Outgoing National Security Advisor Meir Ben-Shabbat has been through countless dramatic moments in the 37 years he served Israel: secret operations, thwarted terrorist attacks, the exposure of terrorist cells, terrorists killed, meetings in enemy states. The high point, he says, came toward the end of his public service – normalization deals with four Arab countries.
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"The most exciting moment was with the King of Morocco, Mohammed VI. We spoke in Moroccan, which I learned growing up at home. We traded polite remarks and I told him about my parents, my father, who was born in Casablanca, and my mother, who was born in Marrakech. I asked him if I could recite the Jewish blessing traditionally used to address kings. He asked me what it meant, I explained, and he responded, 'Of course.' Next to me were Trump's representatives Jared Kushner and Avi Berkowitz. I recited, 'Blessed art Thou, Lord our God, King of the Universe, who has imparted honor to flesh and blood.' Everyone there said 'Amen,'" Ben-Shabbat tells Israel Hayom in a special interview.
"You're standing there, as an official representative of Israel, in the palace of the King of Morocco, the country from which your parents made aliyah, speaking the Moroccan you learned as a child, saying to yourself, 'My god, what a historic moment.' I have no words with which to describe that kind of coming full circle.
"After that, I asked him, 'Where do you expect our relations to go?' Would there be full normalization? And he said, 'Of course. We decided to enter a full process with you, including opening embassies, air travel routes, cooperation in all fields.' What can I say – these were transcendent moments.
"As far as I was concerned, I wasn't speaking on my own behalf, but rather for my parents and for [the Jews] from Morocco who made aliyah to Israel and made a home there in wretched conditions, who built wonderful families and communities with their bare hands. I was speaking on behalf of the thousands who hold the legacy of Moroccan Jewry close to their hearts and are proud of it, who preserve the customs and long for the two countries to have relations. Because the ties between the two peoples were good. I was speaking in their name, and that's what I wrote to anyone who sent me congratulatory messages after the event. I really felt that way," Ben-Shabbat says.
A little over two weeks ago, Ben-Shabbat, 55, finished his term as head of the National Security Council. He spent the last part of his term helping his successor, former Mossad official Dr. Eyal Hulata, learn the ropes, and also accompanied Hulata on trips abroad to destinations that included Moscow and Cairo, hoping to make the transition as easy as possible.
We meet at his modest home in Merkaz Shapira, near Kiryat Malachi. An armed guard is still stationed at the front entrance, which Ben-Shabbat says was "not his decision." His wife, Sigalit, to whom he has been married for 30 years, has hung pictures and documents from his career on the walls of his workroom. One is the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service, which he received about a year ago from former US National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien, the highest honor the Pentagon grants non-citizens.
"Ben-Shabbat raised the relations between the US and Israel to historic heights," then-US Defense Secretary Christopher Miller wrote in the material that went along with the medal.
Sigalit Ben-Shabbat is a veteran educator. In her 28-year career she has trained new immigrants from Ethiopia (for which she learned Amharic), served as a school principal, and still works as a teacher at a religious public school in Bnei Ayish. The couple has four children – Moriah, 29, Michal, 27, Orel, 24, all of whom also work in the field of education, and a son, Eliav, 18, who has finished high school and is on his way to the military. Ben-Shabbat is also a grandfather of six.
Now he has to start getting used to a new life. For the first time in years, he doesn't have a red emergency phone, doesn't have to be on alert, and isn't part of the decision-makers.
"Of course, I miss it," he admits. "Sometimes you want to pick up the phone or write a message. But I told whoever I needed to that I'm always available, for anything they need. Other than that, there's an emergency HQ here at home that operates day and night – my son, who volunteers with ]roadside assistance organization] Yedidim."
Ben-Shabbat was born in Dimona in 1966, the fifth of 12 children of the late Rabbi Mahlouf and Aziza Ben-Shabbat, who had made aliyah two years earlier. His father died years ago. His mother still lives in his childhood home in Dimona.
"Growing up in a big family is an experience like no other," he smiles. "It's not easy, but it instills habits of making concessions and learning to live in a group. As a child I felt that I was getting everything I needed. Lots of warmth, love, and faith in my abilities.
"My parents were unsophisticated people, who raised us with devotion and managed to listen closely to each of us. And what's amazing is that besides the nuclear family, we always had others at our table. Dad would bring guests home. Sometimes Mom would send us to give other people food.
"Neither of them talked much. I can't remember a single sentence that Dad would say to me. Instead of talking, they did. Our upbringing was always through personal example.
"The school system in Dimona embraced us warmly. They believed in our abilities and gave us a sense that the sky was the limit. I remember myself loving to stay at school for extra lessons, sports, and other activities hours after the day ended. We weren't familiar with the terms 'periphery' or 'development town.' The town was small enough for us to feel a sense of intimacy, and big enough to offer everything a town should provide."
In those years, he also became aware of what was happening in Israel and elsewhere in the world. "Every night at 7:30, Dad would take out a transistor or a big radio and listen to the Moroccan-language news on the Voice of Israel. That's what most immigrant families from Morocco in Dimona did. The broadcasts always had static, and Dad would try to improve the reception. It was a cultural experience. I never imagined then that once day I'd work for the security establishment, but I always aspired to reach a position of national influence."
While still in high school, Ben-Shabbat started working as a journalist for local papers in southern Israel. He spent some of those years at the yeshiva high school Ohel Shlomo in Beersheba, an experience that influenced him deeply. When he finished high school, he enlisted in the IDF's Givati Brigade.
When he was discharged from the military in 1988, he joined the Shin Bet security agency and was assigned to the Gaza desk He earned promotion relatively quickly for the Shin Bet, moving up from job to job, sometimes in the field and sometimes in an office setting. In 1992 then-director of the Shin Bet Yaakov Peri awarded him a commendation for exposing a secret group that had carried out large-scale terrorist attacks and was planning to smuggle weapons into Gaza from abroad.
"The Shin Bet's real challenge is to prevent every terrorist attack before it happens, without the public knowing. For example, in the early 2000s [the Second Intifada], we learned about an Arab from Gaza who was living among the Bedouin in Israel, using the identity of an Israeli citizen. He even became an informant for the Israel Police and would regularly meet with one specific police officer to give him information. At one point, he decided to murder the cop, and we discovered it at the last minute. You find yourself in a situation in which a person is about to die and doesn't know it, and at the last second you save his life and catch the murderer.
"In the months leading up to 9/11 we thwarted a large-scale initiative in which Arab Israelis were also involved, to carry out suicide bombings. Because of how serious it was, and to send a message to the Arab population about what the red lines were, we scheduled a media briefing the same day. All the military correspondents came to the Shin Bet headquarters, which is unusual. I presented the information. The reporters understood how serious it was and intended to report it right away, but then the reports [about 9/11] started coming in from the US and swallowed everything else up. I don't think the papers carried so much as a single line about it the next day."
Q: Friends who know you from the Shin Bet say you were part of 200 targeted killing operations. Tell us about one that stands out.
"There were a lot, I haven't counted – Salah Shehade, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, and others. There's one I'll never forget. It was the day I took my wife to the delivery room on April 9, 2003. When we got to Barzilai Medical Center [in Ashkelon], I got a call from the war room. They told me that Saad al-Arbid, Mohammed Deif's partner and one of the senior Hamas commanders, had been found. My wife asked me to stay with her, but I had to leave. It wasn't easy."
"Arbid was killed by an airstrike on the car he was travelling in, which I saw as coming full circle because he was one of the people responsible for the murder of Lt. Col. Meir Mintz, who was a friend of mine from our army service. Arbid was also involved in the No. 5 bus bombing, which killed 21 people; the abduction [and later murder] of IDF soldier Nachshon Wachsman, and more.
"That same day, my son was born, so I'll never forget that date."
Ben-Shabbat doesn't look like the typical Shin Bet commander. He is a short, scholarly man who wears a large kippa, enunciates the Hebrew "het" and "ayin" sounds in the Moroccan manner, and frequently quotes religious literature. He is extremely modest and does not take personal credit for his successes. For 25 years, he has spent his free time teaching Torah and religious lessons in his community, one on a weekday and one on Shabbat.
"Only when I was out of the country did we skip the lesson. Even during COVID, as long as we weren't in lockdown, we never stopped the lessons – we just moved them outside, in accordance with the regulations, and later on to the courtyard, which is where we still hold them," he says.
Q: You're a Mizrahi Jew, religious, and come from a poor 'development' town. What do you think about the people who claim the system is inherently biased against people of your background? Are there jobs you didn't get because of your background?
"I never encountered blatant examples of discrimination. If there were some, they were concealed, and I don't think there are jobs I didn't get because of my background.
"The truth is, I never thought about these issues. I'm a person of faith. My belief is that the place where a person is, that's where he is supposed to be. As someone who appointed people [to positions], I know that there are a lot of reasons and circumstances that affect whether someone will get a job. It's important to me that members of the young generation know that there is no glass ceiling … That it might not be easy, they might have to work, but they can go anywhere. Work yields results."
In 1999, Ben-Shabbat put together the Shin Bet research that spelled out what Israel's security interests would be under a peace agreement with the Palestinians. In 2004 he commanded a particularly massive, unique operation to confiscate 35 million shekels of "terrorist money," in cash, from banks in Judea and Samaria.
He was also one of the people in charge of Shin Bet actions during Operation Cast Lead in 2008. After Operation Protective Edge in 2014, he set up an interagency team to prevent goods and tools that would help Hamas rebuild its capabilities from entering the Gaza Strip. In the second decade of the 2000s he served in a series of senior Shin Bet positions, including head of its cyber division; head of the national counterterror efforts; and finally, as head of the southern region – all roles equivalent to the rank of major-general in the IDF.
In the last role, he tightened the closure on Hamas, promoted cooperation with Egypt and coordinated efforts to prevent Negev Bedouin from smuggling weapons from Sinai and becoming involved in terrorism, with special emphasis on the children of Palestinian mothers who were allowed to move to Israel under the "family reunification" policy.
Q: As someone who spent most of his professional life dealing with Gaza, what in your opinion is the solution to the Gaza issue?
"Israel's long-term goal should be a demilitarized Gaza under leadership that recognizes Israel and does not take violent action against it. This goal can be achieved in one of two ways – either through a broad-scale military operation deep [in the territory], like Defensive Shield, and that would come at a heavy cost; or by gradually wearing Hamas down at every level and leading the population to realize that it's a failed, corrupt regime whose time has come to an end."
Q: Until then, we continue rounds of escalation, and any time someone there wants to fire a rocket, he does?
"The first challenge is to deter the terrorist players in Gaza from firing at us. The second challenge is to prevent the execution of 'classic' terrorism – sending terrorists from Gaza into Israel and Judea and Samaria. The third challenge – to prevent them from growing stronger. Of course, there is the issue of bringing back our boys and the bodies [of Israel's fallen soldiers].
"The real tension, for us, is how to prevent them from gaining power while also keeping things quiet. We want quiet, but they also need quiet to get stronger. So there is a need to crack down on intelligence supervision and inspection of everything that enters [Gaza], because a lot of the weapons are manufactured in Gaza. In addition, we need to carry out targeted killings, including some low-profile ones (which go officially unacknowledged by Israel – A.K.), so people there know that their involvement in terrorism might mean they won't wake up in the morning."
Q: After Operation Guardian of the Walls, we were promised that deterrence had been restored for a few years, but since then, rockets have been fired again.
"I don't know who made that promise. I can say that there were serious, in-depth discussions and that all the ideas and proposals were examined very carefully. Sometimes there are chronic conditions that medicine can't heal completely, but allow you to live with them."
Q: Aside from Gaza, there is a sense that Israel behaves like it's fragile. That we have a lot of power but don't dare exert it. Hamas, Hezbollah, rioters in Gaza, terrorists in prisons – they just aren't afraid of us.
"I don't think that way. We're strong, and our security situation has to be evaluated with a long lens, by a long list of parameters –strict parameters of lives lost and disruptions to the public's daily routine. There are the ones that matter. Today, a single incident gets the same media attention as a major terrorist attack during the Second Intifada.
"I think that the general security situation is good, but delicate. True, there are tense periods in the western Negev. But even there, people live their ordinary lives most days of the year, and the communities there are thriving.
"Another consideration in dealing with Gaza is our priorities. Iran, of course, would be happy if we got involved in a conflict with Hamas and directed our attention to Gaza rather than at it."
Q: What is your position on the Iran question?
"The political echelon has made a clear statement: Nuclear deal or no, Israel will not allow Iran to reach military nuclear capability. On our way there, it would be wrong to cut ourselves off from the world. Israel needs to try and enlist the international community, mostly the US. You can't take action without trying to reach agreement by enlisting partners. For us, the threat is existential, but the challenge isn't Israel's alone. The Americans know that Iran sees us as the 'little Satan' and America as the 'big Satan,' so they should also have an interest in taking action."
Q: But they don't, and the question is – will they?
"I don't know, but we should assume the worst, and we might have to deal with this issue with less partnership or leadership than we would like. The Americans have a clear vision and interests, but that's not enough. They need implementable action plans.
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"We need to tell them [the US], you want to reach a diplomatic solution? Great, set a deadline and what happens when it passes, should the diplomatic means fail. Do you want a better, longer-term nuclear deal? Decide when action will be taken against Iran if it continues spinning its wheels. You're still chasing the Iranians. 'Let's do something'? You need to set a timetable. General declarations aren't enough, you need to lay out steps and schedules, and create a plan for any scenario."
Q: Why are we depending on the Americans?
"We aren't. Israel and the Jewish people can't accept an existential threat, and will not accept Iranian military nuclear capabilities. As for what we do about it, I'll just say that when the political echelon decides that we won't allow it, the military and intelligence echelons realize what that means."
In the summer of 2017, then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu offered Ben-Shabbat the position of head of the National Security Council and national security chief. His predecessors also wore both hats, but Ben-Shabbat added functions that had traditionally been out of that scope to the job.
It used to be that the advisor was quartered in the Prime Minister's Office and participated in the decision-making process while the council, located in a different building, was to a large extent left behind. Ben-Shabbat initiated and implemented a reform that rebuilt the council, codified its work, and bolstered its standing. The council became an entity that directed the activities of many other government ministries, especially when it comes to vital issues of national security. The council, and Ben-Shabbat as its leader, took just an active a role in handling the COVID epidemic in Israel as the Health Ministry.
Q: If the ministries function, why is there a need for a National Security Council?
"Without the National Security Council, every government body could operate as it saw fit, without coordination or synergy. The whole idea of working as a system is so the whole will be greater than the sum of its parts. The National Security Council's work allowed for orderly policy on a long list of domestic, foreign, and security issues. This policy defined the branches responsible for carrying out concrete goals and coordinated between them.
"The government ministries can't generalize policy, because every ministry is focused on its own field. They don't see the big picture and they don't have a mandate to issue instructions to other ministries. The NSC does, because according to law, it answers to the prime minister and the cabinet."
Q: There has been criticism that you intervened in matters not under your purview at the expense of the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, and the Mossad. The state comptroller said in his report on Israel's COVID crisis that at certain points, the NSC moved from a coordinating entity to an executive one.
"True, we adopted a broad approach, but that's what was needed in the reality in which we live, and of course it was with the approval of the government. We didn't deal with areas that were not our responsibility, we didn't act at the expense of the foreign or defense ministries. That's a mistake. The foreign and defense ministers took part in deciding on policy, but they are executive bodies, whose role is to carry out the directives of the government, and they wait for that directive which is transferred through the NSC, which functions as a headquarters.
"A headquarters always relates to the same fields the executive entities handle, and that causes friction. But the claim that the NSC became an executive body is wrong, and we told the state comptroller that. One of the council's roles, under the law, is to ensure that the government and the cabinet's decisions are implemented. When a representative of the NSC picks up the phone and makes sure that something has been carried out, that's his job. If the prime minister decides that the NSC will coordinate between different organizations, that's not execution. Moreover, that's what the law on the NSC requires. Do I have the authority to ignore sections of the law?
"Therefore, with all due respect, I disagree with the comptroller's claim that the NSC also played an executive role. In general, I prefer that the NSC be criticized for being too strong than for being too weak.
"We're a country that operates on the principle of a centralized effort. We have a lot of challenges, and that demands an organization that can direct all the executive entities based on whatever challenge is the top priority.
"Establishing new departments in the NSC led to results. The relations with Chad, for example, came as a result of a new department for special relations in the Middle East and Africa. By working methodically, the new department mapped opportunities and came up with a plan to establish relations with relevant countries.
"Another new department, the domestic policy department, was in charge of the team effort to establish a national policy for the Bedouin, Druze, and Circassian populations, as well as illegal migrants."
Q: Your critics claim that Netanyahu strengthened the NSC and you so it would be easy for him to promote his agenda.
"A lot of countries are strengthening their national security councils because of the growing complexity of the issues and how sensitive they are, and also because national leaders want a direct line [to national security advisors] without having to go through bureaucrats, like they used to.
"Did Bibi invent the US NSA, too? When Russia manages relations with us through the president's office, who do you want talking to them? Not the NSC? If the head of Russia's security council, [Nikolai] Patrushev, or Putin's advisor calls the NSC, should we tell them to talk to the Foreign Ministry? That's not how it works.
"Today, they don't go through the official mechanism of the Foreign Ministry because, among other reasons, that mechanism is tied up by diplomacy and formality, and countries want more direct contact."
With 100 people working under him, Ben-Shabbat became a central figure in Israel's diplomatic system. In his four years in the job, he visited 120 destinations, including countries that still don't recognize Israel.
"He has the sharp mind of a yeshiva student, a broad understanding of defense and Middle East issues, and enormous administrative talent," a former senior NSC official who worked with Ben-Shabbt told Israel Hayom.
"He never raised his voice, and was always kind and polite, but he knew how to insist on what was important to him and hand it to you if you screwed it up. Completing the mission was sacrosanct to him," the official said.
Because his English wasn't good enough, Ben-Shabbat sometimes had to have his bureau chief help him as a translator. But his Arabic helped pave the way for the historic breakthrough with Arab countries. In October 2018 he joined Netanyahu on a visit to the late Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said of Oman, and much at the same time laid the infrastructure for renewed ties between Israel and Morocco, which he visited in secret. He formed covert ties with senior Moroccan officials, including Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita. When the Abraham Accords were announced to the world, Ben-Shabbat headed the Israeli delegations to the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco. His speech, in Arabic, at the Abu Dhabi airport in the summer of 2020, with both countries' flags in the background, will go down in the history of the region.
"In all the countries there was a sense of celebration, that we were making history. Still, I think that in the discussion about the deals the place of Chad has been neglected. There, it took even more courage than the Abraham Accords, because the late Chadian President Idriss Déby decided on his own, without the Americans or others on his side, to establish relations with Israel. Of course, we were in contact with him before that. The establishment had a lot of doubts about whether he would take the step.
"We spent a lot of time with him and his people before he approached Israel and announced the establishment of relations. I asked them, 'Do you know you'll be under immense pressure? Convince us you'll be able to stand up to it.' Because the worst thing is for a declaration to be made, but nothing happens. They said, 'We've decided, it's done, we'll take the pressure. We have to look out for our own country first, and Israel can help us.'"
Q: What led to the breakthrough in the Abraham Accords?
"The situation was different in each country. Their desire to establish ties with a nation that is strong in defense, economically, technologically, was the base. The shared threat from Iran also played a part.
"For the Emirates and Bahrain, which were together, the postponement of Israeli sovereignty in Judea and Samaria was significant. If Israel had applied sovereignty, it would have been harder to reach the breakthrough, although it wouldn't have prevented it entirely. As for Morocco and Sudan, the stories are different and the interests are different.
"What most of the countries have in common is not a matter of agreements between leaders, but between the peoples. The goal is a warm peace, not a forced peace that entails concessions and tallies. One that is made from a position of power, that is the key to other peace deals. They want us because we bring power in defense, economics, and technology, and because we are daring and creative."
Q: Some claim the opposite – that concessions and flexibility are the key to more agreements.
"It might be that if you are flexible when it comes to the Palestinians, it could make it somewhat easier for countries that still haven't joined and are still afraid of the Palestinian reaction to their establishing relations with Israel. On the other hand, countries won't make peace deals with you if you're weak.
"In any case, we've crossed the Rubicon. The countries that joined the Abraham Accords declared to the world that it was possible to recognize Israel without waiting for an end to the conflict with the Palestinians. This removed the Palestinian veto on the process of normalization with Israel. This is one of the most important achievements of the Abraham Accords."
Q: Is it true that the key to the accords was the US agreement to sell them F-35 stealth fighters?
"I don't know what the Americans did. We didn't agree to the sale of the planes in exchange for the Abraham Accords. What's more, [then] Prime Minister Netanyahu put out an official document in which he wrote that with all due respect to normalization, we were opposed to it coming at the expense of Israel's qualitative military edge. That has been our stance the entire time. We agreed to the deal only after the Defense Ministry agreed on what needed to be agreed on with the Americans when it came to our qualitative advantage, and that happened after the Abraham Accords."
Q: Why did you ask IAF commander Amikam Norkin if the air force's position on the F-35 had changed?
"That conversation took place on June 2, 2020, and had nothing to do with the Abraham Accords. At the time, no one knew there would be deals like these, and the working assumption was that we were heading toward declaring sovereignty in Judea and Samaria. My phone call to the head of the air force had nothing to do with the Abraham Accords, it had to do with American inquiries that would come in from time to time. The Americans knew about our opposition to selling F-35s to the Emirates, and would check from time to time to see if we had changed our stance."
Q: In your last two years in the role, Netanyahu was put on trial, and we had four elections. Do you think this hurt his ability to function?
"I draw a distinction between the legal issues and the elections, because elections definitely have an effect. They take the national leader's attention away and freeze processes. You can't do what you want, everything is looked at again and again to see if it has political significance. Foreign countries prefer to wait with important processes, and you are forced to postpone some of your plans.
"As far as the trial, as an expert employee I didn't feel there was any problem … I can say that if it hadn't been for COVID and the elections, we would have public relations with more countries."
Q: Which ones?
"I won't say which, but we were in advanced talks with three or four more countries. In a process like that, in-person contact with the dialogue partner is really important. Because of the elections and COVID, it didn't come to fruition."
Ben-Shabbat's successes, like his close cooperation with Netanyahu, made him more than a few enemies. His alliance in the prime minister's circle was then-Israeli Ambassador to Washington Ron Dermer, but the two got along less well with Mossad director Yossi Cohen, who saw Netanyahu's decision to put Ben-Shabbat in charge of the new peace agreements as stepping on his turf. This lead to considerable tension between Ben-Shabbat and Cohen.
The same former NSC official quoted above, who witnessed the power struggles, said, "In clashes between the different security branches, which were very fierce, Ben-Shabbat didn't give in, even when they tried to trip him up, and they tried. The prime minister saw that and appreciated it, so he gave him more and more to do until he became the face of peace."
When talking about Cohen, Ben-Shabbat chooses his words carefully. "I have a lot of appreciation for Yossi and the Mossad. Under his direction, the Mossad did amazing things. A lot of what happened in the Abraham Accords was made possible because of the Mossad's ongoing work. The Mossad had enormous weight in the process of these countries becoming ready to make peace deals with us.
"I never spoke ill of Yossi, and I'm friendly with him. If he had briefings in which he spoke against the NSC, I can only say that tensions like these always exist when exclusivity is violated. But you need to remember that both of us, and both organizations, work toward the same goals, and know how to cooperate in order to achieve results.
"I didn't see him as a rival and I don't think he saw me that way. The opposite. I saw him as a partner. For the people and the leaders, this competition is beneficial because both organizations try to get results."
Q: This competition also led to negative reports about you. Yair Lapid said, 'Ben-Shabbat doesn't know what he's talking about.'
"He said that in the context of COVID. With all due respect, I think I know what I'm talking about. When I don't understand a certain matter, I try not to discuss it. Discourse about public officials should be more moderate, both because they aren't politicians and because they can't respond."
Q: Maybe you're perceived as a political figure because of your closeness with Netanyahu. In the fall of 2019 you met with Rabbi Haim Druckman, at Netanyahu's request to try and convince Naftali Bennett and Ayelet Shaked not to resign.
"The Civil Service commissioner, after consulting with the attorney general and state prosecutor, couldn't even find grounds for a disciplinary probe against me. There was nothing secret. When I want to, I know how to hold secret meetings. I'm not a political person, and the meeting wasn't about politics. I was asked to confirm that we were in a sensitive security situation, which we were, and I did."
Ben-Shabbat paid a heavy price for that meeting. "When I see my children's faces when the read or hear what is being said about their father, it hurts," he said.
Q: Do you think you were targeted because you worked with Netanyahu?
"I have no other explanation."
Q: Some people said you did what you did so he would appoint you head of the Shin Bet.
"I never asked Netanyahu for the job of Shin Bet director, and he never promised it to me. Actually, we never discussed it. I don't feel comfortable asking for jobs. If I'm contacted, I'll answer, but if they don't reach out to me, why ask? The job as head of the NSC lead me to high points I never even prayed I'd reach.
"I don't want to sound condescending, but at the NSC, I things that were just as exciting and important. I saw things I wasn't familiar with and hadn't understood about Israel's position in the world.
"I was excited by the expressed of appreciation and support for Israel that I heard on a daily basis from heads of state, presidents, kings, and ministers. In some cases, and I'm not exaggerating, they had tears in their eyes. As a citizen, as a patriot, and as a man of the establishment, I was surprised by how powerful their words were.
"For me, these have been four very intensive years, more than any of my roles at the Shin Bet. So like my predecessor Jacob Nagel said, every year as head of the NSC is like four years of life. I feel like 16 years have passed."
