One doesn't have to be a genius to realize that something fundamental in Israel's security doctrine has changed in recent months. The "campaign between the wars," the much-lauded strategy that led the defense establishment's mostly covert efforts to keep Israel's enemies at bay, has been rolled back without any real alternative taking its place.
This operational concept, which encompasses a host of covert and low-intensity military and intelligence efforts and focuses primarily on disrupting the force build-up of the Iranian-Shiite axis throughout the Middle East, was born in the early 2000s but didn't emerge as a leading defense strategy until mid-2011, when the civil war erupted in Syria.
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During the Syrian civil war, Israel made sure to advance its regional interests, including preventing the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, countering Iran's efforts to entrench itself militarily in Syria, and preventing hostile terrorist activity on the Israeli border in the Golan Heights.
The "campaign between the wars," (CBW) was waged under a clear directive, namely to operate "below the threshold of war." Covert operations were approved only when it was clear that, even if they were exposed or botched, they would not trigger war. High-intensity operations were rarely approved.
The operations launched as part of this strategy were many and they included, among others, IAF strikes, cyber ops, special operations, diplomatic efforts, economic measures, and psychological warfare. All of these were synchronized into an orderly campaign, which may not have eliminated the threats, but was able to greatly disrupted them.
Recently, however, it seems that the CBW has all but disappeared. If, in the past, not a week would go by without at least one operation attributed to Israel, in recent weeks, it seems that Israel has been demonstrating unusual restraint.
This could be attributed to the prolonged election period and the High Holidays, which everyone wanted to see go by without a security escalation, but the bigger picture is more complex. The fact that Israel has been holding back may stem from the realization that the CBW in its familiar form has potentially become irrelevant. As volatile as the region is now, any Israeli operation could lead to rapid escalation and possibly war.
This mostly has to do with Iran. Until recently the basic premise was that IDF could lunch a certain number of operations that targeted Iranian assets, mostly in Syria, before the Islamic republic would order one of its regional proxies to retaliate.
This assumption is backed by numbers: while Israel has targeted numerous direct and indirect Iranian interests in the region, Iran has responded only four times in the past two years.
But the Iranian policy has now changed and Israel understands that any operation will meet with an immediate response. This change stems from Tehran's newfound confidence, gained over a series of incidents in the Persian Gulf that have nothing to do with Israel. Quds Force Commander Gen. Qasem Soleimani has been waging his own CBW in the Gulf, seeking to advance Iran's interests without sparking a full-blown war.
This has seen Soleimani deploy pro-Iranian militias and weapons not only in Lebanon and Syria but also in Iraq and Yemen. The idea is to threaten and, if need be, act but not from Iranian soil, thus allowing the ayatollahs' regime to maintain deniability.
The change in Iranian policy requires a similar change in Israel's policy. If CBW operations can no longer take place in the same way for fear of escalation, Israel must find other ways to curb the radical processes Iran and its proxies are leading in the region.
The temporary restraint Israel has taken upon itself may have short-term benefits, but the long-term damage could be considerable.
An example of this was given last week in Lebanon when Hezbollah launched a surface-to-air missile at an unmanned aircraft in southern Lebanon.
This was a blatant policy change on the part of the Shiite terrorist group but Israel chose not to retaliate. Many in the defense establishment believe that was a mistake and that it was imperative that the IAF immediately destroy the launching pad to make it clear to Hezbollah that a red line was crossed, even if it would have spelled escalation.
Several officials expressed concern over the fact that Israel's ability to generate deterrence is being eroded. They believe that Israel must devise a new strategy and implement it quickly, saying that while concerns over escalation are justified, Israel has no choice but to act.
Iran will not shelve its regional aspirations and no one but Israel – not the United States, not Russia, and certainly not the European – will stop it. And if Israel does not set a clear price tag for Iranian aggression immediately, it will soon discover that the Middle East is changing, and not in its favor.
