Anyone who knows Yisrael Beytenu leader Avigdor Lieberman personally – and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is supposed to know him better than anyone – shouldn't have been surprised at his willingness to go all the way. Lieberman has been unpredictable since the start of his career in the public sector. He left his position as director general of the Prime Minister's Office a mere year and a half after Netanyahu appointed him in 1996. He entered and exited the government of former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert with timing that no one understood and because of, as he put it at the time, "considerations of national responsibility."
Going against all the pundits' forecasts and prophecies, he joined Netanyahu's coalition in 2015, then left both the government and his role as defense minister in 2018, which was supposedly not in his political interest. So anyone who thought he would automatically join Netanyahu's fifth government in 2019 wasn't reading the map correctly.
So what does Lieberman want? Ultimately, the current dispute between him and Netanyahu is characteristic of their three-decades-long love-hate relationship. Netanyahu is the star, the one who draws in seats, a prime minister who is supposed to lead, and he and Lieberman share a similar worldview regarding various issues currently on the agenda.
They both used to believe in a presidential system to bring down Hamas, or at least evacuate Khan al-Ahmar. The problem is that when it comes down to it, Netanyahu always allows his policy to be flexible in accordance with the demands of the hour, whereas Lieberman sees himself as someone who doesn't answer to anyone.
So even though the cabinet decided to evacuate Khan al-Ahmar and the prime minister committed to doing so, he sent Lieberman written instructions not to. Or Lieberman, as defense minister, wanted to take major military action in the Gaza Strip, but Prime Minister Netanyahu didn't let him. Or, back in 1996, Lieberman wanted to close the Israel Broadcasting Authority but Netanyahu, who loathed it, nevertheless prevented him from doing so. The same in a thousand other instances over the years.
This has been the dynamic between the two of them since they started working together in 1988. Every so often, Lieberman storms off but eventually joins forces with Netanyahu again after some time has passed. For Lieberman, he can't get along with Bibi, but he can't get along without him. Lieberman has no choice other than to link himself politically to Netanyahu, who wins a lot more votes. But from the time he was director general of the Prime Minister's Office to his terms as foreign minister and defense minister, he quickly loses interest, blows a fuse, and throws a fit, forcing Netanyahu to do what he believes should be done anyway. Then, lacking any other political option, he returns to Netanyahu's embrace and it starts all over again.
In the current circumstances, after his credibility as defense minister crumbled when he didn't take out Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh within 48 hours and because Israel's deterrence against Hamas has slipped since last spring, Lieberman had to shore up his image as a person who keeps to his word. He might be dragging the entire country into a new election, but Netanyahu won't bind his hands as defense minister – at least, that's how Lieberman sees things.
Does he want to topple Netanyahu? There is no proof of that. Lieberman knows that calling an early election is a risk to himself as well as to the prime minister. Voters might up their support of him for keeping his promise on the haredi draft bill. But it is equally likely that voters will punish him for bringing down a right-wing government. So it's hard to find evidence to support the conspiracy theories that Netanyahu was spreading this week. Incidentally, if Lieberman had wanted to bring down Netanyahu, he wouldn't have recommended that President Reuven Rivlin charge him with forming the government and would even have tried to ensure that some other MK – from the Likud or another party – was given that responsibility. But neither of those things happened.
Lieberman's speech at a press conference on Thursday shows that his goal is clear – if the public rewards him at the voting booth and he secures a number of seats in the double digits, he will demand a rotating premiership in coalition negotiations. That is why he won't commit to recommending Netanyahu, but clearly said he would not recommend Blue and White co-leader Benny Gantz either.
Yes, the result of the April 9 election is strange and one that has never happened in the history of Israel. But government crises happen in democracies. Take a look at the news from Great Britain, which has been bogged down in the Brexit crisis for two years already. Or Belgium, Sweden, and Spain, whose governments have been limping along for years, going from one crisis to another – minority governments, transitional governments, or any other kind of unstable governments that are much worse than returning to the polls, even if it means voting twice in a single year.
Given the insanity that characterized the election cycle this past winter, there is some hope that the September election will look different. The April election wasn't about issues – it was replete with spin, lies, and posturing. From far-right activist Moshe Feiglin to the New Right to Blue and White – the public was constantly exposed to manipulations. The public discourse, as we can all recall, was violent and lacked any connection to matters of policy or the nation's future path.
Because the politicians, activists, reporters, and media advisers are tuckered out, there is a chance that the new election will see a greater focus on issues and political fictions, from both the Right and the Left, and attacks will dissipate. Lost seats won't be wasted again. Things will be more mature and the public will know what they are voting for. So while two elections in a year is not something to be desired, it's not something to be horrified over. In the end, this is democracy.
