It's the job of the head of the Research Division in Military Intelligence Directorate to worry, but recently, Brig. Gen. Dror Shalom has been more worried than usual.
In a special interview with Israel Hayom, Shalom says, "We are seeing a much more chilling picture recently. … The past year and a half, I've raised the volume about how volatile things are. We're in a much more complex reality than we were in the past, and it's only getting worse."
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Shalom is talking about all the fronts Israel faces, but first and foremost – Iran.
"At the end of the day, it's all about Iran," he says.
"We're in a dangerous round against Iran, and we need to keep a tight grip on the wheel," he warns.
When it comes to Iran's nuclear program, Shalom envisions three possible scenarios:
First, the US reaches a new nuclear deal with Iran, which might not entail everything Israel wants; second, that the military escalation in the Persian Gulf continues until the US is forced to respond to Iran's activity, which could also force Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to get involved, possibly against Israel; and third, that Iran continues to violate the 2015 nuclear deal while remaining short of nuclear weapons capability.
Q: In other words?
"Raising the level of [uranium] enrichment to over 3.5%, holding more than 130 kg (290 pounds) of enriched uranium, using the heavy water reactor at Arak to hold over 300 kg (660 pounds), and mostly moving ahead in research and development – gathering knowledge and experience that will allow them to progress more quickly in the future."
Q: From the moment they decide to, how long will it take them to build a nuclear bomb?
"I haven't changed my basic assessment, which is two years for a bomb and a year to reach enough fissile material, but the processes that are underway right now allow them to build up their muscle, so when they do decide [to build a nuclear bomb], it will be fast and easy for them."
Q: Are you sure you'll be able to identify those events?
"The destabilizing of the nuclear deal demands that we divert some of our resources to this issue because I'm definitely a lot less easy today. We've gotten into a gray area in which they're moving ahead without, which requires us to be a lot more sensitive. Will we know? The Iranians are a very sophisticated enemy, and it bothers me."
Q: What are the chances that there are [Iranian] sites you don't know about or haven't located?
"My working assumption is always that there are things I don't know, so we have a very well-organized effort to tackle the nuclear issue, not only in Iran but throughout the entire region. We leave no stone unturned to avoid being surprised. As someone who was a partner in the [attack on] the Syrian reactor I'm not at all easy about Iran, and that's a change for the worse that poses a real challenge unless a new nuclear deal is reached that also serves us [Israel]."
'Soleimani is upgrading his capabilities'
In the past few years, Israel has been very active in Syria. The IDF's superior intelligence and airpower allowed it to carry out thousands of actions, at first against Hezbollah's attempts to arm itself and then against Iranian attempts to entrench itself militarily in Syria.
"We've moved from lopping off branches to chopping down trees – from attacking shipments to attacking the core," Shalom says, referring to activity that combines both military and diplomatic aspects.
"We identified the tensions that exist in the Putin-Assad-Iran triad and were able to maneuver within it so that all our actions correspond to all three of those points. The idea is to remain below the level of war. We've managed to stop a lot of things – we've had major successes," he says.
Q: What was stopped?
"A lot fewer weapons are coming in [to Syria and Lebanon]. The Shiite militias bases they wanted to build aren't being built. Iran's monetary investment has declined."
Q: That came at the price of a direct conflict with Iran.
"That was planned. We didn't want to kill Iranians, but we took into account that there was a chance that these actions could result in casualties because Iran is willing to sacrifice Arab Shiites but not Persian Shiites."
Q: Does Tehran know about the results of these attacks, or is Quds Force commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani hiding them?
"Not everything goes through an official approval process, and not everything is reported. Soleimani is a very serious guy. He learns, he's very determined, he has faith, and he is always improving. Now he has started setting up military capabilities there that are designed to attack us without fighting an actual war."
Q: How well do you know him?
"I know him well. I don't like to personify or glorify our enemies, and I think we need to handle him through other channels."
Q: Even so?
"He's very close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, like a son, and that's important because it biases the way the Iranian leader sees things. Soleimani believes in the Islamic Revolution with all his heart, and he is the main one who is executing it, who translates the ideology of Khamenei and Ayatollah Khomeini into practice and influence on the region as a whole."
Q: If he were taken out of the game, would it change anything?
"I don't talk about specific people. Soleimani is a key figure who is spearheading moves against Israel."
At the start of 2018, the IDF's Military Intelligence Division pointed to two processes it expected to see. The first was that as a result of continued pressure on Iran in Syria, Iran could try to gain a foothold in Iraq. The second was that Iran was transferring advanced weaponry to Syria to attack Israel, which could make the "between war" period even more volatile.
Q: What kind of capabilities are we talking about?
"From [manpower] frameworks that include both Sunnis and Shiites and militias that come in from other areas to weapons that include missiles, rockets, drones, and possibly even more complex things."
Q: Like cruise missiles?
"Yes. There is also cruise missile activity."
Q: What is happening in Iraq?
"Soleimani put a lot of time into Iraq, from a geopolitical perspective. He is very busy with that and he is using it as a base for Iranian military capabilities, with militias and allies. He is also using all that to influence Iraqi politics as well as to create another area of military activity, not only against us but also against Saudi Arabia and the Gulf."
Q: Do you see any possibility that he might shoot at us from Iraq?
"I think it's very likely."
Q: What will he shoot?
"It could be surface-to-surface missiles, cruise missiles, or long-range UAVs. He has UAVs that can fly 1,000-1,200 kilometers (600-700 miles) which he has used in the Persian Gulf."
Q: What would make him decide to fire at Israel?
"In the end, when he takes a hit to the nose, he wants to hit back, and he has taken some blows recently. So my working assumption is that it's only a matter of time until he tries."
Q: Any time he has tried to attack Israel from Syria, he hasn't really succeeded.
"He is humiliated. He took some serious blows and discovered that not everything he wants to do works out. But he's active, he isn't giving up, and he isn't saying 'uncle.' He is upgrading his capabilities, and what didn't work out for him last time could succeed next time."
'The tie in Syria has been upset'
Despite the prevailing belief in Israel, Syrian President Bashar Assad isn't thrilled about the Iranian military activity in his country.
"He'll have to understand that Soleimani is playing with him," Shalom says.
"The bases Iran is trying to build in eastern Syria are definitely not what Assad wants, and he is also disturbed by the Iranians spreading radical Shiite ideology. But in the end, his hands are tied. The Russians also understand the complexity of what the Iranians are doing."
Q: How much freedom of action do we have with the Russians after their jet was shot down last year?
"We are holding a very delicate dialogue with the Russians. We don't want to clash with them, but they also understand how much damage we can do. They know we aren't suckers. Still, we're being very careful and walking on tiptoe – but as far as I understand, we have some freedom of action to some degree."
Q: Is it possible that the "non-war" is starting to approach the level of war?
"Yes. I think we're starting to approach the level of war. And yet, as intelligence, our job is to see what can be done without a full-scale war and point to places that could lead us out of that. For now … things are more volatile, and there is more potential for them to devolve."
Q: You said the Iranians are trying to move "advanced capabilities" to Syria. What are we talking about?
"Iran is transferring specialized missile capabilities to Syria and is organizing its militias there - tens of thousands of fighters in Syria, not all of whom are going to be fighting against us in real-time. Some are meant to seize territory or bolster the capabilities of Hezbollah in its war against us in Lebanon."
Q: So your working assumption is that if we fight a war with Hezbollah, it will receive help from the Shiite militias?
"My working assumption is that in the next war in Lebanon, we will need to prevent reinforcements from being moved to Lebanon from Syria, and also expect to be challenged from Syria in the form of rockets and missiles, possibly more."
'Hezbollah was hoping not to kill'
Hezbollah's project to manufacture precision-guided missiles made headlines a few weeks ago after a drone attack on its main development site in Beirut, attributed to Israel, shut it down.
"It's a serious project that's defined as a 'major strategic threat,' which I think is accurate. It needs to be stopped, even though right now missiles are not being manufactured in Lebanon," Shalom says.
Q: Did the incident in Beirut do much to stop those efforts?
"I think that what was blown up there will delay the project by a few months at least."
Q: What did Nasrallah conclude from that strike?
"I think he's playing with fire. Still, it wasn't an incident that he would start a war over. I think he can be made to stop the precision missile project."
Q: How?
"In his risk assessment so far, he has lived with the sense of immunity in Lebanon, that there is an 'equation' that says he doesn't take action on our side and we don't take action on his – that he doesn't kill our people and we don't kill his. He thinks we can do what we want in Syria as long as we don't kill Hezbollah operatives. … The day of the strike, Nasrallah was embarrassed twice: when supposed Hezbollah members from Lebanon were killed in Syria, and by the Beirut incident. So he was committed to a response, but he is slowly realizing what he got himself into. If you ask me, I think he hoped his response would not result in any Israeli soldiers being killed."
Q: In the Avivim incident, was he trying not to kill anyone?
"Nasrallah is a jihadist, a defender of Lebanon. He is no lover of Israel. He gave instructions to carry out a retaliation. Some of our soldiers could have been killed, and if they had, there would be a response, and we might have found ourselves fighting battles in Lebanon."
Q: You said he could be made to give up the missile project. How?
"Through a combination of secret activity … and a broad diplomatic offense. The last incident gave the whole story a boost of energy."
Q: What is Nasrallah's top priority?
"Economics, economics, economics. How he can make cuts here or there because he's in very tough financial circumstances that are partly the result of US sanctions on Iran. He is also busy with the organization's image among the Shiite population and with other domestic matters. A lot of his operatives deal drugs, for example. He has families who lost relatives who fought in Syria, and the wounded [from the Syrian war]. He runs a large, long-standing organization that has to be rehabilitated."
Q: Is he afraid of war?
"He is very put off by the thought of war. Nasrallah understands our capabilities. In the Research Division, I have an entire branch that has spent years identifying targets in Lebanon, and he is very familiar with what our air force can deliver."
Q: In Operation Northern Shield, he lost a major project – the tunnels.
"He was really surprised, but I'm not sure that's behind us. We need to remember that his plans to attack us didn't depend on the tunnels alone. He has a massive plan that we've been practicing for."
Q: Has he given up the underground front?
"My assumption is no."
'Islam doesn't put food on the table'
At the other end of the country, the Gaza Strip has been on the brink of war for the past year and a half. It's always on the verge of blowing up, even though neither Israel nor Hamas wants that to happen.
Shalom says it took time for Israel to realize that Yahyah Sinwar was a different kind of leader, one who wasn't aspiring to terrorism alone.
"His strategy is more challenging. He didn't pop out of a tunnel. He wears suits and leads the masses to the border, and we hand suitcases of money over to Gaza."
Q: How long can we keep a lid on things in Gaza?
"In Gaza, we're sitting on powder kegs. But the main problem there is the economic, civil, and humanitarian situation. Even Hamas understands that – it might say that Islam is the solution, but Islam can't feed the masses or pay the electricity bill. So it's starting to look for other ways.
Q: A peace deal?
"Yes. Hamas wants a deal, but one that doesn't recognize Israel even though it's unclear to me how that could stop it from getting stronger. So we are recommending an arrangement that will include easements, improve the civil situation and promote long-term projects so they can get out of the sewage they're swimming in. Still, the question about Israel's strategy in the Palestinian context remains open."
Q: Is Sinwar willing to put jihad aside to rebuild the Gaza Strip?
"No, but Hamas is now willing to agree to long-term ceasefires."
Q: A hudna (truce)?
"Yes. We in intelligence have identified an opportunity for an agreement. To those who think our only role is to identify targets, I say, 'what is a target?" Because I don't think we'd be stronger after another escalation or war."
Q: Explain that.
"There are two scenarios. One is that we make major military progress but suffer heavy losses, and then reach the same deal Hamas is willing to make now. The other is that Hamas would fall apart during a war."
Q: Would that give us a Somalia situation in Gaza?
"I think it would. Hamas' governability is already facing challenges in Gaza, and given what we are planning to do to it in the next war – and this isn't propaganda – it's not certain it would survive, even if we aren't the ones who decide to bring it down. It could fall apart on its own."
Q: Would Hamas be willing to pay any price in a deal, including returning Israel's captive citizens and fallen soldiers?
"I think so, although that depends to a large extent on us."
Q: Will the Palestinian Islamic Jihad thwart a move like that?
"The Islamic Jihad has no responsibility. They get up in the morning and want to carry out jihad, to provoke wherever possible. We are doing risk management with Gaza, and it could all blow up at any moment."
Q: Would a war in Gaza drag us into escalation in the north?
"Not necessarily. I think that it's much more likely that the northern front would drag in Gaza."
The Arab Spring continues
The delicate situation in the north and in Gaza obscures the fact that most recent terror attacks, and victims of terrorism, have been in Judea and Samaria. Still, that area remains relatively quiet, due to Israel's efforts to thwart terrorist activity; effective security coordination with the Palestinian Authority; and attempts to improve the economic situation of Palestinians there and protect their daily routine.
"All of that depends greatly on PA President Mahmoud Abbas," Shalom says. A lot of people in Israel see him as an inciter, but he is key to the quiet that has been in effect since 2006. That doesn't mean he loves Israel – he isn't a member of Likud or Blue and White, but it's in his interest."
Q: And yet you talk about 'strategic deterrence' in Judea and Samaria.
"Because the situation is unstable and could get worse. Strategic deterrence isn't to prevent an intifada. That's the easy part, and we were almost engulfed in one with all the lone-wolf terrorist attacks. But in the past year or two, we've seen incidents in which the Palestinians tried to damage security coordination, and with a younger generation that barely remembers the last intifada and the unknown factor of Hamas, everything could crumble."
Q: Could someone replace Abbas?
"I find it hard to imagine anyone who would present more moderate or pragmatic positions than Abbas. We need to take that into consideration."
Q: How stable are the moderate regimes in the region?
"The upset in the Arab street continues. Regime stability is in question throughout the Middle East. Even in places that supposedly made it through the rocky time, there is still instability and they don't have well-balanced systems. Tyranny still exists, but in different forms and the economic development that's underway won't lead to any major change."
Remembering Sadat in 2019
The 1973 Yom Kippur War is an open wound for the Research Division and a constant reminder of the limits of intelligence.
"It's always in our mind. That generation wasn't any less intelligent, and they got it wrong. It forces us to be humble," Shalom says.
Q: Is the Research Division as important as it was, or is it less central in our cyber world?
"It's true we've gone to a technological world, but the Research Division has a very prominent status. … At the end of the day, the core of the IDF's and the government's activity comes from intelligence the Research Division supplies, and as a result, we have a great amount of responsibility on our shoulders."
