When he completed his term as the commander of the Israeli Air Force in 2008, Maj. Gen. (res.) Eliezer Shkedi gave a gift to the leaders of the state and to the top brass of the military: a photo of three Israeli F-15 fighter jets flying over the Auschwitz extermination camp in Poland. Shkedi added hand-written text to all the flyover photos, ending in the words: "remember, never forget, and rely only on ourselves."
These words reflected the lesson Shkedi had learned a few months prior, during the bombing of the Syrian nuclear reactor in Deir ez-Zor. They were also his warning for the future, as Israel faced the very real possibility of having to bomb a nuclear facility in Iran. Shkedi wanted to clarify with his words that when push comes to shove, Israel can only rely on itself.
"There are very few instances in a man's life when he has the opportunity to do something that is bigger than him," Shkedi tells Israel Hayom. "This was the thing that was bigger than me, bigger than you, and bigger than any job. It was something that was truly critical, without being overly dramatic, to the existence and survival of the state. I am grateful that I had the privilege of leading the air force in this mission, and I think that what we did was part of that statement – remember, never forget, and rely only on ourselves – to ensure that what happened in the past never happens again. Never."
Shkedi recalls that in Nov. 2006, initial intelligence began raising suspicion that Syria was working on a nuclear project. "It came up in an operational forum and made me think something was off," he recounts. "I requested a closer inspection, and we shared [the suspicions] with the Military Intelligence Directorate and it all snowballed from there. The first time we got concrete proof was in March 2007."
Q: Do you remember the moment when they came and put this on your desk as fact?
"I remember the feeling. I felt it on two levels. The first part was that there was something there that needs to be a top priority in every sense – in the practical aspects of the plan and the preparation; the second part was that you immediately begin to understand that this is something entirely different. Something bigger than anything and truly existential. When these two things come together, you understand that there is something very dramatic here and that you are supposed to lead. From there, you start to think about how to go about it in the best possible way to complete the mission."
Q: So what do you do?
"We convened a meeting of the operational team at the helm of the air force and started developing a plan. It was clear to us from the get-go that besides working on a plan of attack, we needed to prepare for the possibility of this thing devolving into war. It was a very big challenge."
Q: But first you had to make sure that this was in fact a nuclear reactor.
"There are a number of steps that have to do with planning and the bigger picture. The first step is to confirm that the intelligence you possess is true, accurate and reliable. The second step is to decode [the intelligence] to figure out the structure of the facility in order to be able to confront it operationally, if the objective is to strike and destroy it. This part was constantly evolving.
"Since it came as a surprise in March 2007, the process of understanding that this was in fact a nuclear reactor progressed rather quickly. The plan of attack was in development the whole time – how to get there, how to proceed and the implications. The third part, which I thought was very significant, was the question of timing. When would be the right time to do it. Dealing with a 'hot reactor' is a significant challenge. We made sure to understand exactly where we stand at all times and to be ready for attack at a moment's notice."
Q: At what stage were you ready to attack?
"In the initial stages. Very early, relatively speaking. But at that point, the plan was more aggressive and violent, and it could certainly have set off a war. With time, we developed our ideas and formulated a plan to reach the target and destroy it covertly, something known as a 'low signature' strike, to the point where I knew that we could combine the two – destroy the reactor and maintain secrecy – in a way that we and the decision makers could agree on."
Q: How many people in the air force did you involve in this?
"The team that was involved was defined by name, as per our needs and respective roles. It was obvious that if this were to leak it would put us in a very tough spot in terms of being able to destroy this thing. So there were individuals who handled the intelligence and those who handled the operational technology, but it was a very small team. Every time we felt we needed to expand it, it was confined to a specific individual who had a specific skill that we thought could help us."
Q: How did you develop the plan of attack?
"The air force is exceptional not only in its quality and its profound operational understanding but also in our ability to learn as we go. We engaged in a process where every option was thoroughly studied and investigated. We planned, tested, made models and flew. We looked at all the relevant weapons, we established a 'red team' [a simulated enemy force] for every scenario that would try to foil the plan, to make sure that we are right. The critical point, to me, was not when we knew we could destroy the reactor, because we knew we could do it rather early, practically from the beginning, but in an aggressive way. It was the moment when I felt that we could arrive, attack and do it while minimizing the risk of war."
Q: When was that?
"About two months before the strike. In mid-July I came to the senior general staff and the top political echelon and showed them that we had figured it out."
Shkedi recalls that one of the biggest challenges was training the air force for the strike, and for the possibility of war, without telling them why and what for. "You find ways of doing it," he says. "There is a small group in the know that puts together training outlines that are close to something like this, and then you train for parts that you know are critical and practice them intensively. You check your weapons, because that is also key, and you make sure that you are always prepared to take immediate action."
Q: How long did you train?
"A few months. At first we didn't know how urgent it was. We understood that we might be called to action tomorrow morning, so we prepared a plan that would have ensured the destruction of the reactor in the event that we had to act immediately. From there, things matured, with planning, operational readiness, models. It was quite a challenge."
Q: How do you decide which aircraft fly and which pilots take part in the strike?
"The discussion wasn't easy. I believed in going for redundancy – having a limited number of jets to maintain secrecy but to use two kinds of jets, because you don't know what could impact this type or that type of aircraft on the way there. You need to get to a point where you are absolutely certain that after you get there and you strike, you will hit your target and destroy the reactor. That is why we chose several types of weapons, so that if one thing failed, another would compensate."
"Luckily, everything worked as it should. Four F-16 jets and four F-15 jets, carrying 18 tons of weaponry, all reached the target and hit it."
Q: And how did you select the pilots?
"The squadron commander selects the pilots. Obviously I knew who they were, but it was an internal choice within the squadron. Those who were selected were the best of the best."
Q: I'm assuming that every pilot in the force would have given a kidney to have been a part of it.
"Of course. This is a kind of mission that happens once in a generation. Everyone knew that it was something that we were doing for the very existence of our people and our state, and therefore everyone wanted very much to participate in this mission."
Q: Were the pilots in on the secret?
"Most of the pilots didn't know until the day of the strike."
Q: And what happened on that day?
"A day before the strike, we tried an operational model and I invited the chief of staff to get an impression of how we were handling this operation, who was taking part in it and of the processes that we were undergoing. After that, we sat in my office and talked, but while we were talking a message came from the Mossad warning that this may have begun to leak. The message set off a process that culminated in our striking, but first, I traveled to meet the pilots and speak to them personally."
Q: You had to get approval from the political echelon first, didn't you?
"The important meeting was at the prime minister's home in Jerusalem. The different plans were presented, as were the different intelligence facets, and at the end it was clear that we were getting ready for action. I remember that the prime minister asked me what I would recommend, and I answered and explained why we would be successful both in doing it and preventing a situation where we would face enemy fire the following day. At the end of the meeting I asked to speak to him privately, because it was important to me that he hear it again from me in the clearest possible way – my opinion on the planning and the execution and the pilots and our ability to do it accurately and covertly. This was a conversation that both [then-Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert and I remember very clearly. He really deserves a lot of credit for leading this thing with tenacity and clarity. After I told him what I had to say he shook my hand warmly and I left knowing that this was it, it was happening."
Q: And then you went to meet the pilots.
"Those were very special meetings. I had never had meetings like that before, or since. There have been special things that we have done, but not like that. I had several things to tell them and it was important that they hear it from me personally."
Q: Like what?
"First of all, what the target was and what it meant. This was the first time they heard the words 'nuclear reactor.' I didn't need to go into too much detail, everyone understood very well. The other thing that was important to me was to convey the weight of the mission – to strike the target and destroy it. The third thing was to make sure that our jets do not sustain a hit, because a setback like that on a mission like this could mean war. So I made sure to explain that the mission was not to down enemy aircraft. Anyone who knows me will tell you how uncharacteristic that message is for me – when you see an enemy aircraft trying to hit you, you down them. But it was important that they understand that the mission was not only to destroy the reactor, but also to prevent a war."
Q: That's a lot of responsibility to put on their shoulders.
"Pilots are used to that. I also told them that they have the authority and the responsibility, and that if they feel that there is something that could disrupt the mission, the decisions are up to them, in the spirit of the outline that I set. It was a truly emotional meeting. It was amazing to see these people, their eyes, first one squadron at one base and then another squadron at another base. The understanding seeping in that they are about to embark on something meaningful and fateful."
Q: How did they react?
"The same way I reacted the first time. First with surprise that there is a nuclear reactor in Syria – granted, it is far, in Syria, but still across the border. But they didn't have time to dwell on it, because they had to fly. It was a long mission, on a difficult night, to a delicate destination with two complicated tasks to complete – attack and avoid a war."
Q: You took part in the training models yourself, to become fully convinced, right?
"Beyond the planning and the intelligence, ultimately there is nothing that provides better understanding than flying yourself. You don't have to fly everything, but you do need to fly those parts that you know you have to feel and see yourself, both for the sake of the flight and the strike. I flew both the F-16 and the F-15 and it gave me a better sense of what the pilot is going to be dealing with. Incidentally, I wanted the chief of staff to fly in the concluding model, but because of the speed at which things progressed, we didn't get to it in the end."
Q: So while you trained for the attack, you were also preparing to prevent a war, without anyone knowing that you were about to attack, without calling up reserves, without making any noise.
"Our work ran along two central channels. One was the operation itself, and the other was preparation for possible war. Since we didn't call up reserves, to prevent raising suspicion, it was clear that the main, essentially only force to confront the situation would be the air force. We prepared the force for a quick shift to a state of war, and in many respects that was no less challenging than the operation itself."
In the evening hours of Sept. 5, 2007, Shkedi entered the air force "pit" accompanied by the top brass of the IAF and the seniormost operational intelligence officers. "We went down [to the pit] earlier than usual because we wanted to go over everything again and make sure that there wasn't anything we were wrong about. We tracked the entire process, from the planning stage to takeoff and to the actual strike, which was at 12:45 a.m."
Q: It was a long flight, and you had no real contact with the pilots, right?
"You understand what's happening every step of the way. Part of the time you know with certainty, and part of the time you make deductions. But there was no speech communication, because we wanted to keep it covert."
Q: Those were probably some very tense hours.
"Tension is natural. But it came with the faith and the knowledge that we were ready and that we knew what to do and that we would do it very well, both in the attack and in the sense that we would maintain a low signature and secrecy. However, you never know what could happen on such missions. You are flying at night, at a difficult altitude, carrying heavy weaponry, and there is an enemy that very well may surprise you. So yes, it was definitely tense."
Q: Until the moment that the pilots say the code word "Arizona" (meaning the target has been hit).
"I don't think anyone can describe the feeling you get when you hear that code word. It's an amazing feeling. But the first thing that crosses your mind is that the mission is not over yet. The reactor may have been destroyed, but the aircraft haven't returned and there is still a long way to go before they get home. So I immediately focused and said to the colleagues in the control room 'very nice, but now let's refocus.'
"That's why it took so long before I briefed the prime minister, defense minister and chief of staff. I didn't want to divert my attention for one second before the mission was complete. It's not over until it's over."
Q: So when is it over?
"On two levels: One is the immediate end, when you cross the line and realize that the threat and risk decreased dramatically, and the second is when you land."
Q: On the way, you had an unplanned incident where you had to dump detachable fuel tanks in Turkey.
"That goes back to what I said before about the pilots' independent authority and responsibility. They attacked, no one was downed, and for reasons having to do with fuel they made the decision to dump the detachable fuel tanks. That is a legitimate decision and I support them in it."
Q: Did you meet with them afterward?
"They landed at 4 a.m. so I talked to them by phone and sent them off to sleep. We had our big meeting only weeks later, and in between there was a lot of debriefing because we wanted to draw every possible conclusion from such a complex operation."
Q: Syrian President Bashar Assad could have launched a war.
"We assessed in advance that if we managed to get through the first 12 hours without sustaining fire, meaning without them firing at us and us at them, without jets being shot down and without, heaven forbid, captive soldiers, then the risk would decrease substantially. After 24 hours we really felt like we were in the clear. We gradually lowered the alert level to the normal state. The amazing thing is that I think that even today, more than a decade later, the Syrians still don't really know what happened there. They know that the reactor was demolished, but they don't understand how."
Q: What is the lesson to be learned?
"There are a few lessons. The first is that it is the military's job to know how to confront challenges, certainly existential challenges. The second has to do with intelligence – to know how to gather important information in time, certainly when it comes to threats to the state's existence. It's not an easy task, you have to be suspicious and skeptical and never underestimate your enemies. The third is to do things right, in a considerate and relevant manner. The last thing is that ultimately, we can and should rely only on ourselves."
