This Monday, it will be a year since the IDF's botched intelligence raid near Khan Younis in the Gaza Strip. Plenty has already been written about the failed mission and what it means, from the friendly-fire death of Lt. Col. M. to the exposure of the methods the special forces used and the in-depth changes the special forces have instituted as a result.
Hamas wanted to cast itself in the role of victor. It exposed a special op, thwarted a major intelligence action, and identified hole in Israel's intelligence apparatus. It's doubtful that Hamas has made public everything it knows, and it's also likely that it is holding back information that it can bring out to embarrass Israel the next time things aren't going its way. Hamas might be playing its cards close to the chest to maintain ambiguity about what it really knows, or it might not have finished studying and learning from the incident. When it has drawn its conclusions, the organization will likely share its insights with experts outside the organization.
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The Khan Younis failure also has ramifications that are visible to anyone who visits the Gaza border. The incident made Hamas even more suspicious than it used to be. Gaza is already an especially tough zone in which to operate – it is densely populated and booby-trapped, and any foreigner stands out. As strange as it might sound, it is much easier to operate in Lebanon or Iran than in the Gaza Strip – not only because there are multiple ways into those countries, but also because daily life there has a normality that is lacking in Gaza, which makes it easier to work.
So Hamas has upped its guard and erected many more watchtowers along the border fence. The organization is also obsessively collecting intelligence about the border between Gaza and Israel, some of which is intended to serve its purposes in a future war and allow it to mark weak points to attack, like it did when it fired the anti-tank missile that killed an Israeli citizen on Highway 232 during the sharp escalation in violence this past May. Other intelligence is intended to ensure that its borders are not breached again and keep Israel from launching similar operations that would allow it to maintain its intelligence superiority.
Paradoxically, Hamas' activity benefits Israel, not only because it highlights the need to be creative, but also for much more populist reasons. It increases Hamas' governability in Gaza – a major interest for Israel – and sets up convenient targets to be attacked in any future conflict.
One such target was destroyed in August, when forces from the 12th Golani Battalion took out four terrorists who tried to penetrate Israeli territory. Battalion commander Lt. Col. Itai Matak used the fighting to attack one of the organization's two positions in the zone where the attempted terrorist attack was to be carried out. Not that it caused any strategic change or struck a major blow to Hamas – for the most part, it was a simple observation post that was re-erected immediately, but the message was clear: Hamas and its operatives are expected to spot and prevent attacks.
Low-level friction
Golani forces are in the process of wrapping up four months of operations on the Gaza border. The battalions are being swapped out in stages, once every few days, to ensure that experienced troops remain stationed there in case of an unexpected escalation. The 12th Battalion will be departing soon and will begin divisional training on the Golan Heights. The security tensions on all fronts will determine the nature of the training, which will have to increase readiness for war in the North and in Gaza.
Matak and his soldiers are used to it. During their last period of training, they were scrambled to Gaza twice as preparation for a wide-scale escalation that was averted. But ongoing security and defense ops are different by their very nature – Golani wasn't deployed there to enter Gaza and destroy terrorist targets but rather as forces charged with defending Israel. Instead of the offense it is used to and loves, the Golani soldiers have been playing defense during their time on the border.
It's been a complicated few months. Gaza is always complex, now even more so. It is constantly moving between agreements and rounds of violence, seeking sanity and preparing for insanity. Facing an immense economic and humanitarian challenge as well as a variety of players who are trying to destabilize its rule, Hamas is making efforts, which are unseen by Israel, to prevent a war. Not that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and his people have become Zionists, but they are pragmatists and understand better than anyone what head of the IDF's Research Division, Brig. Gen. Dror Shalom, said in a major interview just before Rosh Hashana is true: that a future war with Israel could bring down Hamas, and send Gaza into a state of anarchy that would resemble the situation in Somalia and drag Israel in, as well.
A standout example of that are the weekly protests on the border, which have taken place consistently since March 2018. Hamas is spearheading them, and controls them. It hangs notices about them in the streets, funds the buses that transport the protesters, and in some areas even assigns security guards to make sure that everyone who arrives at the fence is unarmed. But it is doing nothing to stop them, as the protests allow the organization to maintain steady friction with Israel and win the sympathy of international officials and news outlets, and give the residents of Gaza some outlet for their boundless fury at their difficult situation.
When the protests began, they were very violence. The IDF had to employ force, which led to wounded and dead on the Palestinian side, which led to a response, which sometimes led to an escalation. So today, Israel is making a concerted effort to see Fridays end without casualties and a minimum of wounded. That requires professionalism and absolute control by the field commanders.
"We're trying to cut down the number of protesters who arrive, and mostly wound only the ones we need to – not the innocent. The more I can prevent casualties, the more I reduce the chance of a big mess," Matak says.
This means he has to be out there every Friday – on the border, with the troops, to ensure that everything is under control. His situation is no different from that of the other commanders in the zone, none of whom remember what a Friday evening meal with their families tastes like. But Matak's own story is a little different. While he was assigned to the Gaza border, his wife gave birth to twin girls shortly before Rosh Hashana. He took two days off for the birth, and then was back on duty. Now, during training, he'll have a little more time and home with his four kids.
According to Matak, there is nothing anarchic or random about the protests. They are thoroughly organized, down to the smallest details. During one protest a few weeks ago, one of the deputy commanders was given a green light to fire at violent protesters by the fence. A few minutes later, after the shots hadn't been fired, Matak wondered about the holdup. "I can't see a target that isn't kids," the officer told him.
In most cases, Matak says, soldiers encounter only children under 10 along the fence. The protest organizers keep back and send the little ones ahead, sometimes armed with smoke grenades, Molotov cocktails, and wire-cutting tools to sabotage the fence. That is why the IDF has such stringent rule about when to shoot in place – only snipers are allowed to shoot, under supervision, and only in extreme cases that demand an attack must be averted immediately.
Get back to engagement
The demonstrations aren't the only challenge to troops stationed on the border. The 12th Battalion has had two confrontations with terrorists who tried to enter Israel to carry out an attack. Palestinians crossing into Israel from Gaza is nothing new, but they used to be mostly civilians who were looking for a better life in Israel. In the past few months, as Hamas' governability erodes amid growing criticism of its rule – some from within its ranks – there have been a few attempts by terrorists to penetrate Israel, which were thwarted.
In the first incident, a terrorist crossed into Israel near the Kissufim crossing. The forces that arrived first did not attempt to engage, but the terrorist was caught in a controlled area. Backup forces were diverted, and a few hours later the terrorist was neutralized. Following a probe, two Golani soldiers got the boot.
"We fulfilled the mission, but not in the way I would have liked," says Matak. "The terrorist didn't get past us and didn't carry out an attack, but I expect Golani combat soldiers to engage and take him out. There have always been and will always be excuses about why that didn't happen; our mission is to overcome the problems and solve them."
Matak rejects criticism about how long the incident lasted: "From the moment we had the terrorist isolated and it was clear that it was not an attempt to distract us or part of any bigger action, it was better to do it right and with [proper] judgment to avoid harm to our forces."
But the main thing for Matak is the lesson learned: "Soldiers in the battalion realized what is expected of them. The fact is, it helped us learn and improve."
Not long after this incident, four terrorists tried to enter Israel a few kilometers to the south. This time, the 12th Battalion was ready. Matak himself arrived on the scene and took command of the event, which resulted in the four terrorists being killed and a nearby Hamas outpost being destroyed. The terrorists had been in possession of weapons and equipment that hinted at what they had intended to do: anti-aircraft missiles and RPGs, Kalachnikov rifles and ammunition, shovels and wire-cutting tools, and enough medical supplies and food to last them some time outdoors.
The terrorists themselves were former members of a few different organizations who had joined up to carry out an attack because they knew each other. The preceding attempted attack, as well as others, taught Israel how challenged Hamas in Gaza is. The organization itself has learned the same lesson, and has invested significant intelligence and operational resources in trying to prevent similar attempts to carry out terrorist attacks.
This chain of attempted attacks, combined with the ongoing protests at the border fence, have also led Israel to change its protocol about engagement. From that standpoint, Gaza has been a gift. Its topography can be changed relatively easily. Sand has been piled up at several points to either hide Israeli communities or give Israeli forces an edge as needed.
"It's like my kids' playground," says Matak. "Both here and there reality can be changed fairly easily. The fact that we put up barbed wire on the western side of the border helps us delay anyone who tries to cross into Israel. It might be only be a few minutes, but that time is critical when you're talking about preventing a cross-border attack."
The activity around the border is just a small part of the picture. Major Israeli efforts include work on the subterranean barrier to prevent terror tunnels, which will be topped by a high-tech and much higher fence, like the ones on Israel's borders with Egypt and Syria. The fence is slated for completion in the summer of 2020, and until then, the ongoing security mission will continue. From next week, the headache of providing strong defenses against terrorism will be transferred to the head of the Kfir Brigade, which is replacing Golani.
Hamas won't always stop terrorism
The successful tactical operations help maintain a relative calm, but cannot provide immunity from periodic escalation. Israel and Hamas' joint interest in avoiding a widespread conflict coincides with other interests that post a challenge to both sides and could cause them to work against their own clear reasoning.
The main factor is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, particularly the main who commands its northern sector, Baha Abu Al Atta. He is a field commander who has artfully exploited the existing situation. In the past few months, his people have been responsible for nearly all the terrorist activity that originates from Gaza, including rocket fire on Ashdod prior to the Sept. 17 election and the rockets fired at Sderot last Saturday.
Al Atta, 42 and a father of five, was born and raised in Gaza. He joined the Palestinian Islamic Jihad when he was young but has managed to evade capture by Israel. As the organization's leadership in Damascus changed, he became increasingly militant.
It seems that the idea that he radicalized his activity under direct instructions from Iran, which is the exclusive provider of funds to the group, is overly simplistic. Al Atta is a Palestinian Gazan, first and foremost. His home and family are there. He won't rush to do anything to bring the roof down on them just because Tehran tells him to. However, he is consistently positioning himself closer to Iran and Israel won't be able to ignore rocket fire much longer.
At some point, the government's patience will run out. It almost happened after the rocket fire on Ashdod, and only the unfeasibility of an operation and legal counsel stopped an Israeli retaliation that was already in the works. At that point, various Arab officials – from the Hamas leadership to Egyptian mediators to Qatar to the UN – were called into calm things down. Al Atta himself was summoned to Cairo, where they tried to dampen his belligerent ardor.
It's doubtful they were successful, and even if they were, the meeting gives Al Atta and his organization growing weight in terms of the future of the Gaza Strip. Al Atta can now enjoy the best of both worlds. He can cooperate with terrorism and feel no responsibility. Hamas is familiar with that position, which is what the group enjoyed when the Palestinian Authority was still in control of Gaza.
If Hamas doesn't manage to hold him in check, Israel will have to. That will certainly lead to a major escalation. Hamas won't be able to stop it, and will have to fight, both to identify with the PIJ and as the entity in charge of defending Gaza and its residents. The decision makers in Israel and in Gaza can see this clearly. If nothing changes, especially when it comes to the truce talks that require both sides to make tough decisions, it's a scenario that could soon come to pass.
