More than 25,000 dunams (over 6,100 acres) of woodlands consumed by fires; thousands of residents evacuated from their homes – including dozens of patients and staff at the Eitanim psychiatric hospital; thousands of dead and wounded animals; damages to homes and farms. That is just the initial estimate of the damage caused by the massive forest fire in the Jerusalem hills this week.
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Fire and Rescue Service Commissioner David Simchi said the fire was of the same dimensions as the 2010 Mount Carmel forest fire disaster, and the fact that there was no loss of life this time around was a major achievement. But many argue that the writing was on the wall, and raise several difficult questions regarding the preparedness of the fire and rescue services, the shortfall in personnel, the skills possessed by the fire fighters, the availability of firefighting planes, and the conduct of the fire service senior echelons.
"In the final outcome all the billions spent by the state of Israel on the firefighting service since the Mount Carmel disaster did not have the required effect," says L., a senior firefighter from the Jerusalem District who took part in the firefighting efforts this week. "Planes and a few new fire trucks can't be the game changer in the face of fires of that scale. The fire service needs at least twice as much manpower than it currently has, otherwise we can't deal with fires like this quickly and efficiently.
"The top brass says that there are 2,200 active firefighters. We need at least 5,000. Fixing the damages caused by these fires costs a lot more than 2,500 firefighters."
Q: What do you think was wrong with the way this week's fires were handled?
"In the evening hours of Sunday, the first day of the fires, the commissioner declared that the fire was under control, despite weather conditions that pointed to the event being far from over. He made a mistake in his situational evaluation.
"At night the fires die down because there are no winds, but in the morning, I and others involved, including personnel from the firefighting plane squadron, requested that all the planes be sent up, not just some of them, but the commissioner refused. In the afternoon the winds picked up and the fires renewed. The forces on the ground were exhausted and there were only a few planes in the air - and then they called for more forces and even spoke about international aid.
"When additional forces arrived there as chaos on the ground, Firefighters got lost and it was a miracle that a disaster didn't happen. In events like that it is the police that are in charge, but the commissioner refused to sit with them in the command and control center so we end up with two command and control centers, one for the fire service and the other for the police. Things just got messier.
"In my opinion, the reason for all of that was a mistaken situational evaluation and misunderstanding of the weather conditions. The area was split up into six sectors, and four of them were given to firefighting officers who came from the army and don't have any knowledge of firefighting. The most difficult sector, around Kibbutz Tzuba, was given to the commander of the firefighters training college, an infantry officer, who came to the fire service about a year ago from the army.
"It's about time that events like these undergo an investigation by external professionals who have no interest in a cover-up. The inquiries regarding previous disasters such as the fires in Nof HaGalil and Mevo Modiim don't reflect reality. Unfortunately, that's what's likely to happen this time around as well."
Those aren't the only claims about improper coordination between the fire service and the police. "On Monday, while the fire was burning out of control and residents were being evacuated from their homes, police and fire service representatives couldn't even decide in which command and control center they would sit," says a person in the fire service. "At the end of the day the two bodies set up two command and control centers, and low-level officers from each body were sent to meetings and situational assessments. Regional commanders, the police commissioner and the fire service commissioner didn't sit together to conduct a joint situational assessment, except for one occasion when the incident began, and even then, the only thing that interested them was how they were going to be photographed for the press.
"The result was a complete lack of coordination between the police and the fire service. The police said roads should be closed; the fire service wanted them kept open. The firefighting plane squadron wanted aircraft in the air; the fire service was opposed. There was no dialogue, commands coming down to the ground were contradictory, and meanwhile everything was burning.
There were also accusations of fighting between the various bodies over the role of the fire fighting plane squadron. Israel's aerial firefighting unit falls under the command of the Israel Police and is composed of members of the aerial unit of the Israel Police, the field unit of the National Fire and Rescue Authority, and civilian companies Elbit and Clear-Cut Aviation.
This complexity, say senior fire and rescue officials speaking off the record, leads to a clash of egos between the police and the fire service, and this often creates disputes and delays in getting planes in the air.
"Managing aerial operations is extremely complex," says chief superintendent Tomer Brenner, the firefighting squadron commander. "There are a lot of different bodies involved that have to work together. Sometimes it works smoothly, sometimes things are more difficult. Sometimes people agree and sometimes they don't.
"I always try to make the best decision for the State of Israel. If we hadn't acted as we did during the fire, six communities would have been burned to the ground."
Q: What actions did you take?
"Our planes have a limited capacity to carry fire retardants, so it is best that they take off as soon as the fire is spotted. We received a report of a fire on Sunday at 3:15 p.m. via a civilian who reported it to the fire service. We were sent in by the fire service as part of a procedure called "liberal take-off." The procedure which was the result of the lessons of previous incidents, states that in areas where it will take fire trucks too long to get to the scene, planes can be sent up first.
"We sent up two planes, and I managed the incident from the command and control center. I opened the window and saw the cloud of smoke. The first report was that the fire was advancing at a pace of one kilometer every ten minutes due to weather conditions. The implications of this are a very complex event, and immediately sent up all the remaining places in the squadron, 12 altogether. The planes worked until nightfall."
A senior fire service source claims that the following morning the squadron wanted to send up all its planes, but the fire service commission believed there was no need to do so.
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"In the afternoon the fire grew very strong, and it was decided to use all the air power available in Israel. International aid was also considered. On Tuesday we went at the fire as quickly as possible and managed to gain control."
Q: Are there things you feel you should have done differently?
"I would do a lot of things differently but I prefer to debrief them with the relevant professional authorities and not in the media."
Q: Are there plans to increase the size of the squadron so that you will be able to deal with large fires?
We are in the midst of a process of purchasing planes with a larger payload capacity. It's a very complex issue that depends on the state budget and other factors. The order is supposed to go out soon, but even then, it will take two years for the planes to arrive."
Failings in dealing with fires in Israel are nothing new. Only last month, senior former fire service officers, municipal chiefs, firefighters, safety experts, residents and volunteers about a severe shortage of manpower and equipment, delays in operations of firefighting planes, misunderstanding of ground conditions, and an absence of operational plans. They all warned that, "it's a question of when, not if, a disaster will happen." Over and again, we heard the words: "Don't let anyone say they didn't know."
At the beginning of June, three large fires, apparently caused by arson, burned out of control in the Jerusalem Hills. The cost was heavy: Thousands of dunams of woodland were consumed by the fires and dozens of residents of nearby communities were evacuated.
Doron (not his real name), a firefighter from Jerusalem, was called to fires in Tzur Hadassah and Ma'aleh Hahamisha when they were already out of control. "The fire could have been doused within an hour," says Doron. "There was no need to reach a situation where teams from around the country had to be called in to fight the fire.
In my district, what happens on a regular basis is that the officer managing an incident conducts a situational assessment, asks for ten firefighting teams and then gets barely five, because someone is saving on budgets and there is a manpower shortage. You have to beg. At the fire in Har Haruach and Ma'aleh Hahamisha we asked for ten teams, but we got three. At a fire near Moshav Ora, it was a miracle that the moshav wasn't burnt down. We asked for firefighting planes and crews, but we didn't get them."
Q: Why does it take two hours for planes to get to the scene?
The fire service has an agreement with Elbit Systems, which operates the firefighting squadron and is paid per work hour and on call hours. Somebody gambled and let the pilots be on call from home rather than from the base so that it would cost less. If the pilots had been on call at the base, they would have got to the scene within 15 minutes."
The Carmel disaster in December 2010 was a turning point with respect to firefighting in Israel. The previously municipal fire departments were all brought under the Israel Fire and Rescue Authority Law and placed under the purview of the Public Security Ministry, and the fire and rescue designated a commissioner, giving him full operational authority.
The commission received large budgets and a firefighting squadron with 14 places each able to carry 3,000 liters of fire retardant. The planes are stationed at two permanent run strips: Meggido in the North and Kedma in the South. Last year they handled over 200 fires in open areas. According to the Fire and Rescue Authority, since the Carmel Disaster some 300 fire and rescue vehicles adaptable to all scenarios have been purchased.
In 2014, the Knesset drafted regulations covering the protection of communities from forest fires, however due to budgetary disagreements between various government offices, the ordinances have yet to be approved. In 2015, then-State Comptroller Joseph Shapira released a report on the preparations of municipal authorities for fires and weather-related hazards. Shapira wrote that the "existing infrastructure does not give any entity the authority to enforce upon local authorities' compliance with instructions regarding emergency situations including fires and extraordinary weather-related damages. The preparedness of local authorities for such situations depends on their desire to comply with given instructions and on the resources, they choose to allocate. Some local authorities are not prepared and are not properly prepared or equipped for fires."
The State Comptroller also issued a report in June of this year that painted a difficult picture regarding preparedness for fires in Israel: "Over 40,000 fires occur in Israel every year, on average 100 a day. There are 126 firefighting stations around the country; 1,641 firefighters and commanders man 72% of the operational standard. There is a shortage of 1,675 firefighters to reach the target set by the Authority."
Figures presented by the Fire and Rescue Authority show a slightly different picture with 2,200 fighters and 1,000 support personnel.
A report by the Knesset research center in September 2017 stated that Israel has 120 fire stations and is short 105 stations to reach the optimal number.
"To put it simply – there is no money," says Haim Rokach, head of the Golan Regional Council and head of safety and emergency preparedness at the Federation of Regional Councils. "We are supposed to create firebreaks, thin forests, place fire-fighting systems around communities, prepare fire trails, put in fire hydrants. It will cost millions.
"I'm not ashamed to say that I'm scared. A Technion report filed in 2012 at the request of the Ministry of the Interior found that the required response time of a fire truck is seven minutes, while the longest it should take is 15 minutes, but we don't meet those standards. We are simply being abandoned."
Yosef Ben Yosef, CEO of the Yavniel local council, left the fire service a year and half ago after 30 years. His last position was commander of the Tiberias fire station.
He says that the Carmel disaster caused positive shock waves in the fire service. "We were moved to the Ministry of Public Security; the firefighting squadron was established and so was an academy for training firefighters. I was part of a program to train firefighters in the French system called Forest Fire Defense, which includes five levels of training for commanders in command and control of fires in open ground and forests. The training was funded by the European Union. Several groups of firefighters, officers and commanders went through the program. A computerized firefighting system and a simulator were put into use, with technological adaptations made for local conditions.
"In 2017, when the new commissioner David Simchi took up his position, he claimed that isn't the way to teach and the program was stopped. But no other method has been introduced. So in one go, the professional issue and in particular the issue of firefighting programs was shunted aside. But the recent fires in the Jerusalem Hills prove that preparation is required: preparation of scenarios and action modes. You can't be responsive and just rely on luck.
Worse yet, the number of new people employed at headquarters is completely disproportionate to the number of firefighters. The State Comptroller noted that there are too many support staff and not enough firefighters. The new commissioner was uncomfortable with the worker's committee and decided to fight them. This led to a lack of trust between the command echelon and the operational level. When the firefighters don't believe in the commander, they don't do what they know how to do best – put out fires."
Yuval (not his real name) is the head of a fire station in the center of the country. He too believes that the shortcomings are a result of mismanagement of manpower. "At my station, and at other stations as well, the firefighters no longer receive overtime, even on days with extreme weather conditions when we need to beef up teams.
"The standard set by the United States Fire Administration (which is a professional beacon to fire authorities worldwide) is one firefighter per one thousand residents. According to this standard I should have 400 firefighters, but I have just 100. That means that I am working much of the time under the red line of minimal operational readiness. If there is a fire and I send teams, I am left exposed in the area I am responsible for.
"What's more, what happens to a firefighter when there is no overtime? His fighting spirit is low. The commissioner's fight against the firefighters really hit them hard and there is no lack of incidents where there were failures as a result."
The 2015 State Comptroller's report lists a series of steps to be taken by localities: preparation of buffer lines and perimeter access roads; maintenance of access roads to communities and maintenance of the main roads within them; peripheral water supply lines with fire hydrants 100 meters (328 feet) apart, a fire-fighting equipment stockpile in every locality, and more.
The report states: "The State Comptroller's Office believes that in view of the danger presented by fires to localities close to or within forests, the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of the Interior, together with the Finance Ministry, the Federation of Local Authorities and the Federation of Regional Councils must act with haste to authorize ordinances to defend the localities against forest fires. Any delay in providing a defensive envelope for the localities and roads, and in establishing firefighting stockpiles could lead to loss of life and damage to property."
Alon Biton, the security officer of the Federation of Local Authorities, believes that the solution is to have one body that is responsible for the issue. "A government body operating under the Ministry of the Interior that will connect between the various government ministries and define their authority. The goal is to approve and budget a master plan for fire readiness, especially with regard to buffer lines. To define security rings, decide what types of trees can be planted within each locality, and create national priorities for the localities depending on their degree of risk.
"After the fire in Nof HaGalil, we set up a pilot program to establish buffer lines according to the guidelines. I hope this will be followed up with practical steps, but without budgets it's all just talk. No local authority can afford those kinds of costs. I hope the new Knesset will find the required funds."
Keren Kayemet LeIsrael-Jewish National Fund [the body that administers Israel's forests] isn't waiting for the regulator to allocate budgets. "After the Carmel Disaster we established buffer lines between forests and communities next to forests in more than 400 sectors covering 30,000 dunams [7,400 acres]," says Gilad Ostrovsky, director of forestry at KKL-JNF. "In some places we also set up buffer lines within forests to prevent fires from spreading and enable access to fire and rescue service vehicles. We also brought in Beduin shepherds from the south to graze with their herds and get rid of the dry grasses that could become flammable materials.
"We have 24 of our own fire trucks operated by KKL-JNF employees. From the start of the fire season on May 1, we have lookouts watching over the forests to detect fires quickly. We are also building a master plan for all the forests which takes into account research on how fires behave differently in different places."
Q: Why isn't there a ban on lighting fires in forests?
"On days where we receive fire warnings from the meteorological service, we put out a notice to the public that it is forbidden to light fires in the forests. We have rangers on patrol, but we are talking about very large areas and we don't have the authority to give fines. We are working on a "Forest Law" that will give us the authority to give out fines. I hope we will manage to pass it in the current Knesset."
Simchi said in July that "what I have improved in the past four years hasn't been done in 40 years. We have added 500 new firefighters, including 80 from the Arab sector, and we have recruited Arab citizens to national service as firefighting support personnel.
"I set up a research and development division. One of the products of its work is the addition of chemical retardants to water which has made firefighting with water hoses much more efficient. A year ago, I put robots into use for life endangering missions, and we are shortly planning to launch a pilot program employing drones, UAVs and ground cameras to locate fires in real time.
"Our squadron operates, according to our operational concept, only in the summer season, and responds to fires by classification: saving lives, homes, and then nature. In high fire index situations, we put planes in the air to detect fires before they spread. In high-risk areas we put planes in the air before the fire trucks.
"The firefighting budget is NIS 1.4 billion [$432 million] per year, of which NIS 70 million [$22 million] is allocated to the firefighting squadron. I have to manage those resources. There is a limitation of flying hours. In situational assessments we look at whether there is a danger to a locality, and whether there is a need for the squadron elsewhere. I have to meet the cost-benefit test, and manage national risks."
The National Fire and Rescue Authority said in response: "We do not intend to address false allegations based on cheap gossip, at best, on behalf of self-interested parties driven by extraneous considerations. The development of firefighting in recent years has nothing to do with all of this. These allegations are part of repeated attempts to harm the senior fire service command, officers and firefighters, while purposely ignoring reality, and facts on the ground."
No response was available from the Israel Police.
