Like the three military operations in the Gaza Strip that came before it, Guardian of the Walls ended on a sour note. For a year, the IDF has been trying to market its achievements in the 2021 operation as a major success, but it was doomed to end as a "disappointing draw," as it would have been called in the sports pages.
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Of course, it did include some successes for Israel, most notably the Gaza Division managing to maintain a near-impermeable defense and prevent border breaches, attacks on Israeli communities, and abductions or heavy casualties. The offense achieved a lot, as well, but much less than was expected of it. The missile-firing capabilities in Gaza were only partially taken out, Hamas' top leadership wasn't touched at all, and its military field units retained their capabilities. Even the impressive strikes on the organization's network of tunnels during Operation Lightning Strike proved that the Israeli Air Forces' capabilities are impressive, but did not take out hundreds of Hamas operatives as planned, and thus a unique strategic resource was wasted as a tactical target.
But all these events have to do with the battlefield, where no one can guarantee absolute victory. The main failures were on the strategic level, where Israel traditionally lacks long-term planning and strategy. This is true for the failure to seek out more comprehensive solutions to the Gaza problem than throwing suitcases of money at it, and it's true for the failure to fundamentally address the problem of the Arab Israelis, which blew up in our faces when the violent events started at the Temple Mount last year that wound up dragging us all into a war in the south.
The main lesson from Guardian of the Walls is that we cannot treat these two issues as separate. Gaza is tied to the West Bank, which is tied to Jerusalem, which is tied to Arab Israelis, who are tied to what happens in the north. Everything influences everything else, certainly in an era of social media and a widespread fake news industry. This is something that can only be expected to worsen. From this perspective, Guardian of the Walls was a present for Israel – a wake-up call that came at a relatively low cost, one that should allow us to better prepare for the true challenge that might face us in the next war.
Some people are waiting to strike a match
The IDF has certainly reached a number of conclusions as a result of Guardian of the Walls. Some have already been implemented, and some are in the process. For example, the realization that refraining from any intention of a ground incursion sends a message of weakness to the other wide. A team headed by Brig. Gen. (res.) Chico Tamir, former commander of the Gaza Division, has spent a few months examining the question. This doesn't mean that the next war will automatically include a ground incursion, but it does mean that the IDF will have better, more effective, and surprising options for one.
But Gaza could turn out to be Israel's smallest problem, assuming that the next war takes place here. The IDF has decent solutions for offense – mainly from the air, but also on the ground – and excellent defense options. These will be improved significantly when the new laser defense system goes online next year, which will allow Israel not only more breathing room for defense, but also more freedom on the offense, partly because some of the burden of an extended campaign to defend the home front will be lifted, as the home front will be much better defended.
The main concern is that different fronts will converge, which happened half-way last year. Judea and Samaria might be quiet, mostly because of the public's apathy and reasonable economic conditions, but could easily fall apart due to the Palestinian Authority's lack of governability there. This has recently been seen in northern Samaria, and could spread to other areas and have an immediate influence on east Jerusalem, Lebanon, and Syria, which were less calm during Guardian of the Walls than they had been during past operations.
All these are headaches, but ones with which the IDF can contend. Israel is a regional power, and can defeat each of its enemies separately or together. The main problem that Guardian of the Walls gave us a preview is internal – the threat from Israel's Arabs. Unlike a foreign enemy, this sector is a challenge against which Israel has much more limited military-policing, legal, or psychological tools – always assuming that the people in question are citizens against whom military power cannot be wielded.
The working assumption for the next round must be that what happened in 2021 will happen again. In other words, elements from the Arab Israeli sector will join the fight. There are a number of factors that determine how intense their participation will be: the deterrence and governability Israel shows, how assertive Arab Israeli leaders and moderate officials in the Arab sector are, and more than anything, the character of the war itself and what happens during it. The fate of a battle in Gaza, over which Israel has total control, is not the same as the fate of a battle in Lebanon, where Hezbollah is firing thousands of missiles a day at the Israeli home front, causing casualties and heavy damage.
In a scenario like that, which is what the IDF predicts will happen in the next Lebanon war – there could be some actors who will try to use the chaos that will certainly be created in some places to challenge the system even more. This could express itself in several ways: from attempts to interfere with troop movements on the roads, to widespread violence in mixed cities and outside them, and even anarchy that could spread through Arab towns and villages (as happened on the sidelines of Guardian of the Walls in Shfaram, where stores were looted and public property was vandalized for no purpose). Hezbollah is putting a lot of effort into building infrastructure that it can activate the day the order comes. How successful it will be depends directly on Israel's ongoing preparedness and response in an emergency.
Guardian of the Walls taught Israel plenty of lessons in that context. Joint teams of Defense Ministry and Public Security Ministry personnel, as well as people from the IDF and the Israel Police, realized that they needed to prepare ahead of time for the worst. A decision was taken about a series of steps to be implemented as soon as the next conflict erupts – companies of Border Police reservists will be called up and deployed in cities; the IDF will transfer the Border Police personnel on compulsory service, who are mostly in Judea and Samaria, to the responsibility of the Israel Police and replace them with IDF soldiers or reservists, according to combat conditions in various zones; and the IDF will also call up reservists to help secure roads, especially ones critical to troop callus and movement, as well as roads that lead to bases and facilities, with a stress on airbases.
Another decision that Israel Hayom reported earlier this year was to establish a brigade of Border Police reservists. The brigade will be founded on Border Police who have finished their compulsory service, and in its early stages will be supplemented by officers from the IDF's infantry and armored forces. Thus far, most Border Police who were discharged after their compulsory service were assigned to reserve duty with IDF units, and now the intent is to make use of the experience they gained during their service during their reserves duty. Most of the troops' reservist time will be devoted to training, as well as operations in Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria. In case of an escalation, they will be assigned to security missions, with an emphasis on the mixed cities. The first brigade is expected to be founded this year, and a second one in 2023, and possibly a third brigade later on. Not only will they provide police with strong, skilled, and available forces, they will also free the IDF from the need to send soldiers untrained in public security operations to back up the police.
'A mini civil war'
These steps are important, but far from a solution to the problem. Worse, they almost ignore it. Violence in Arab society stems from deeply rooted problems that should be solved through constant effort, not just in times of emergency. The investment has to be massive, and it has to fix problems that have existed for years, or the situation will continue to deteriorate and boomerang on us during the next war.
"In the last 30 years, Israel's population has doubled, but the police force has increased by only 20%," says Maj. Gen. (ret.) Zohar Dvir, former deputy commissioner of the Israel Police and commander of the police's Northern District.
"The police mean national resilience, but they are very low on the national list of priorities. For years, they've been neglected, and now we're seeing the result," Dvir says.
Dvir thinks that Israel's Border Police and special police forces should be tripled, and that the "regular" police force should also be increased significantly. He warns that crime and ethno-nationalism could merge, mostly because of hopelessness in the young generation of Arabs.
"Today, there's 40% unemployment among the youth. They see weapons dealers and criminals with BMWs and money, and they want it, too. We have to solve this – through employment, education, leisure places, and investment, otherwise it will blow up in our faces," he says.
A team led by Deputy Public Security Minister Yoav Segalovitz reached the same conclusion. Data the team collected indicate that Arab youth are losing a sense of connection to the country and are being influenced by extremists. This is clear among the Bedouin in southern Israel, but is also happening in the north.
"We need to address the issue at the root. If we don't handle it well – and they feel that it's happening, and that they have a future here – we'll have to handle it under much worse conditions," a high-ranking official said.
Segalovitz's team is addressing all aspects of crime in the Arab sector. In the six months since he was appointed to head the team in response to a growing wave of crime and astonishing number of murders among Arabs in Israel, it has seen a number of successes. In a Facebook post before Passover, Segalovitz revealed that an Israel Police anti-crime operation had defined 745 targets, against whom 228 indictments had been filed, with 196 under arrest. In addition, the police have confiscated some 210 million shekels ($65 million) worth of property, the Israel Tax Authority has collected 189 million shekels ($58.7 million) in unpaid taxes, and money changers have been pressured not to help launder money.
As part of the team's work, cooperation between the police, the Shin Bet security agency, the Justice Ministry, Treasury, and Israel Tax Authority has been tightened so they coordinate their fight against criminals and the sources of their money. Tenders issued by local authorities are under close tabs, and the authorities are on the lookout for use of cash and fake bank accounts. The pressure has prompted a few criminal leaders to leave the country, primarily for Turkey.
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A main emphasis on the team's work is collecting illegal weapons in the Arab sector. Dvir doesn't like the term "collecting."
"The weapons aren't lying in the streets, to be picked up by anyone who happens by. To get to it you need intelligence, and combat troops who will work together when they raid weapons caches. The police aren't strong enough to do that. Even when they catch [suspects], the courts rush to release them," he says.
Dvir is convinced that the next escalation of violence in the Arab sector will be much worse than the events during Guardian of the Walls.
"It's not a question of 'if,' but 'when.' There's no doubt it will happen, and it's clear to me we aren't ready. Even if the decision is made tomorrow morning, it takes a year to recruit and train personnel. We are now in a grace period, but if we don't start to do it today, we'll be really sorry tomorrow," he says.
One of the most disturbing scenarios is that of armed militias – Arab and Jewish – battling against each other.
"There are countless numbers of weapons on both sides," Dvir says. "We've already seen that it's not difficult for the Arab street to move from criminality to ethno-religious [crime], but I could definitely see Jewish extremists taking up guns and going to fight in places where they think the police aren't defending the civilians. That could lead us into a mini civil war."
It's clearly time for a strategy
Preventing the civil war scenario depends on two things: early intelligence and deterrence. It also has to do with Arabs' sense of belonging to and identification with the state, but the first two are the crux. If Israel knows ahead of time, it can prepare, and if it can deter, radical elements will be afraid to act. The second part, deterrence, is lacking, to say the least. If that issue is not addressed immediately, it will be hard to exert it in an emergency. What's worse, it could lead to overuse of force that results in damage that only deepens existing rifts and will take years to rectify.
The intelligence aspect was also sorely deficient prior to Guardian of the Walls. Israel was surprised at what happened in its mixed cities and the roads of southern Israel (and to a lesser extent in the north), and it was the Shin Bet (and to a lesser extent the Israel Police) who was responsible for that failure. The Shin Bet has learned plenty of lessons and begun to make organizational changes that include significant additional manpower and tools to address the Arab Israeli challenge. This didn't help it thwart the two terrorist attacks Arab Israelis influenced by the Islamic State carried out last month in Beersheba and Hadera, which were also wake-up calls about the problems that need to be handled to keep the dam from bursting.
The security apparatus is careful not to characterize Arab Israelis as enemies, not only because they are Israeli citizens who are supposed to have equal rights, but also because of the understanding that most of the Arab public opposes violence and is even hoping that the authorities will be able to curb it and do away with the palpable danger than hangs over them. There is also the fear of a self-fulfilling prophecy – that if Arab Israelis are treated as hostile, they will start to treat the state as hostile.
The way to avoid that is to overinvest, and now. Strengthen the police in terms of both personnel and budgets, and increase synchronicity between the police, the IDF and the Shin Bet, while also investing in civil areas – education and employment first and foremost – that will help the Arab public feel like they belong, and also keep them away from crime and terrorism. These are long processes that will take years, but the alternative is to increase isolation and hostility, and risk widespread violence during the next conflict.
Israel has to prepare for that possibility, as well, with everything that means. It will have to do what governments have stubbornly refused to do – put together a clear strategy that translates to a working plan. Only if that happens – which will require courage and the ability to look the threat in the eye – will Israel know that the lessons of Guardian of the Walls have been learned. Sadly, it still hasn't.
