In about one month's time, Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi stands to mark his first anniversary as chief of the Israel Defense Forces. Common wisdom says that what the chief of staff doesn't accomplish during his first year in office he may never get around to doing.
Kochavi had many plans for his first year, but he – like the rest of the Israeli public – got thrown for a loop over the unprecedented electoral crisis.
With the exception of the operational theater, which goes about its business regardless of politics – dictated by the Middle Eastern reality that, for the most part, doesn't care about politicians' interests – everything else has been treading water.
Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook and Twitter
The mountain of necessary streamlining efforts, procurement plans, and various other objectives – some of them critical – has been reduced to a small list of "must-dos." Everything else remains on a future to-do list.
Kochavi will never admit it publicly, but he is angry – and he is not alone. Most top defense officials say the paralysis imposed on them by the political logjam is outrageous. The damage it has inflicted on the military and, by extension, Israel's security, amounts to gross negligence.
The interim government that has been in place since the April 9 election cannot put together a state budget, meaning defense spending has been put on hold and with it, the IDF's new work plan. The current one sustains the military's immediate needs, but it cannot take it forward.
Kochavi's work plan was carefully outlined to cover dozens of issues, from procurement and R&D, to force build-up, structural changes, and social adjustments, but "Momentum," as the plan is called, is stuck in its tracks.
But, as things stand right now, even if you set aside the perils of managing a significant security crisis in such a fragile political reality, national security is paying a heavy price for the political chaos.
For example, two weeks ago, a Sikorsky CH-53 helicopter crash-landed during a training exercise after one of its engines caught fire. The aircraft was completely engulfed in flames within minutes of hitting the ground and it was only by a sheer miracle that none of the troops on board were hurt.
The Israeli Air Force's fleet of Sikorsky helicopters is fast approaching the end of its operational lifecycle and is slated to be replaced. The wheels for this move were set in motion last year, but in the absence of a functioning government and an orderly work plan, everything has ground to a halt.
The same is true for dozens of other projects. Were Kochavi a cynic, he would make the full details available to the public and inform the Knesset's 120 lawmakers that they can already hold themselves responsible for any operational failures that may occur in the next war.
But Kochavi is far too professional and discrete for that. Besides, it is doubtful such a move would do any good: The average Israeli politician has an armor impervious to shame.
No such thing as cheap wars
The IDF's current multi-year work plan, "Gideon," will run its course by Jan. 1, 2020. The plan was put together in 2015 by then-IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot, and its bottom line was that the military promised not to ask for additional funds and the Finance Ministry pledged not to demand cuts to defense spending.
Eizenkot kept his end of the bargain and for the most part so did the Treasury, with the exception of lateral budget cuts that were imposed on all government ministries and therefore applied to the Defense Ministry as well.
The problem is that the political standstill has precluded the transitional government from giving "Momentum" the final green light and once "Gideon" elapses, the IDF will be working off a monthly budget until such time that the plan can be approved by the next government.
Under Israeli law, in the absence of a state budget, government ministries operate on a monthly stipend that equals one-twelfth of their last sanctioned budget. As the IDF's budget depends on the Defense Ministry, it will have to make do with a fraction of the funds it needs.
That means that the military will be unable to do anything beyond the here and now and will have to plan month-to-month. For a system that needs stability to thrive this is nothing short of a catastrophe.
When Eizenkot outlined "Gideon," the geo-strategic situation in the Middle East was different: Many of the nations in the region were embroiled in civil wars and Iran was restrained by the 2015 nuclear agreement. Fast-forward five years and the regional reality has changed – and not for the better, especially where Iran is concerned.
As a result, the chances of a security escalation in the northern sectors have increased exponentially and to win a future war there Israel needs to ensure it has four basic components: Good operational plans, trained soldiers, comprehensive weapons stockpiles, and the ability to make right and timely decisions. The IDF is solely responsible for the first component, but it depends entirely on the political echelon for the remaining three.
Training in 2019 is far more expensive than before. Weapons too. Every Air Force bomb, every Iron Dome interceptor costs a fortune. The "campaign between the wars" – an ongoing Israeli military and intelligence effort to disrupt the force build-up of the Iranian-Shiite axis throughout the Middle East – has afforded Israel peace and quiet in the northern sector, but if anything, it has proven that a budget war is never good.
But the Finance Ministry is also pushing for cuts in career officers' salaries, which if approved will deal the military's very backbone a crippling blow.
Contrary to popular belief that career officers enjoy hefty salaries at the taxpayers' expense, among public servants they are actually at the bottom of the pay grade. Below police officers and wardens, and light-years away from Shin Bet security agents and Mossad intelligence officers.
Any further injury to this echelon could result in permanent disability. Recent cutbacks and streamlining efforts have already taken their toll and the IDF is having real difficulties retaining junior officers in some units. Officers serve in two, sometimes three positions simultaneously, and burnout rates are high.
People want professional stability, and the vague budgetary reality means the IDF cannot provide it. The result is a loss of quality human capital, which in turn impairs war readiness.
In this situation, Kochavi has two options: Be a gentleman or come out swinging. For now, it seems he is opting for the former, which may be a mistake. The damage done to national security already superseded his legacy as chief of staff.
Kochavi has the responsibility to present the hard facts to the government and in the absence of one – to the public. Just as hospital administrators did this week, and school principals the week before. And not just to avoid being labeled the one who shirked responsibility, rather from a true desire to protect and defend Israel.
