The Israeli military confirmed Wednesday that it had carried out the 2007 airstrike that destroyed a nuclear facility in Syria, lifting the veil of secrecy over one of its most daring and mysterious operations in recent memory.
In Operation Arizona, sometimes referred to in foreign media reports as Operation Orchard, eight F-15 fighter jets targeted the suspected nuclear reactor in Al-Kubar, in the Deir ez-Zor region in eastern Syria, on the night of Sept. 6, 2007. Although Israel was widely believed to have been behind the airstrike, it has never before commented publicly on it.
The White House and Central Intelligence Agency subsequently confirmed that U.S. intelligence had also indicated the site was a nuclear facility developed for military purposes, though Syria denied it.
A 2009 International Atomic Energy Agency investigation reported evidence of uranium and graphite at the site and concluded that it bore features resembling an undeclared nuclear reactor. Syria disputed those claims. In April 2011, the IAEA officially confirmed that the facility was a nuclear reactor.
Israeli intelligence first began suspecting that Syria was pursuing a military nuclear program in 2006.
"We could see that unusual things were taking place that really couldn't be explained any other way," said Brig. Gen. (ret.) Eli Ben-Meir, then head of the technical unit in the Military Intelligence's Research Division.
Then-Military Intelligence Director Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin presented the information to the prime minister, defense minister and chief of staff, and was ordered to investigate more deeply and refute or substantiate the suspicions.
"The result was several worldwide intelligence operations by the Mossad, which yielded nothing," Yadlin said. "At the time, Israel was primarily concerned with the Iranian threat and there were many in Israeli intelligence who argued that searching for nuclear [activity] in Syria was a waste of time and resources."
The revelation that Syrian President Bashar Assad was building a nuclear reactor was shocking.
According to then-Deputy Director of the Mossad Ram Ben-Barak, "At the time, we thought we knew everything there was to know about Syria. It was inconceivable to us that such a project was taking place unknown to Israel."
Once it was confirmed that a nuclear facility was under construction in Syria, Israel set out to figure out its location. Several facilities were flagged before a square building in Deir ez-Zor, later dubbed "the cube," was identified as the reactor.
The second phase was to determine how close the reactor was to becoming operational.
"It was a race against time. It was clear to everyone that the window of opportunity would be closed as soon as it became operational," Yadlin said.
This question came to dominate dozens of professional deliberations by the intelligence community, the Israel Atomic Energy Commission and the military. It was clear that striking an active nuclear reactor was out of the question, as Israel would be held responsible for the damage, which would have caused mass deaths and environmental pollution for decades to come.
This led to the decision that eventually determined the strike's timeline, namely that the rate at which the reactor was being built would define when Israel would set out to destroy it.
In April 2007, then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert shared the Israeli intelligence with President George W. Bush's administration.
Washington was also stunned to learn of the Syrian nuclear program, as it was focused on the North Korean and Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons.
"It was clear that we couldn't live with this, that it [the reactor] had to be destroyed," then-Mossad Director Meir Dagan said in a 2016 interview, just prior to his death.
The discussions between Jerusalem and Washington were frequent and intense. Israel pushed for the United States to bomb the facility, as that would have sent a clear message to Iran as well, but the White House was reluctant.
In late July, Bush informed Olmert that the U.S. preferred to pursue a diplomatic course of action, taking the matter to the U.N. Security Council.
The Israeli leader was horrified.
"I'm very disappointed with your decision," Olmert told Bush. Olmert added that Israel would know how to act alone.
The surveillance on the Syrian reactor was enhanced while Israel explored possible alternatives to an airstrike, and the IDF began preparing for a potential war.
The military's premise was that Assad would fire missiles on large Israeli cities in retaliation, making war inevitable. Weaponry and equipment acquisitions were ordered and the IDF stepped up training for all combat units under the guise of rectifying operational shortcomings found in the Second Lebanon War the previous year.
"Our primary concern was that the real motive would be revealed. It would have thrown a wrench in the planned airstrike at a time when we were not ready for war," then-IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi said.
Message to Iran?
Israel's involvement has been one of its most closely held secrets, and it was not immediately clear why Israel has decided to go public now.
The decision comes after repeated calls in recent months by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for the United States and the international community to take tougher action against Syria's ally, Iran.
Netanyahu has repeatedly warned that Israel will not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon – "not now, not in 10 years, not ever" – or to build missile factories in Syria that could threaten Israel, or provide advanced weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Intelligence Minister Yisrael Katz suggested Wednesday that the timing of the revelation was meant to send a message to Iran.
"The operation and its success made clear that Israel will never allow nuclear weaponry to be in the hands of those who threaten its existence - Syria then, and Iran today," he wrote on Twitter.
Israel and Syria have always been bitter enemies. During Syria's seven-year civil war, foreign reports have attributed over 100 airstrikes on Syrian soil to Israel, most believed to have been aimed at suspected weapons shipments destined for Hezbollah.
At the time of the 2007 strike, Syria accused Israel of invading its airspace but gave no further details about the target.
The strike was reminiscent of the Israeli attack against a reactor that was under construction in Iraq in 1981. The strike was later credited with preventing Saddam Hussein from acquiring weapons of mass destruction that could have been used in the Gulf War a decade later.
From Israel's perspective, the 2007 airstrike was an astounding success since it not only destroyed the site, but prevented further escalation and strengthened its deterrence in the region.
In his memoir, "Decision Points," Bush said the target was believed to be a Syrian nuclear reactor being built with North Korean assistance. He said Israel first asked the U.S. to bomb the site and then carried out an attack itself when Washington declined.
The strike came about a year after Israel's inconclusive war against Hezbollah, in which Lebanese guerrillas battled Israel's powerful army to a stalemate. The poor performance raised questions about Israel's deterrent capabilities.
"Prime Minister Olmert's execution of the strike made up for the confidence I had lost in the Israelis during the Lebanon war," Bush wrote.
He said the Israeli leader rejected a suggestion to go public with the operation.
"Olmert told me he wanted total secrecy. He wanted to avoid anything that might back Syria into a corner and force Assad to retaliate. This was his operation, and I felt an obligation to respect his wishes," Bush wrote.
Olmert has skirted around the issue, and military censors, for years, repeatedly saying that according to foreign sources Israel was involved. After Bush's account was published in 2010, Olmert said: "I don't want [to] and I can't deny it."
