We need to start from the bottom line: nothing on Israel's southern front is over. As usual with the Gaza Strip, this is only a temporary lull. It could last a month, two months, or a little longer, but without a thorough, far-reaching solution – which there is little chance of reaching – at some point, we'll find ourselves in a rerun.
Still, the truce reached with Gaza this week is welcome. Quiet has been restored to the communities of the western Negev, as well as the residents of Gaza. The physical damage caused by long weeks of explosives-laden balloons and ensuing wildfires was limited, but exhausting for the locals. Gaza, too, made it through the IDF's intensive strikes without any major damage (except to Hamas installations), but we shouldn't dismiss what they did to the Gazans' nerves, and the pressure that put on Hamas.
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And that might be the whole story. Unlike the previous rounds of violence, this time, Hamas misread Israel and failed to gain the upper hand. Israel was handling Hamas through four parallel, simultaneous campaigns, which ultimately led the Hamas leadership to accept a ceasefire on less satisfactory terms than it could have gotten at the start of the escalation.
The first campaign was military. The policy that GOC Southern Command Maj. Gen. Herzl Halevi spearheaded and which was adopted by both the IDF chief of staff and the political leadership was to create a clear equation in which every arson balloon released toward Israel would meet with a response. Hamas tried to claim that the balloons were being released as part of a "popular resistance," but Israel took care to define them as terrorist activity.
This resulted 19 IDF strikes in Gaza over the 22 days of fires in southern Israel caused by balloons from Gaza. The balloons that were "ignored" were because mediators trying to broker a ceasefire had asked for quiet here and there as a way of building trust in order to achieve a truce, or because the weather was uncooperative, leading the IDF to worry that an errant strike could cause Palestinian casualties, which would in turn results in further escalation.
The strikes themselves targeted Hamas infrastructure. The organization lost weapons and equipment used to manufacture them, as well as parts of its defenses along the border and its abilities to dig tunnels. This doesn't hurt the organization at the strategic level, but given its financial straits, even smaller-scale damage is a headache, and will require time and resources to get these capabilities up and running again.
Elastic pressure
The second campaign came in the area of civil sanctions. It unfolded gradually, but in the end, Israel went all in, closing the Kerem Shalom goods crossing, even for fuel deliveries, and a total closure on the Gazan fishing zone. One senior official this week described this approach as a "rubber band," which the harder Israel pulled, the more pressure would be created at the opposite end, on the residents of Gaza, who would put pressure on Hamas. This was collective punishment, but one that proved particularly effective in light of Hamas' sensitivity to the distress of the people of Gaza.
The third campaign was international. The usual mediators were acting in this latest crisis – Egypt and UN officials – but this time, there was a third broker, which turned out to have more influence: Qatar. In the past, Qatar was just a purse that provided the Gazans with a pile of dollars every moth, but this time, it had demands. This led to Qatari envoy Mohammad al-Amadi arriving in Gaza with the money, but refusing to disburse it. He held fast for five days. He had the suitcases of cash with him, but until Hamas complied with his demands, the money stayed where it was.
As part of the negotiations, Qatar agreed to Hamas' demand to increase the monthly "deposit" from $30 million to $34 million (including fuel). Hamas, for its part, agreed to an immediate, unconditional ceasefire that would apply to all terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip. Facts on the ground have proven how strong a grip Hamas has on Gaza when it wants to. The moment Hamas agreed to a truce on Monday evening, all arson balloon activity stopped.
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As part of the deal, Israel promised to help promote a series of projects in the Gaza Strip, from work to improve health care in Gaza to helping handle a new outbreak of coronavirus and increasing export quotas on goods from Gaza, as well as infrastructure and employment initiatives. Some of these will be held up because of coronavirus; Israel intends to allow Gaza businesspeople to hold meetings at the Erez checkpoint, but due to concerns about the virus spreading, will be keeping goods and people from Gaza out of Israel for the foreseeable future.
This is a serious blow to the Gazan economy, even though the decision was made at Hamas' request. Hamas is worried that Gazans who enter Israel might bring the virus back with them and cause an outbreak.
The fourth campaign put out fires. When the balloons started, relatively few caused large-scale fires that burned up huge areas. Later one, lots of balloons caused small fires. This was thanks to coordination between the Fire and Rescue Services, the Israel Police, the IDF, the western Negev communities and local authorities, and the Israel Nature and Parks Authority, who spotted balloons in time and handled them quickly. The result was that the balloons became less effective, as did the main trump card Hamas was holding.
Back to the starting point
Qatar didn't take center stage in a vacuum. It had two motives: One, they are sick of paying and not getting any credit for it. Second, the peace process that broke out between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. Qatar found itself on the side of the "bad guys," irrelevant, on the wrong side of history, and wanted to improve its position.
This doesn't mean that Qatar has changed its ways. It remains a staunch supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, and therefore a clear opponent of the moderate Sunni axis led by Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. But Dohan realized that in order to not be left behind entirely, it should throw its hat in the ring. The Qatari mediation between Israel and Gaza was part of that new policy. For Israel, it was a blessing, because Qatar, with its money and diplomatic influence, can be another effective means of leverage on the Hamas political and military leadership.
Still, nothing is over. The let-up is temporary, and fragile. The fundamental problems of the Gaza Strip remain, and they are enormous: the poverty, unemployment, crumbling infrastructure all require immediate solutions. Defense Minister Benny Gantz and the IDF are willing to take action to promote a broad agreement, but always, there is the Israeli pre-condition to solve the issue of Israel's captive fallen soldiers and civilians. In previous negotiations on the matter, Hamas made demands that Israel had no intention of discussing, let alone agreeing to – first, that it release terrorists with blood on their hands. It's possible that now, given the ongoing coronavirus crisis in the Gaza Strip, Hamas will be more flexible in exchange for humanitarian aid.
In the absence of a solution, or a process toward a solution, the two sides could soon find themselves back at the starting point and involved in another escalation for some reason or other. Right now, everyone involved is trying to write a different ending to the same old script. There's not much chance of that happening, but it's worth a shot. Sooner or later, Israel could find itself having to fight a widespread, bloody war in Gaza, and it must leave no stone unturned to try and avoid that.
