A decade has passed since Israeli commandos boarded the Turkish Mavi Marmara, which was part of a flotilla en route to break the Israeli blockade on the Gaza Strip, resulting in the deaths of nine Turkish activists and an unprecedented diplomatic crisis for Israel and Turkey.
Dr. Gallia Lindenstrauss, an expert in Turkish foreign policy and a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, sat down with Israel Hayom to discuss relations between Jerusalem and Ankara over the past 10 years in light of the Marmara raid, the Iranian nuclear crisis, the discovery of natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean, and the Palestinian issue.
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Q: In recent weeks, the Turkish media has been talking about attempts to thaw relations between Turkey and Israel. 10 years after the Mavi Marmara incident, do the Turks really want a more balanced foreign policy?
"It's clear to both countries that relations won't return to the honeymoon of the 1990s. Many people are saying now that that 'honeymoon' was unusual in and of itself. I see reports of approaching normalization as overblown."
Q: But there are positive signs.
"Correct. One is that at the height of the coronavirus crisis, the Turks allowed the export of medical aid to Israel, which required approval from [Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan. The second – an El Al cargo plane landed in Turkey and, interestingly, then transferred some of its cargo to the US. Why would an El Al plane fly to Turkey, then to the US? It's a little awkward, to say the least. It is a testament to the traditional view that Israel has a lot of influence in Washington … An [Israeli] plane hasn't landed in Turkey for a decade because the Turks refused to have Israeli security personnel in their territory ... Another event that attracted attention in Turkey came when the head of the [Israeli] embassy in Ankara wrote an article saying that despite the lack of agreement between the two countries, there was no reason for them not to have ambassadors.
Q: Isn't there?
"After the Marmara incident, Turkey made three conditions for restoring normal relations with Israel: An apology, compensation, and the removal of the blockade on the Gaza Strip. However, after the riots on the Gaza border started in 2018, Turkey sent the Israeli ambassador in Ankara to hold consultations in Israel, which comprised an attempt to demonstrate disapproval without creating too serious a crisis."
"But since 2018, it's been unclear what needs to be done to reinstate the ambassadors. No conditions have been made, and there is nothing preventing their return. The question of why there aren't ambassadors in Tel Aviv and Ankara is always in the air. But in the end, I think that the main reason we're hearing about normalization and renewed relations has to do with the new government in Israel. We were in an ongoing political crisis, and foreign players don't know how to deal with us."
Q: Ankara is expected to respond harshly to Israel's plans to declare sovereignty in parts of Judea and Samaria. In general, Israeli-Turkish relations have deteriorated along with negative developments between Israel and the Palestinians.
"On Eid al-Fitr [the holiday that marks the end of Ramadan], Erdogan spoke against Israel's annexation plans, and the more they move forward, the more we'll hear harsh statements from Turkey. If the annexation goes as planned, it will lead to worrying responses, particularly an eruption of violence in the West Bank [and] on the Gaza border. There's no way Israel and Turkey can get through that without another crisis in bilateral relations, so there is no sense in warming up relations now just to see them blow up."
Q: Another cause of tension is the negotiations between Israel and Saudi Arabia to give the Saudis a foothold on the Temple Mount, at Turkey's expense. Turkey has become a major player in east Jerusalem.
"Turkish activity in east Jerusalem is certainly creating tension, both with Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Generally, in recent years Israel has moved closer to the pragmatic Sunni states, first and foremost around the Iranian issue, but also when it comes to other issues. The tension between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is widespread and also has to do with the continued blockade on Qatar, as well as the Turkish support for the Qataris and the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Moreover, in recent years Turkey has come to be seen as the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood axis and also as a domestic threat to other countries.
"But if Jordan and Saudi Arabia reach agreements about the Temple Mount, it still won't prevent other Turkish activity in east Jerusalem and among the Arabs of Israel, and I expect that activity to continue. It won't necessarily affect Turkey's relations with other Sunni countries, but it is seen as proof that Turkey has bigger aspirations to acquire regional influence."
Q: The Marmara incident created a unique balance of power in the Middle East: Cyprus and Greece increased their ties to Israel, and along with Egypt (with US support), they are facing off against Turkey and Libya. Is that a volatile balance?
"Yes. We need to look at other regional and international actors, too. For example, Cyprus, a small country with very creative diplomacy, which has signed agreements on economic maritime borders with Israel, Lebanon, and Egypt is the country that has spurred a process in the Mediterranean from which we are now seeing positive results: close ties between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus.
"On the other hand, the Marmara also created a negative process of increased tensions in the region. The incident happened right when natural gas was being discovered in the Mediterranean, and a lot of economic interests arose around a relatively small area. The territories of the countries overlap and not every player can be given exactly what they deserve. It has the potential to escalate: the eastern Mediterranean has become an area of concern, and in a certain sense that began with the Marmara."
Q: Some countries have described Turkey's behavior in the Mediterranean as "wild expansion." Should we be worried, especially given Erdogan's Ottoman aspirations?
"The Turks are sending ships to drill in Cypriot economic waters, to blocs where European companies are drilling, and they are doing so without hesitation. The navies of the region are also becoming more prominent – that is true of Israel, Egypt, and Turkey. More vessels are in the area, and I see that as a worrying development. As far as unexpected behavior, someone once said that Erdogan has 'planned explosions.' His style can be very crude, but he is calculating in his own way."
"It's important to note that his policy makes sense in the eastern Mediterranean. It was adopted due to the country's experience with failed diplomacy. Turkey feels that until 2016, it played nice, and only did it get them nowhere, it caused other countries to align against them: Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and you can also add Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. They have all isolated [Turkey] in the Mediterranean, so it has moved on to 'gunboat diplomacy'. Since Turkey has been behaving more aggressively, the various players are more impressed by its claims. So for Turkey, this policy is very rational."
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Q: How does Iran come into the picture?
"The Turks have a very delicate relationship with Iran, as well as trade. Iran is a very important energy supplier for Turkey. The Israeli defense establishment wanted to bring Turkey into the fight against Iran, but it didn't work. Turkey might not want a nuclear Iran, but that doesn't mean it will solve the issue by partnering with Israel. In effect, Turkey is taking a very different approach to the Iranian problem than Israel, and it doesn't see Iran as an existential threat like Israel does."
Q: Trade between Israel and Turkey, which in 2018 stood at some $5 billion, has been key to preserving bilateral relations. How big a role are economics expected to play in developing relations?
"Along with all his attacks on Israel, Erdogan understands that a strong economy is what will keep him in power, so he isn't touching economic ties with Israel, except for the difficulty Israeli firms have in competing for Turkish government tenders. Remember, the balance of trade is ultimately in Turkey's benefit. Turkey is in a trade deficit with most of the other countries it trades with – it imports more than it exports. When it comes to Israel, two-thirds of the trade is Turkish exports to Israel and one-third imports form Israel. Moreover, this entire time Turkey has maintained a policy of not requiring entry visas for Israeli citizens."
Q: In Turkey, the Marmara still plays a major role in the anti-Israel discourse, and it looks as if it's being exploited by political and military figures.
"In many senses, Turkey is a split society – divided between supporters and opponents of Erdogan, but there are some issues that unite them. The Palestinian issue is one such example. In terms of the discourse, Erdogan is putting less emphasis on Gaza and more on Jerusalem, which is seeing as a uniting issue. This has been the trend in the past few years."
Q: Erdogan's attempts to deal with internal Turkish rifts are controversial.
"The steps he has taken in recent years – creating an atmosphere of fear, closing newspapers, imprisoning people on the claim that they have ties to terrorism – are all things that serve to silence members of the fractured opposition. Leaders like Erdogan feel as if they are waging a constant battle, which is what gives them power, and they try to find an enemy they can fight against, rallying the public behind them."
Q: How would you describe Erdogan?
"When he started out, in his first decade as a leader, he took more risks on courageous reforms. In his second decade in power, he has been busy shoring up his regime, weakening his opponents, but without grooming a successor. If he disappeared off the political stage tomorrow, his party could certainly fall apart. He is an example of a leader who has been in power for too many years.
"Surprisingly, he takes very good care of his health. He is against smoking and he can get furious when people smoke near him. At any rate, he sparks strong feelings. His supporters see him as an inspiration, and his opponents see him as a determined, serious, and consistent."
Q: They say he is also a kind of megalomaniac.
"He certainly sees himself as no less important and maybe more important than [Mustafa Kemal] Ataturk, who is seen as the father of the Turkish nation. He wants to leave his mark, and he is definitely not modest in his aspirations."
