The summit held earlier this month between Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi may not have been a massive breakthrough but it was an important display of a process that has been 40 years in the making, which cements Israel's position as a regional – even global – power.
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Many have yet to become accustomed to this status and still look at Israel's diplomatic and strategic leeway in what is now obsolete terms.
In the first few decades after Israel's inception, until after the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel was a small, vulnerable, isolated and threatened nation, the existence of which was dependent in part on its military achievements and sheer resolve and in part on the sympathies of Europe and the United States, with the latter's somewhat reluctant support anchored by the lobbying of the Jewish community.
Israel existed in the shadow of existential anxiety and sometimes with a sense of impasse, which intensified in the wake of the War of Attrition (1967-1970) and the disappointment of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
During Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's messianic euphoria in the 1950s and 1960s, and the dejection of the mid-1970s, many in mainstream Israeli society found it difficult to find a reassuring answer to the critical question of "Who will time favor"?
The dramatic turning point came in 1979 with the historic peace treaty with Egypt. Mistakes and temporary setbacks aside, the overall strategic picture was very encouraging. As it turns out, Israel has managed to transcend the senseless chatter by those who in recent generations have poisoned the atmosphere with learned theories about the Jewish state's obstinacy, faults, hubris and sins, and has been able to dictate its will to its rivals – by force as well as by noteworthy flexibility – in very difficult conditions in the regional and global arena.
Israel's independent existent, imposed by force and political maneuverability on Arab states in 1948, was an achievement that was put to critical tests in the 1956 and 1967 wars.
In the post-1967 war reality, the ultimate purpose of this conflict was to forge and accords that would remove Egypt from the cycle of wars.
The test was formulating an accord that would see the Arab power leading hostilities against Israel effectively turn its back on the solidarity with other Arab states on the matter, most notably with the Palestinian. The 1979 peace deal – achieved following a lengthy, laborious effort that exacted a painful price – achieved its goal.
From a broader perspective, Israel would be wise to exclude all its enemies and rivals from the cycle of hostilities (fans of fiction may continue fantasizing about regional peace, a historic compromise with the Palestinians, and the Tooth Fairy) but the separate peace treaty with Egypt remains the necessary and critical condition for any other achievement.
Once the peace deal with Egypt has proven resilient, Israel could turn its attention and resources to building its society, economy, and technological prowess; to deter its nearest Arab enemies; face the Iranian threat, and build its position in the global arena.
What determines the overall picture is not the repeated conflicts in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Lebanon (sometimes called "wars"), or political difficulties at the United Nations, vis-à-vis Europe, or even tensions in relations with the United States.
What determines the overall picture is the process by which Israel is gradually growing stronger, establishing a solid regional and international position, and preparing for a confrontation with Iran.
In the important and formidable confrontation with the Islamic republic, Israel is facing a difficult test that is very far from anyone being able to sum it up and judge its success. However, such an interim tally can be taken with respect to Israel's regional and global status, which is also very relevant to the Jewish state's ability to deal with Iran.
The strength vs. weakness equation
In the regional theater, this summary illustrates an ongoing and consistent process, in which most Arab countries have come to terms not only with Israel's existence but also with its leading position in the region and with the important potential contribution maintaining close ties with Israel can have on their vital interests.
In a broader international context, Israel's achievement focuses on earning the recognition of the most prominent world powers – the United States, China, India, Japan, Russia and even Europe – in its regional importance, as well as its unique position at the forefront of technology in a way that requires special consideration in its needs.
The peace deal with Egypt gave way to a lengthy process of cementing this turn, reaching critical mass over the past decade. This historic achievement was guaranteed by a convergence of the success of the Zionist enterprise and Israel's national strategy, and Arab society's structural failure and the fact that the Pan-Arab strategy turned out to be a dead-end one.
The Zionist enterprise prioritized the nation-building for the Jewish people gathered in its historical homeland, even at the expense of exercising their national rights, for example, on the question of the integrity of the land, including Jerusalem.
After over 100 years of adhering to this national strategy, and despite occasional errors and deviations from it, a functioning, free, prosperous and robust society has been built in Israel, allowing it to integrate well with the modern world.
It has successfully combined prudent and flexible political conduct with the resolve to defend the country's vital needs even by forceful means, which are no longer acceptable among its valued partners, and even when isolated in the international arena.
This combination enabled Israel to withstand both major attempts by its enemies to break it, as well as the pressure applied by its partners.
Thus, for example, it ensured the full realization of its claim to exclude Egypt from the equation of strategic threats, both at the cost of painful wars and at the cost of pressure and friction with those who tried to force Israel to abandon its assets in exchange for a political sham, like a cessation of hostilities pact disguised as a "peace deal" that was appealing at the time.
In contrast, Arab society has not forged a solid social, economic and national base to use to close the gaps with the developed world and upon which to build inclusive governments and stable regional order.
These regimes squandered national resources (mostly oil) on corruption and internal fighting and was taken to task for it during the 2011 Arab Spring only to realize that the removal of the autocratic and failed rulers in a popular revolution allowed – with widespread public support – for the rise of dictators and regressive social forces, or led to chaos, civil wars and even social disintegration.
What was new in its intensity was the widespread loss of hope for a better future among the Arab public and their realization that even this failed existence was in danger of facing an even bigger catastrophe.
The combination of these two factors – the recognition of Israel's power and the forlornness of the Arabs - changed the strategic architecture of the region.
Understanding the depth and political potential of this change over the past decade has enabled a profound change that has established the new balance of power in recent years. The infrastructure was set in place in the days of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israel prime ministers Golda Meir, Yitzhak Rabin, and Menachem Begin, and the foundations were cast and bolstered in the days of US President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Recently, Bennett and PM-designate Yair Lapid and, in spirit, US President Joe Biden and his Secretary of State Antony Blinken have been trying to build the next tier.
US's regional role waning
After the accords with Egypt and Jordan proved their resilience, the important albeit limited, role of the United States gradually became clear.
The peace treaty with Egypt was achieved mostly thanks to then-US President Richard Nixon and is top diplomat Henry Kissinger and was finalized despite the reservation of President Jimmy Carter.
US President Bill Clinton facilitated the 1994 peace deal with Jordan, mostly because King Hussein had the foresight and courage to capitalize on the deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization, reached a year prior.
The Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco were achieved thanks to Trump's revolutionary policies and his adviser Jared Kushner's creative mediation.
The goal was achieved despite eight years of harmful policies during the Obama administration, based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the forces in the Middle East. Obama had pinned his hopes on reconciling the radical elements – Iran, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the Muslim Brotherhood – at the expense of his traditional allies - Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt - and saw the establishment of a Palestinian state as a precondition for stabilizing the Middle East.
Trump, encouraged by Netanyahu, was able to capitalize on these allies' fears of Obama's policies and advocated the opposite view, which sought to isolate Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood, ignore the Palestinians, and back an open Israeli-Arab alliance – the common interest of the pro-American elements in the region.
The weak response in the Arab world to Trump's revolutionary moves in Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the expanding legitimacy for overt ties and public cooperation with Israel, proved the validity of his views.
It turns out that the US is successful when it fully understands regional reality and acts in unison with its allies, and fails when it acts against them.
The combination of Israel's success and the Arabs nations' recognition of their own weakness fundamentally changed the Jewish state's strategic position in the region. Once its former enemies realized that without relying on Israel's power, determination and credibility they would be easy prey to the hegemonic aspirations of Iran and Turkey, they were also willing to risk a public backlash to admitting to cooperation with Jerusalem.
They were willing to take the risk because they knew how much the taboo had been eroded and how Western observers' exaggerated and unfounded anxiety about the "Arab rage" that would follow allowed radical forces to maintain what little veto power they have left.
Taking Israeli interests into consideration
The same combination – Israel getting stronger and Arabs getting weaker – also explains Israel's dramatic rise in the global theater.
For many years, the fear of undermining the interests of the prominent Arab and Muslim elements was the main obstacle that made it difficult for them to realize the potential of a partnership with Israel as a developed and strong state. Gradually not only Americans and some Europeans, but also the Chinese, Japanese, Indians, Russians and many others, came to understand that the rules of the game had changed.
The change took place mainly in three areas: the first is derived from the recognition of Israel's exceptional global contribution as a cyber, intelligence, science, technology and innovation power, which cannot be ignored.
The second concerns the understanding that Arab countries have lost much of their prominence due to the internal weakness and sometimes even the violent disintegration of their societies, and have lost much of their economic and political clout due to US energy independence.
The third dramatically affects the cost/benefit balance, as it becomes gradually clear that partnership with Israel no longer involves losing markets and ties among the major factors in the Arab world, which themselves seek to rely on important contributions from Israel.
When all this joins the understanding of Israel's strategic position in the Middle East, this issue is actually easy to decipher: paradoxically, a country that wants to deepen its relations with the Gulf states must now also take into account the fact that Israel has a de facto strategic alliance with them, fueled by their apprehension of Iran.
Those who want ties with Egypt should be aware of Cairo's strategic contiguity with Jerusalem vis-à-vis Erdogan's aggression in the eastern Mediterranean. They must also be aware of the fact that Egypt and Israel's interests are aligned with respect to Hamas in Gaza and the fight against the Islamic State in Sinai.
Anyone who seeks to defend Jordan knows how critical the Israeli guarantee is to the existence of the Hashemite Kingdom, and how it has repeatedly been tested. Even Russian President Vladimir Putin, who seeks to establish his position among radicals in the region by force, knows that he needs to reach understanding with Israel to ensure that moves that are particularly important to him do not go awry.
Other countries in the global arena see how world powers are changing their perception of Israel and do not or cannot afford to be "left out" with respect to diplomatic ties with the Jewish state.
Israel is indeed isolated on the multilateral level, in the circus of international organizations, but on the bilateral level, its status is undergoing an accelerated process of the notable improvement almost everywhere in the world.
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It is worth concluding this optimistic review with two important notes of caution.
First, during any confrontation with Iran and its proxies, Israel could be severely harmed – in a way that could significantly change the picture presented here, especially if the Biden administration adopts Obama's conciliatory policy, despite the hesitations shown by the administration after its failure in Afghanistan; and/or if China implements the strategic agreement wat would rehabilitate the Iranian economy despite, and perhaps thanks to, its regional aggression.
Second, Israel has a series of internal problems, such as with a non-productive ultra-Orthodox population with extreme reproduction rates. While at this point in time this does not overshadow the achievements and resilience of Israeli society – on which the country's entire strategic success is based – if these get out of hand, Israel's social structure will not be able to withstand it for long.
Dan Schueftan is the head of the International Graduate Program in National Security Studies at the University of Haifa.
