Since the beginning of the current protests against the Iranian regime, opinions and views on the impact of these protests have been divided.
But all agree that they will not lead to regime change, no matter how serious, given the violence and brutality with which the security police are cracking down on protesters, so further demonstrations mean a concession to life, be it death or years behind bars.
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This explains the rising death toll and the death of more than eighty Iranian citizens after the announcement of the death of Mahsa Amini, a young Kurdish woman who paid for the violence of the "morality police" with her life. Since there is always a third way in such crises, some analysts and experts believe that the demonstrations will make the regime weaker over time.
This scenario is disputed among those who cover Iran. I believe that the Iranian regime was already afraid of demonstrations and protests in previous years, especially in the post-2011 period.
It has always anticipated that outside intervention would fuel internal anger and push the regime into a critical corner where it would either make significant concessions, relinquish power, or be overthrown, as has happened in a number of Arab countries. Now the situation is very different from before. The system is becoming more assertive and confrontational, both internally and externally.
There are several reasons for this. The first is the path it has taken to acquire a nuclear military capability. It has become clear that Tehran is on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons and that it is only a political decision that separates it from doing so.
As a result, the regime feels to some extent impunity from possible military strikes, especially by the US. Another problem is the international environment, which provides Iran with ample room for maneuver and strategic advantage, both for its adversaries and its allies.
For example, the Ukraine crisis has shifted China and Russia from the role of mediator, third party, or even substantive partner in the nuclear agreement renewal negotiations to the role of explicit partner supporting Iran vis-à-vis the Atlantic West. This is an asset that will help strengthen Iran's negotiating position with respect to further radicalization.
Another issue is the internal situation in Iran. It is deteriorating at the level of the living conditions of the Iranian people. But it is becoming stronger and more united under a regime that has succeeded in recent years in weakening its opponents, preventing their movement and influence, and gaining more experience in dealing with protests.
The confidence to proceed with extreme force and harshness regardless of external reactions has also doubled. Either because everyone in the West is concerned about the consequences of the energy crisis, or because the international community is increasingly unable to agree, whether on the internal situation in Iran or elsewhere.
There is also a lot of confidence that the Iranian regime has gained by improving its weapons capabilities, especially after becoming a supplier of military equipment such as drones to a major power like Russia, joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an official member, and creating a broad base of strategic interests with Beijing and Moscow - going so far as to come close to creating a potential strategic alliance in the event that negotiations on the nuclear agreement fail and the conflict in Ukraine escalates into a confrontation between NATO and Russia.
It is true that the Iranian people, who are in a state of constant protest and express their anger, sometimes muted, sometimes vocal, against the regime's policies, are learning and benefiting from the experience of constant protests; new angry generations are emerging that seem to be more intense and violent in the face of the grip of power.
It can bypass repressive measures and virtual isolation due to measures such as blocking the Internet. But all these experiences are not comparable to the state of the Iranian regime, which knows very well that it cannot be overthrown by internal protests without outside support. The protests suffer from a lack of leadership, unity of purpose, slogans, and causes.
Therefore, one can understand the public statements of the Iranian leaders and officials in which they act with the utmost brutality and harshness against the protests against the regime. But without fear of an international backlash condemning this defiant official discourse. If I accept all this, it does not mean that the Iranian regime is closed and can survive in the future.
But I mean that the current phase with all its variables is relatively in the interest of the regime, characterized by an enormous brutality with which everything can be done to survive. Therefore, it is difficult to discuss the hypothesis of capitulation to the anger and protests of the population, however high the number of victims and casualties may be.
It is also true that the current protests will not be without consequences for the Iranian regime. They will be a link in a chain at the end of which there could be a future regime change, at least at the heads and leadership.
There is an undeniable coincidence between these difficult domestic circumstances and credible reports of the deteriorating health of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, such that the possibility of his death is imminent, opening the door to a transitional phase that will not be without major conflict within the regime.
Expectations and assessments are largely focused on a period of hardship that will return the regime to its early years, especially if it ends up electing a leader by inheritance. Many are setting their eyes on Mojtaba Khamenei as his father's successor. Protesters in all cities across Iran feel threatened by his rise, as he is more of a military militia leader than a religious leader.
Thus, Iran is on the threshold of a new phase whose fate is difficult for any observer to predict.
Salem al-Ketbi is a UAE political analyst and former Federal National Council candidate.
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