Head of the IDF's Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Eliezer Toledano, spent this week on an extensive drill for a future war on the Palestinian front. The drill sought to prepare the command for the next war against terrorists in the Gaza Strip, although no one knows when it will erupt.
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Toledano does not speak a lot. In his first long interview since taking over as GOC of the command last March, he tells Israel Hayom that the IDF is seeking an offensive solution to rocket fire from Gaza after it managed to strike a major blow to Hamas' underground network during Operation Guardian of the Walls in May. "It's a matter of time, but we'll get there," he says.
Toledano also makes it clear that Gaza must be handled delicately, that its 2 million residents cannot be "strangled." He says it is in Israel's interest to find solutions that will improve their quality of life. However, as far as he is concerned, Hamas leaders are living on borrowed time.
He rejects the claims about the death of Barel Hadaria Shmueli, a Border Police sniper killed by Hamas fire, saying, "There is a price for our existence here. Soldiers will be killed, and so will civilians." When it comes to Israel's captive fallen soldiers and civilians, Toledano says Israel must leave no stone unturned to bring them back, but "Hamas needs to realize that Israel has changed its approach."
'Looking a decade ahead'
Toledano, 48, wears a kippa. He is married, a father of five, and lives on Moshav Gamliel near Yavne. He was born and raised in Kiryat Motzkin and grew up in the modern Orthodox youth movement Bnei Akiva.
He joined the army as a paratrooper with the 101st Brigade and earned promotion until he was assigned command of the brigade, the position he held during Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014. During the 2006 Second Lebanon War, he was commander of the Maglan Unit. He also served as former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's military secretary and as commander of the IDF's Gaza Division.
When asked about Hamas, Toledano uses medical terminology.
"We have a patient called Gaza. It suffers from two problems. The first is a chronic infection, which is the civilian situation in the Gaza Strip. In 1948, there were 150,000 people living in Gaza. In 1967, there were 300,000. Today, 2.1 million people live there, and a decade from now we'll encounter three million. All this on 365 square kilometers [140 square miles] in which the economic situation isn't getting better, it's deteriorating.
"To those who ask me, 'What do you care what happens there?' I respond that it's not as if we're separated by an impenetrable barrier. These are 2 million people who use the same aquifer, the same sea, and are here, right beyond the barbed wire.
"The second problem is a cancerous growth, which is Hamas – a terrorist movement that is actually the regime. A government that the world does not see as legitimate. This lack of legitimacy creates a problem for us, because you can't hold talks with a regime like that. You can't give it money through banks.
"And this obsessive terrorist movement is constantly building its strength. It has a terrorist army, whose entire purpose is to frighten the citizens of Israel. They can be frightened with [explosives-laden] balloons, or on Twitter, and they are intensively working on this all the time."
Toledano continues: "The patient, Gaza, is being kept alive by an ECMO machine that is the money the Palestinian Authority gives it each month and the Gazans who work in Israel. If we want to treat the cancer, Hamas, we need to wage a battle that will make the infection, the socio-economic situation, worse. And if we want to treat the infection, and give Gaza economic 'vitamins,' we thereby strengthen the cancer.
"It's a frustrating situation, but that's the story. Even if we decide to reoccupy Gaza, we would have no one to hand it over to. No one wants it," he says.
Q: What does Hamas actually want?
"Hamas started as a movement that was based on the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, and it grew a military branch that gained strength, and in the past 14 years has become 'Hamastan.' Dawa [the Islamic idea of outreach through charity work] isn't the main story now. When international organizations approach me, I quote the Sting song, 'I hope the Russians love their children, too.' I hope that Hamas loves its children. I often think they don't."
Q: Why?
"Because if you love your child, you build them a school, not hundreds of kilometers of tunnels. Take all that concrete and build a new neighborhood.
"Hamas wants to increase its political power, and grab Judea and Samaria. It understands that beating Israel is not an option, or even threatening its existence. But it can scare Israel. Make our lives wretched. Harass us. Like it always does."
Q: And what does Israel want from Gaza?
"I'm not speaking on behalf of the political echelon, but I think it's very clear – we want a high level of security. The higher our level of security is, the more we can allow civilian conditions to improve. This is very significant in terms of deterrence. When you want to deter a terrorist organization, one hammer blow after another won't do it. The opposite, it will make them apathetic. In deterrence, there are one-ton bombs that we don't hold back when we need to use them, and there are tens of thousands of work permits. Therese are two elements of deterrence, and anyone who distinguishes between them doesn't understand the condition of the patient who is lying on the bed in front of him. Israel's military leaders have to understand that."
Q: Does Hamas want Palestinian from Gaza to work in Israel?
"Yes, because it needs to strike a balance. And it realizes that if its public collapses, Hamas itself will collapse."
Q: So why do tens of thousands of Gazans work in Israel, rather than 100,000, like in the past, to improve the economic situation and create a counter-balance to Hamas?
"Handling the civil situation brings with it security challenges. My partners in the Shin Bet [security agency] look first of all at thwarting terrorism, and ask me to move slowly. It's delicate risk management."
Q: If it's possible to neutralize security risks entailed in allowing Palestinians from Gaza to work in Israel, would you be in favor of expanding that incentive?
"I support improving the civilian situation in Gaza, for a few reasons. First of all, it's the biggest competition for Hamas. Second, because we are sitting on shared resources. Third, because I'm looking a decade ahead and asking myself where this is headed. If things are more difficult in Gaza, it doesn't help me. Therefore, the two aspects of our strategy for Gaza are a high level of security [for Israel] and improving civilian conditions."
Q: But when you improve civilian parameters, you also take security risks. When you send in cement to rebuild destroyed homes, it turns into tunnels.
"We always need to balance the two things: eradicating Hamas' military capabilities but not allowing civilian matters to grow worse. Anyone who wants a clear answer will be disappointed, because there isn't one for Gaza. Subtle maneuvering is necessary."
Q: Can you accept the suitcases of money that go to Gaza?
"The civilian situation requires upkeep, and the money is good for the civilians there. Not all the money comes from Qatar; there are other countries that donate. And if the money donated to Gaza dwindles, it's not good for the 2 million residents living in Hamas' prison."
'We have an obligation to bring our boys home'
Israel has made it clear that its position is that any progress on civil issues in Gaza is conditioned on a start to solving the problem of its missing and captives – the bodies of fallen soldiers Lt. Hadar Goldin and Staff Sgt. Oron Shaul, and civilians Avera Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed, who have been held prisoner since they crossed the border in 2014.
"Our obligation in the IDF is to bring the boys home. That's clear, and there is no question. That includes the two fallen soldiers and the two helpless citizens who found themselves in Gaza and are being held there. It's a very delicate matter," Toledano says.
Q: Do you think it can be solved?
"If Hamas realizes that Israel has changed its approach – yes."
Q: So how can you be promoting a long-term arrangement with Hamas if the issue of the missing and captives still isn't progressing?
"Progress is made when there is a high level of security. If security isn't at a high level, we don't. I think that security is currently at a high level. But if I look at deep-seated processes, I'm bothered. They [Hamas] are doing everything they can to increase their power, get back on track. They're not having an easy time."
Q: Why?
"Because they took a serious hit. Both in terms of strength-building and production. They want to strengthen their ability to fire on us, because they realize that's all they have against us."
Q: In terms of quantity? Precision? Range?
"In every aspect. During Guardian of the Walls they were checked thanks to very good work by the Gaza Division. What remains? Rockets, whose efficacy is limited. Not that I think it's reasonable for them to fire 4,300 rockets at Israel, but it's the only tool they have left.
"So they learn, and we learn. The end point of Guardian of the Walls is the starting point for the competition of learning. And I run as fast as I can, always looking at them, to see where they are."
Toledano reveals that during Operation Guardian of the Walls Hamas tried twice to cross Israel's subterranean border barrier, both of which attempts were thwarted in Gazan territory. "There is no impenetrable obstacle anywhere in the world, but this one is good, strong, and we're proud of it."
"There is no doubt that Hamas will keep trying. This is a tough enemy. But every time I think about it, I remind myself that the people who used to do my job included Shaika Gavish [who led the Southern Command in Sinai during the 1967 Six-Day War], and Gorodish [Shmuel Gonen, who had the job during the 1973 Yom Kippur War], and Yitzhak Rabin, who fought wars against tanks and fighter jets, at times when Israel was under existential threat. That's not what we're facing now, and maybe that's why Israel expects a decisive victory from us."
Q: On the other hand, Hamas is now firing on your family in your home.
"This is the new war. The rockets are my breakfast, lunch, and dinner. There is no day when I'm not working on building a response. Not a defensive one, our air defenses – which also earned high marks during Guardian of the Walls – handle that. We have an insane challenge here."
Q: Is there a solution?
"Look at the tunnels. It's a complicated problem all over the world. It was complicated in Vietnam, and complicated in Korea, and we've managed to get into them. It took us time, but we succeeded.
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"I say the same thing about rockets. We need to get there and find a solution. If we don't believe that's a realistic goal, we won't. It won't end this coming year, but that's the goal."

Q: Are Yahya Sinwar, Mohammad Deif, and Marwan Issa targets?
"That's not an appropriate definition for a period between wars. During war itself, they're all targets. Between wars, if you want to kill someone, just kill him."
Q: So why don't we kill them?
"That's the kind of thing we don't talk about. If you want to do it, do it. Don't talk."
'We've already won'
The IDF is having a hard time digesting the discrepancy between the military achievements of Operation Guardian of the Walls and how it is perceived by the public. Militarily, the operation saw a number of successes: Hamas did not penetrate into Israeli territory, and all the "surprises" it had planned (drones, anti-tank missiles, tunnels) were thwarted; and its rockets caused relatively little damage or casualties. But if we pan back, Hamas was able to fire on both Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, stir up Arab Israelis, and cause the frustrating sense that this round, too, ended in a bitter draw.
Toledano says, "I was born in 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, which was when wars ended with an image of victory. So if I look at a picture like that – and they're romantic – there isn't one now. There are no images of victory because we've already won. We're a strong country, not one starting out. It's something quite special, and I have responsibility for that something special. To provide a high level of security so that there can be growth and prosperity here."
Q: So we won't see a picture of victory against Gaza?
"It doesn't exist anymore. The new construction in Sderot is a picture of victory. A third new neighborhood in Nahal Oz is a picture of victory. Even a new kindergarten in Kerem Shalom is a picture of victory."
Q: Some people would say that rockets fired at Jerusalem or sirens in Tel Aviv are a picture of victory for Hamas.
"We need to improve the issue of public consciousness and influence."
Q: Explain to the man on the street what he doesn't understand.
"That we are facing an enemy whose only equipment is to cause fright. To do that, he'll take a balloon and burn our fields, or fire a rocket. That's a weapon of influence, fear, consciousness. We live in a democratic state with an open media that broadcasts every rocket that falls 100 times. That plays into Hamas' hands in bolstering its achievement."
Q: Do you expect us not to report?
"Certainly not. But I expect people to understand that the story is, first of all, that we are here. And we're strong. And we have wins. During Guardian of the Walls we killed 15 rocket manufacturing operatives under the ground. That's an unprecedented elimination, sorry for saying so. Think about the intelligence needed to locate them, what capabilities were necessary to hit them.
"It's true that this doesn't stand up with a mother who has to run with her kid to the stairwell [for protection from rockets], but we need to understand that if we don't panic, they lose. And for them to lose, we need to panic less. I know this isn't an easy thing to ask, but when we understand their goal – to hurt our resilience – we should be strong and not scared."
Q: That requires an adjustment of expectations.
"True, and it's important for us to be on the same page, because in the next war, there will be fire on the homefront and there will be infiltration attempts, and they'll try out all sorts of other capabilities."
Q: And there will be casualties.
"Yes. There will be casualties, too. But no one counted the over 800 casualties in the Six-Day War against Shaike Gavish, because the victory was worth any price."
Q: Was the achievement of Guardian of the Walls worth any price?
"The achievement in wars of choice like this one isn't worth any price. It's worth paying a price, but not any price. Only an existential threat is worth any price. Wars of choice need to be waged smartly."
Q: Do you accept the decision made during the operation not to send forces into Gaza?
"I thought then, and I still think, that sending ground forces in wasn't the right thing to do. That doesn't mean anything when it comes to the next war."
Q: Are we scaring ourselves too much?
"You need to look at a ground invasion in professional terms, not heroic terms. Last week I talked to the members of the company commanders course. They're my son's age, which is bad news, because it means I'm already old. The good news is that they look exactly like I remember myself at that age. They really laid into me, saying it was too bad we hadn't sent ground forces into Gaza, and I was very happy that these are our guys.

Q: Have we reached the point where we're afraid to use a ground invasion?
"No. We aren't afraid. Maneuvers aren't a question of courage, but of choice. It's not like I had [Lionel] Messi on the bench and didn't send him onto the field. I have to ask myself what the ground maneuver would give us, and what price I would pay. I have to see that the achievement would be a big one, and the price would be justified. It's not easy."
Q: And in the meantime, aren't we wearing down the ground forces? Their faith in themselves and the faith of the leaders in their abilities?
"We have to build a strong ground army, because that's our insurance policy. There's no army without ground forces, and no ability to win without ground forces. But they need to be used wisely.
"My job is to put together a relevant maneuver that can enter Gaza and secure a major victory at a low price. I believe that I have the conditions to carry something like that out, and that's what we're working on day and night."
To that end, Toledano brought an experienced player into the Southern Command: Brig. Gen. (res.) Moshe Chico Tamir, former commander of the Gaza Division and one of the IDF's most brilliant offensive officers of the past few decades.
"His main role is to plan the offense of the next war, so it will be a surprise, fast, and exact the maximum price from the enemy and a minimum price to us," Toledano says. "I think it's possible."
'Know how to listen'
After Operation Guardian of the Walls, the IDF talked about quiet in Gaza for years to come. That didn't happen, and in the six months that have passed, terrorists in Gaza have fired rockets and sent arson balloons at Israel, and Staff Sgt. Barel Hadaria Shmueli was killed during an operation.
Q: How close are we to the next round?
"At the moment, the security situation is good, even very good. We need to keep it going, but also be ready because of the fragility in Gaza.
Q: How do you see the incident in which Shmueli was killed?
"There are two sides to it. The first is that even though we're a strong country, we're still under a threat, and even if it's not an existential one, we need to deal with it. The second is that the media's story has become very dominant. Today, every incident is filmed, and there are 9 million researchers who know exactly what happened, and drew conclusions, and even passed judgment. I say to them: 'Slow down, calm down.' This is the situation, and we need to live with it."
Q: What's the lesson from it?
"There won't ever be a high level of security here at no cost. That doesn't exist. There will be wounded, and there will be casualties, both on the front and the home front. We'll have to know how to handle it, and do so in solidarity. This is important.
"Sometimes there's a sense that we don't need that solidarity, that it's a luxury. This is a mistake. The career soldiers aren't some exclusive club that enjoys amazing conditions. They're people who volunteered to sacrifice their personal and family lives to lead soldiers on the battlefield, not to earn promotion.
"The soldiers of the IDF are the defensive force that protects Israel, whose role it is to defend civilians and – if necessary – be wounded doing so. A defensive force is necessary so that Nahal Oz won't be attacked, so that Ramle or Tel Aviv won't be attacked. That's a defensive force, that's its mission, that's its purpose, that is also what IDF troops swear to do."
Q: Can a soldier do it when he's wrapped in cotton wool?
"No. and the public has to realize that we make use of our force with the fear of God, because we understand the costs and the meaning. But that doesn't stop us from utilizing it when there is a need."
"Barel was a skilled sniper, part of the Border Police's terrific counter-terror unit. He was a combat soldier who was killed in combat, defending Nahal Oz and Kfar Aza. That's how I see it."
Q: What lessons were learned as a result of the incident in which he was killed?
"We improved the subterranean barrier, as well as other techniques."
Q: Combat soldiers have harshly criticized the protocol for opening fire.
"I don't think there's a problem with the protocol for opening fire. Barel himself fired seven bullets before he was killed. In all, there were 43 sniper targets that we hit. We killed a child, and we killed a terrorist, which shows you how complicated these events are."
Q: Barel's mother called on you to resign.
"I don't respond to a grieving mother. She can say what she thinks. Part of my mission is to know how to listen."
Q: And the public criticism about the incident, some of which was blatantly political?
"I think that Israel should know how to be grateful to its soldiers, its fighters, its officers. This is what I expect of Israeli society, that it not take any of what I mentioned here for granted."