to break the rules in an attempt to get out of their predicament; (2) Hezbollah will not benefit financially from this agreement, the opposite is true: it will allow any reasonable forces that still remain in Lebanon to become stable, after a period when only Hezbollah – sponsored and financed by Iran – could offer any help to its population.
On the eastern border with Syria, Israel may face a mounting challenge to its independence in air action (as part of Israel's inter-war campaign), which will happen if Iran demands that Russia compensate it for its aid to the war in Ukraine and if this aid includes any attempt to curtail Israeli activity or sabotage it. Israel should prepare for this in the very near future, and define for itself whether it insists on this position, even at the expense of a confrontation with Moscow, while simultaneously looking for replacements for the current inter-war campaign format.
In any event, it undertakes to strengthen cooperation with the US, which might be required to provide Israel with its own defense umbrella, in the event of a possible clash with Moscow.
The Palestinian arena
Gaza is calm, but as volatile as ever. Hamas and the Islamic Jihad are busy renewing their strength after being blasted in the last two military operations and are not interested in another round of fighting anytime soon. Even so, the situation on the ground might change due to internal (economic) or external (from the struggle for leadership in the Palestinian Authority to events on the Temple Mount or major terrorist attacks in the West Bank) pressures. Israel must be prepared for such a situation and, at the same time, maintain the current policy that is trying to keep the war away, mainly through economic measures. The strategy of bringing Gazan workers to Israel has so far proven to be successful and it is necessary to invest in additional economic projects, that the fear of their collapse will reduce the terrorist organizations' motivation to escalate the situation.
The situation in Judea and Samaria is much more complicated. Even though the Palestinian Authority holds official powers, voices from the ground give other messages. It has lost its sovereignty in northern Samaria and the public has lost confidence in it in other areas – a result of many years of corruption and futility. Abu Mazen is aging and reaching the end of his term in office. The struggle for his successor could be violent. Israel might be required to enter the vacuum that will be created and, in any case, decide with which ruling power it prefers to tie its fate.
At the same time, the high level of terrorism in recent months is expected to continue, as a result of the young generation that did not experience the Second Intifada, the stirring up of passions on social networks (mainly TikTok), and anarchy in the area. This might force Israel to reinforce and diversify its activities – an example of this is the assassination this week in Nablus using an incendiary motorcycle – and be prepared at all times for a large-scale operation in the West Bank.
IDF structure and readiness
The IDF has a problem. It has two particularly strong units –Intelligence and the Air Force – and large corps that range from mediocre to weak (with isles of excellence, mainly in the elite units). All recent Chiefs of Staff, as well as the next Chief of Staff, Herzi Halevi, who will take office in mid-January, are concerned with this issue. But this is not only an IDF problem, rather one of the entire country.
Running an army is an expensive business, and even though Israel is a highly threatened country, its security budget is one of the lowest in the Western World. This is a matter that must be corrected, but this must start with a decision to be made by the next government regarding what type of army it wants and which tasks it designates the force. The desire to get everything at a low price may prove to be a failure in the next military campaign; whoever wants to avoid this must put their hands in the mud - and get to work; from the nature of the IDF service and the remuneration for those serving, through the arming of military equipment and technology, to a fundamental change in the status of those serving as compulsory and permanent soldiers in the IDF. The transformation of these soldiers into a public punching bag in recent years must be corrected, otherwise the IDF could turn into a mediocre army.
Public trust
For many years the IDF was a sacred cow. This is no longer the case. Public support for the army is dwindling (except in times of war) and suspicion towards it is rising. This is the direct result of political cynicism, expressed in diverse ways: from long-term IDF personnel becoming millionaires thanks to military pensions, through the conversion of army generals into politicians-in-uniform who serve a political agenda.
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Not like any other public sector, those in the IDF do not work, rather they serve. This is often a demanding, dangerous service which come at the expense of more pampering and rewarding positions in civil life. If there is no trust in the IDF commanders (and the GSS and the Mossad and, of course, the police) and their integrity – this would be a tragedy. This is at a time that only half of the Israeli population currently serve in the people's army and if that half still feels attacked or rejected – the IDF and Israel will be in trouble. Israel is a miracle thanks more than anything to its security strength that is disproportionate in every respect to its geographical size. Whoever sets out to purposely harm the IDF – and unfortunately there are many in the Israeli society who do this - is harming this strength and, as a result, endangering the continued existence of the State of Israel.
