We didn't need the IDF spokesperson to explain to us on Monday that the report making the rounds via WhatsApp about IDF reinforcements on the northern border wasn't true. The rank attributed to the IDF chief of staff – major general instead of lieutenant general – was enough to know it was a hoax.
Basic logic should have ruled out the report from the outset. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah's promise that his organization would target IDF soldiers patrolling the border would not have led the army to send more troops there. The IDF would instead reduce its visibility to minimize the number of available targets. Assuming there will always be mistakes, the correct equation is fewer soldiers equals fewer opportunities for Hezbollah – in other words, less risk that it will be able to carry out Nasrallah's wishes.
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And yet, some intelligence and air force units did receive reinforcements – while certain movements near the border were restricted and alert levels were raised significantly.
At this stage, the IDF is primarily focused on intelligence gathering in an effort to understand what Hezbollah intends to do and when; in the assumption that quality intelligence will also provide ample advanced warning to help thwart the terrorist organization's plans or mitigate their potential damage.
Hezbollah isn't a crackerjack organization. The revenge attack it will seek to execute won't be pulled out of a hat.
It will be approved after running up an organized chain of command, up until and including Nasrallah. Hezbollah will likely seek out a target that will allow it to hit and more importantly embarrass Israel – but won't force a response strong enough to spark a conflagration that Hezbollah doesn't want right now. This is a delicate equation, which Nasrallah himself complicated even further on Sunday by adding more variables.
An unexpected PR win
While Israel accused the Iranian Quds Force, under the command of Qasem Soleimani, of planning and funding the terrorist plot that was foiled in a drone attack in south Beirut on Sunday, and that the people killed were members of an Iranian militia, Nasrallah claimed the targeted building was a Hezbollah media center and that the people killed were Hezbollah operatives. By doing so, not only did Nasrallah unnecessarily incriminate himself, but he also officially admitted to what Israel has long argued – that Hezbollah is trying to build a new terrorist front on the Golan Heights – giving Israel an unexpected public relations victory.
Perhaps Nasrallah did this as an excuse for vowing a reprisal attack, but it's certainly possible his anxiety stems from a different source: the drone attack itself, which he attributed to Israel. If the reports are to be believed, then it's quite conceivable what we've heard is merely the tip of the iceberg, and that the actual target was far more significant than a relatively unimportant and only slightly damaged media center. We can deduce, therefore, that the message for Hezbollah was of a different nature. In the past, Israel has avoided kinetic messages, opting instead for other ways to signal to Hezbollah or expose its intentions. In his speech at the United Nations General Assembly last September, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu revealed that Hezbollah was building three precision-missile factories on Lebanese soil. On another occasion, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo transferred tough messages from Jerusalem to Beirut.
From this vantage point, Nasrallah's real equation quite possibly stems from a more obscure context. Perhaps his goal is to set clear boundaries for Israel and deter it from operating on Lebanese soil again. And although it's doubtful Israel will consent to this, the threats emanating from Jerusalem on Monday should be taken with a grain of salt. No one on the Israeli side is gung-ho about a broad war in the north. However, if it is pushed into a corner by a large, mass casualty terrorist attack, Israel's response will have to extend beyond the obligatory and would likely set the wheels in motion for an uncontainable escalation.
Leveraging Trump's meeting with Rouhani
Israel and Hezbollah will grapple with these dilemmas for the foreseeable future. If this wasn't enough, the upcoming general election in Israel will affect how both sides make their decisions. More than a few leaders in modern times have lost their seats due to terror. Yet while this factor will certainly influence the actions of Jerusalem and Beirut, and produce more intense rhetoric, in practice it will also force them to tread more carefully as both are well aware of the potentially devastating consequences.
Paradoxically, Iran could emerge as a moderating force.
If US President Donald Trump's reported meeting with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani ever materializes, Tehran will put on an innocent, pleasant, friendly face – anything to remove the stifling American sanctions and begin rehabilitating the Iranian economy. An escalation of hostilities in the Middle East involving its chief proxy, Hezbollah, isn't convenient for Iran at the moment. Israel needs to exploit this in Washington – not to torpedo the Trump-Rouhani meeting but to leverage it: In the immediate term, to mitigate Hezbollah's response and avoid a possible conflagration; and later on, if and when, to secure a better nuclear deal that doesn't only improve supervision of Iran's nuclear program and facilities, but addresses its ballistic missile program and export of terror across the globe, primarily via Hezbollah.
