Although still too early to form a definitive evaluation of the Israel-United Arab Emirates agreement, there are already some preliminary conclusions that are possible to draw.
The Israel-UAE deal is a tremendous victory for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's strategic vision, which he managed to impose gradually over time, regarding relations between Israel and the Arab world.
According to most Israeli commentators, it is an unprecedented and tremendous diplomatic coup that marks the triumph of Netanyahu's political doctrine, a doctrine that promotes the increasing marginalization of the Palestinian Authority and the gradual disappearance of the "two states for two peoples" notion on which Israeli diplomacy has largely relied since the Oslo Accords.
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This strategic vision is inseparable from the policy Netanyahu has, with remarkable consistency, been pursuing for over two decades now with regards to the Iranian threat, which he was one of the first to take seriously and about which he often finds himself preaching into the wind and against the advice of certain heads of military intelligence and the Mossad.
The normalization of ties with Sunni Arab countries is illustrative of the second part of the Netanyahu Doctrine vis-à-vis Iran and its proxies (Hezbollah, Hamas, and others) that in recent years has taken the form of close military and security collaboration, usually far from the spotlight, between Israel and the Gulf countries.
Contrary to the assertions of his detractors, not only was Netanyahu not mistaken about the Iranian threat (which they erroneously claim he exaggerated or even outright "invented"), but he also correctly evaluated the diplomatic and strategic opportunity this threat presented: to establish an Israeli-Arab alliance against Iran and its allies, of which the accords with the UAE are the first fruits.
In this respect, Binyamin Netanyahu's strategic vision can only be compared – in its depth and scope – to that of David Ben-Gurion, who in the 1950s had advocated for the establishment of links with the countries of the non-Arab "second circle" – Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia –in order to loosen the grip of the Arab countries bordering Israel.
The Netanyahu doctrine consists of exploiting the old Arab-Persian dispute and of positioning the Jewish state as a protective bulwark for the countries of the moderate Sunni axis. Furthermore, what at first might appear to be only a convergence of circumstantial interests, temporary and fragile, now turns out to be a true and deep alliance, on the verge of materializing into the establishment of full diplomatic relations and a long-term rapprochement between Israel and several Arab countries in the Gulf (and perhaps also in North Africa).
The accuracy of Netanyahu's strategic vision is all the more striking in light of his apparent ongoing posture of equivocation and seeming adoption of the false "two states for two people" narrative, particularly in his famous Bar-Ilan speech. This latest step has shown, however, that not only did Netanyahu not continue on the path taken by his predecessors since the time of the Oslo Accords of seeking to establish a Palestinian state, but it was he who stuck the final nail into the coffin of the illusory notion of a new Arab state west of the Jordan.
In doing so, Netanyahu shattered the myth of the centrality of the "Palestinian question," maintained for several decades not only by the Arab League, but also by the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the European Union, and the UN.
By agreeing to sign an agreement with Israel without making it dependent on any resolution of the Palestinian question, the UAE showed that they understood that, far from being an Arab priority, the latter in fact constituted an obstacle to the realization of Arab interests.
Contrary to the worst-case policy adopted since 1964 by the leaders of the PLO and the PA, who have "never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity," the Sunni leaders of the Gulf have, for their part, shown their willingness to seize every chance to advance normalization and rapprochement with the Jewish state, in light of what they clearly perceive as their countries' shared interest with Israel.
The question of Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria and the Temple Mount, which currently remains open, constitutes the third, and somewhat more obscure, part of the Netanyahu Doctrine. On this crucial subject, he once again showed his absolute pragmatism and rejection of any ideological position. Only the future will show if Netanyahu's (overly?) cautious wait-and-see attitude on this issue will enable Israel to establish full Jewish sovereignty west of the Jordan River, taking advantage of the historic opportunity offered by current US President Donald Trump, or if it will signify another missed opportunity to fulfill the millennial promise of the Jewish people's return to the heart of their heritage and their homeland.
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