Despite the many failures that the fresh coalition has already managed to accumulate, despite the many hiccups and the eroding public trust – primarily because of the growing number of disenchanted right-wingers, those who were willing to give it a chance – the opposition under former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu does not have a clear strategy on how they plan to topple Prime Minister Naftali Bennett's government.
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Netanyahu has trained his sights on the most plausible path that he could think of – pressure on his former deputy at the ill-fated unity government, Defense Minister Benny Gantz. The plan is based on the fact that Likud, its allies and Gantz's Blue and White have together 60 MKs in the Knesset, and 61 with renegade Yamina lawmaker Amichai Chikli. This would allow them to swear in a new government under Netanyahu, through a no-confidence motion. But they would have to ensure this falls under the Knesset's definition of a constructive no-confidence motion, by putting Gantz's name as the would-be prime minister if it passes. Once this is accomplished, Gantz would serve first and then be replaced by Netanyahu under a rotation agreement.
But in order to make all this possible, he would have to have Gantz on board. And this is where things get complicated. As of mid-July, despite this being clearly in line with his life-long dream of being prime minister, Gantz is unwilling to be Netanyahu's launchpad for a political comeback. Gantz, not unlike his early days in politics, is wedded to a paradigm of being loyal to a non-existent base that supposedly wants above everything else to see Netanyahu out of power. '
Gantz knows that if he collaborates with this effort he might be prime minister, but this would be at the price of being under attack from the media, the Left and possibly even by the law enforcement agencies and the judiciary. This will overwhelm him.
In order to leave the government in the coming weeks or months, Gantz has to lay the groundwork with Netanyahu right now. Gantz will have to intensify his attacks on the government in order to create a plausible narrative for ditching the ship, but this is not happening. Gantz may very well be annoyed and disappointed, and he has repeatedly lamented to his associates that he is unhappy by how things are handled and how he is being dismissed as unimportant despite his party having more seats than Bennett's party and despite being defense minister. But if he is unwilling to express this out loud and rally support among his faction members for the possibility of switching sides, if he is not ready to attack those who are looking down at him and taking him for granted, nothing is going to change and he will be stuck. The government will then survive and Gantz will just whine and whine.
It's ironic that on Nov. 15, the date in which he was to become prime minister under the short-lived rotating premiership agreement with Netanyahu in the previous government, he will vote with the current government to pass a state budget, essentially securing the continued survival of a coalition in which he has no future.
Aside from the Gantz option, Netanyahu and the opposition don't have any real options left. The battles in the Knesset, which have been put on the back burner because of the Muslim holidays, will resume in the final two weeks of this Knesset session. Although the opposition has been able to exhaust the coalition and even reap some dividends, this does not seem to be heading toward a breaking point. Winning in the Knesset is important, but it still remains to be seen how much this advances the ultimate goal: topping the government.
The opposition has been eyeing two strategic dates that could bring the attrition war to its peak. The first, in September, is the first reading (a plenum vote) of the state budget. The second, in November, when the final reading is held for the budget. But in order to prevent the budget's passing, which would automatically topple the government and trigger elections, they need a plan. If this was all about denying the coalition a majority in the Knesset, that would have been easy since they could just try to focus on the fringes. But it is clear that the coalition, unofficially, has a strategic buffer that gives it more than 61 votes, thanks to the Joint Arab List. The party, despite technically being part of the opposition, has been caucusing with the coalition in practically every vote, and it will be part of the passing of the budget. The safety net it provides the government is now a fact, despite the coalition's efforts to obscure this.
There are quite a few senior Likud officials who were surprised in July when they saw Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu call on Israelis to register for the Likud party. As far as the former prime minister is concerned, this is the most sensical approach to deal with the growing number of Likud members who have begun to challenge his leadership by holding rallies to showcase their relative strength and even grant interviews in which they criticize him. Having a registration drive will put those would-be challengers in their proper place. If he manages to register tens of thousands of new members until the end of August, as is his plan, this will send a clear-cut message to MK Nir Barkat and others in Likud, and they would shrink to their proper sizer.
The registration drive will be the pro-Netanyahu drive. It is about bringing home those who have left the party and voted for Yamina and Likud renegade Gideon Sa'ar's New Hope. But it is also a registration drive aimed at bringing into the party new blood, the voters who have grown to appreciate and even admire the former premier.: those who go out of their way to defend him in every possible forum, in the media or in various social gatherings; those would-be members who consider Netanyahu not just a leader but a symbol; those who believe that his ouster was a wrong that has to be righted, because they believe it is a personal affront to them. .
Netanyahu's move has surprised many because he has long stopped investing time and effort in rallying support within the party. It is now clear that before any general election, the Likud will have to hold a leadership race and primaries to determine the makeup of its Knesset candidate list. Those who register by the end of August would be able to participate in the intra-party elections for various apparatuses, including the party's governing bodies: the convention, the secretariat and the main office. These elections are scheduled for late 2022. Netanyahu wants to have complete control over these institutions because they will ultimately determine how the leadership race will be conducted.
There are some who consider Netanyahu's move particularly strange because it could backfire. After all it was Netanyahu who had prevented an online registration drive to take place for fear that the "New Likudniks" would use it to oust him.
Many Netanyahu supporters fear that allowing the drive to take place online will only increase the intensity of this group to take action against Netanyahu. Just hours after Netanyahu announced his move, a senior member of that group wrote: "Likud, which is swamped in debt, has apparently overcome its fear of the New Likudniks and has now relaunched the drive. If we do not ensure that 40,000 new members are registered in order to save the party from its rampant corruption and rot, and thus save the state, what are we worth anyways."
Somewhere over the Green Line
The Judea and Samaria Zoning Committee has not convened for several months. This stagnation started even before Bennett's government took office, and now, a month into his premiership nothing has yet to change. The government insists that there is nothing that prevents the committee from convening because neither Gantz (whose ministry oversees the committee) nor Bennett are opposed. The government's sources actually insist they are wholeheartedly in favor of having it convene, and they deflect any claim that the Americans are pressuring otherwise.
So why hasn't it convened? One of the accusations that have been circulating as of late is that Bennett and Gantz want to set up some mechanism that would ensure the committee's agenda items get released prior to any meeting, so that the US would never be surprised by settlement construction.
This is a bizarre claim since according to the official statement by the Prime Minister's Office, the reports on US pressure are just "fake news." So if the Biden administration is not overly concerned over this matter, why is the government so keen on pleasing it?
Those who have had to pay the price are the settlers. The committee has to meet every so often to go over construction plans. This is just part of the painstakingly long process any municipality has to endure when they want to build in their community, even if its just an addition to an existing home, such as expanding a balcony. Unlike the regulations within the Green Line, when it comes to construction permits in Judea and Samaria, an additional four or five signatures are needed.
The additional red tape is meant to provide the government with closer scrutiny over settlement activity so that no surprises emerge. The committee is just the gateway for other exhausting procedures that would come at a later stage, but the government has kept this gate sealed shut. There is no other term that would befit this situation other than a de fact settlement freeze unless the government reopens it. And this is particularly ironic since this government has called itself "10 degrees more right-wing than the Netanyahu government." .
So it's no wonder that the Yesha Council (the settlement umbrella group), has felt compelled to issue a condemnation of this de facto freeze despite being in the tank for this government.
What's kosher, and who decides?
Under Israeli law, a food establishment cannot claim to be classified as halachically kosher unless the Chief Rabbinate grants it the official certificate stating as such. Under new draft legislation led by Religious Services Minister Matan Kahana, a new system would be introduced under which several competing Kashrut supervision entities would replace the rabbinate's enforcement.
Since the public doesn't have real means to determine if a certain supervision entity would actually uphold the Halachah or go skimpy, the new kashrut certificates' validity would be in big question.
Proponents of this reform say this will only increase kashrut supervision in Israel because competition would lead more businesses to apply for a certificate and expand their clientele by getting the stamp of approval from one of the new entities, which would be much more accessible than the rabbinate and allow a much more affordable way of getting it. What about the level of kashrut? Those who support the reform are not concerned because they believe every kashrut entity would have to abide by the rabbinate's overall standard. If it does not, the rabbinate would have the power to strip it of its supervision authority.
But such a move would empower the rabbinate to determine which kashrut body could enforce the law and would require both to be on the same page, essentially turning the rabbinate into a highly powerful regulatory body. Such coordination will not be possible, because the chief rabbinate has already announced that they would not play along in such a case.
The fact is that as soon as Kahana announced this move, the race between the proponents and opponents of the proposals began. The latter group includes the chief rabbis. Both groups are vying for control over the rabbinate council, and it appears that the new minister's chances are slim. If he fails to gain the upper hand by winning a majority in that council, his proposal will be left on paper, like many other attempts to streamline the kashrut supervision system in Israel.
The more time passes, it appears that the current system is the lesser of two evils.
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