From the moment the latest round of fighting with the Gaza Strip ended on Monday morning, the political and defense establishment started a campaign of explanation. In interviews and in background discussions, senior officials tried to make it clear how much Israel had achieved vs. the other side's lack of success, how we beat/pummeled/pressured the organizations in Gaza and how they had begged us to stop.
The truth is a little more complicated than these talking points. Gaza was hurt, and the IDF acted differently than it did in other flare-ups of violence in this past year, but it's hard to change the bottom line: it's the Palestinians who decide when the next round will begin, and they also decide when it will end. Above all, their promises of quiet aren't worth anything. When they want to, they will turn up the flames, and it might happen soon.
The responsibility for the latest round of violence lies with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This comes as no surprise to Israel. Unlike Hamas, which is responsible not only for terrorism but first and foremost for the lives and welfare of Gaza's 2 million residents, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad is concerned with jihad and jihad only.
It is sick of sitting idly by, behaving itself, and observing the limitations of the various cease-fires. Under its new, militant leader in Damascus – one Ziad Nahala – and under pressure from its only sponsor, Iran, in recent months it has been more active.
This hasn't gone unnoticed in Israel. In the violence of last November, there was a debate about whether or not Israeli actions should focus on the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. At the time, a decision was made not to in order to keep the fighting in check, but the dilemma has grown more urgent in the past few months once it became clear that operatives from the group are involved in almost everything, from firing the rocket ("in error") that hit Moshav Mishmeret to firing on Ashdod (not in error) two weeks ago, as well as for many attacks near the border and underground.
The tunnel the organization dug into Israeli territory near Rafah was proof of the group's attack schemes and goal of reaching a state of operational readiness. The IDF has been keeping close tabs on the tunnel to keep it from being used in any terrorist attacks, and used the fighting this week to destroy it.
Last Friday, amid the weekly chaos at the border fence, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad once again took action, although it tried to stay under the radar so it wouldn't be seen as trying to blow up the cease-fire. Still, the message was sent in the form of sniper fire that was apparently aiming at the commander of the Southern Brigade, Col. Liron Batito, but hit another officer, who was moderately wounded, and a female soldier, who sustained light wounds.
This time, the IDF decided on a different kind of response. Rather than response strikes on empty outposts, it carried out a direct strike on a manned Hamas post. At the time of the attack, an operative known to be involved in the group's weapons manufacturing activity was at the site. Hamas was surprised at Israel's change of tactics and also because they were paying the price for an incident for which they were not responsible. That was why last Saturday morning, Hamas made the conscious decision to join forces with the Islamic Jihad in the biggest rocket onslaught that Israel had seen since Operation Protective Edge in 2014.
690 rockets too many
In only two days of fighting, Saturday and Sunday, the organizations fired 690 rockets from Gaza toward Israel. In comparison, 150 rockets a day were fired from Gaza during Operation Protective Edge. This shows us two things: one, that Gaza – like Israel – did its homework and prepared for the next round of fighting with an emphasis on its rocket-firing capabilities; and two, that like Israel, Hamas decided that this time it would jump straight into the deep end.
The scorecard looks more or less like this. Israel struck 350 targets, including ones that had not been green-lighted in the past, and killed about 30 terrorist operatives. It also employed its tactic of targeted killings for the first time since 2014. Israel destroyed quite a few buildings in Gaza, including over 20 homes of senior commanders in the terrorist organizations, and the Islamic Jihad no longer enjoys any immunity: about 40% of the targets belonged to them, and 11 of the terrorists killed were from its ranks.
For the Palestinians: a third of Israel spend 48 hours in bomb shelters and their attacks exacted a heavy price of four dead civilians - three from rockets and one from an anti-tank missile that was fired toward Highway 232 - no small achievement if we take into account that in the 50 days of Operations Protective Edge, a total of six Israeli civilians were killed.
The Palestinian attacks also caused a large number of Israeli wounded and considerable damage. The terrorist organizations proved what we already knew - that Iron Dome is an excellent system, but cannot provide hermetic protection. During the fighting, it racked up an 86% interception rate. Still, civilians who did not abide by instructions were putting their lives in danger.
The IDF could not obstruct or reduce the rocket fire, and in the case of the anti-tank missile, it failed in its analysis of the field conditions and the threat. It also took no action to erect a barrier that would prevent rocket fire from Gaza. The missile might have been a Kornet model whose range had been modified, but that doesn't matter: We can assume that the only reason Hamas didn't fire at a passenger train was that it decided not to. The Gaza Division needed to ensure that these vulnerable points be located and closed. The fact that they were not is disturbing.
Hamas had at least two failures of its own. For the first time, it deployed a drone carrying a mortar that was supposed to attack an armored vehicle, but failed to; and it planned a cyberattack on key national infrastructure that Israel thwarted. This isn't Hamas' first foray into cyberwarfare; it has already tried to hack Israeli systems and it has also made plenty of attempts to set honey traps for IDF soldiers using social media. We will see a lot more drones and attempted cyberattacks in the next rounds of fighting.
Kochavi's line
From the start of the two days of violence, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi took a new, more militant line that included attacks on armed operatives, destroying a large number of buildings, and taking out the main man responsible for distributing Iranian funds to terrorist groups in Gaza, money changer Hamad Hudri.
Kochavi believed that a more aggressive approach would pose a dilemma for the other side, which does not want a full-out war. In Kochavi's terms, the approach worked. By Saturday night, Hamas was alarmed, and on Sunday was clearly seeking a cease-fire. Egypt and Qatar, together with U.N. Middle East envoy Nikolay Mladenov, intervened and pressed both Hamas and Israel to go back to the relative cease-fire that had been in place until the sniper incident on Friday.
As with every one of the 10 flare-ups of violence over the past year, Israel accepted without openly saying so. This time, too, the Israeli public received no update about what was agreed and what was promised. The only ones who announced anything were the Palestinians, who were the first to report talks for a cease-fire and who later said it had been secured. This situation is bad, because bit by bit, Israel is losing its credibility in the eyes of its own citizens.
It's also causing more than a little outrage in the IDF, where people think that politics is playing too big a role, and that it is unacceptable for a defense minister not to tour the area when fighting is ongoing and refrains from providing the public with clear information. One senior IDF officer said that this sends the message that Gaza is in charge.
On the other hand, the IDF isn't exempt from criticism, either. Its tactics this past week did nothing to change the big picture. Despite the relative militancy and the bombastic declarations, Hamas realized from the get-go that Israel didn't want a full-scale war, that Memorial Day and Independence Day were coming up, not to mention the Eurovision song competition. This is why the group refrained from firing on central Israel, knowing that sending a rocket flying toward Tel Aviv could wind up snowballing and unleashing Israel's fury on Gaza. So until the end, the group kept announcing it was ready to fire on Tel Aviv, but didn't.
Israel, despite its statements, freaked out and played into Hamas' hands. The Qatari money was transferred to Gaza, and even increased from $30 million to $40 million, as well as guaranteed for a year. All this is happening during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which ensures that the Gaza public will have something to eat at the end of the fast. It's only an aspirin for a much more serious illness, but once again, Hamas proved that a judicious use of force can get it what it wants.
This is problematic lesson for it to have learned because it sends the message that Israel can be pressured and extorted. It casts the IDF as fearful of a ground operation, which is bad in two ways – what it tells the enemy, and what it tells the Israeli public, who sees an absurd situation in which civilians pay with their lives so the army that is supposed to defend them is protected from harm.
A number of officials thought that Israel had a golden opportunity this week to change the equation. Maybe not go all-out, but make it clear to the other side that it was willing to, no matter what the cost, even if it meant canceling Eurovision. They thought that only if Gaza realized that the dam was about to burst and the time for talk was over would they ever give us something other than empty words.
Like a satirical sketch
Deterrence is, on the whole, a slippery concept. You only know it exists when it's already gone. There is no doubt that Gaza is deterred from a full-scale war with the IDF, but it isn't afraid of provocations. The fact that for the past year, Israel hasn't put its foot down, is reason to worry. This past year has racked up enough international legitimacy for military action, even in Arab states that don't really care what happens in Gaza. The Israeli public has made it clear in every way possible that enough is enough.
The army cannot change the equation on its own. The change needs to start and end with the political establishment, with an orderly plan about what Israel wants to do with Gaza. Simple reason says that Israel should seek to put the Palestinian Authority back in charge of Gaza, but that's not an option right now. So Israel needs to take the initiative on alternatives, mostly economic, civil, and infrastructure measures that will raise the quality of life for the people of Gaza and force Hamas to calculate the profits and loss.
These are precisely the issues that are being discussed in cease-fire talks in Cairo. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad delegations were in Egypt during the fighting, too (talks are one thing, and shooting is another), but things are progressing at a snail's pace. Hamas has big aspirations – it wants energy and a port, border crossings and shipments of goods, the blockade to be lifted, and international recognition.
Very little of this is expected to materialize. Everything depends on a green light from Israel, which won't give it in a situation of war. And we still haven't even touched on the remains of fallen soldiers Lt. Hadar Goldin and Staff Sgt. Oron Shaul, which Hamas has been holding since they were killed during Protective Edge, and the two Israelis that are currently captive in Gaza. Israel is demanding the return of the living and the dead as a precondition to any progress in negotiations but isn't willing to pay even a fraction of the exorbitant price Hamas is demanding for their release.
With things as they stand now, it's only a matter of time until another round of violence erupts. The assurances Hamas gave Israel will be put to the test immediately. This Friday, there will be another protest at the border fence, and later we will see if Hamas refrains from sending arson balloons into Israel and whether or not it will force the Islamic Jihad to maintain the calm through actions, and not just lip service.
And the Palestinian Islamic Jihad itself is another story. It has no obligations. Even assuming that it sustained a blow that will deter it, its basic interests haven't changed, and Tehran and Damascus will continue to pull its strings. That means that every Israeli strike against Iranian targets in Syria will now provide a reason for a "response" from Gaza. Iran could even make the transfer of money to Gaza conditional upon the group firing rockets as Israel as a thank you.
This means that Israel is in thrall to Gaza. Israel's main goal, now that the latest round of fighting is over, should be to put together a definitive strategy that will allow it to change the equation the next time around. Since every round of violence begins where the last one left off, it is likely that the next events will be bigger and more violence and could turn into a full-scale war.
The IDF is preparing itself for that scenario. When Kochavi took over as chief of staff, he made preparations for a Gaza war a top priority for the military, including allocating resources and forces. The reigning assessment heard this past week in the chief of staff's bureau was that if no breakthrough is made in the talks, things could light up again sometime between July and September.
So Israel has to show up ready not only from a military point of view but also politically and in terms of its civilians. The IDF will need to win, or at least secure major deterrence that will remain in place for quite a while. The Israeli people, for their part, will need to demonstrate discipline, and the government will have to be ready with a plan for what will happen in Gaza the day after it's all over. That is the only way we can not only achieve our goals but also change the situation in southern Israel for years to come.
