The current weekend will see Israel increase its military deployment across Judea and Samaria over concerns that the spate of deadly attacks in the area signals a new wave of terrorism. This is not a general concern, as the military believes the Palestinians' motivation to carry out terrorist attacks is on the rise, inspired by the recent murders of Har Bracha resident Itamar Ben-Gal and Havat Gilad resident Rabbi Raziel Shevach.
The uptick in violence was noted immediately following U.S. President Donald Trump's Dec. 6 recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital and his announcement that the United States will move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Israel's concerns that the American proclamation would spark wide-spread riots proved wrong, but experience has taught us that there are three catalysts that can cause a conflagration on the ground: a unifying symbol, friction with Judea and Samaria settlers, and Palestinian casualties.
The embassy issue, as it turned out, failed to ignite the Palestinian imagination. The embassy is not a religious symbol like the Temple Mount, but rather a national symbol behind which the masses found it difficult to unite. As a result, the Palestinian Authority's efforts to instigate mass demonstrations failed miserably: In one case, a target of 20,000 protesters was set for a demonstration at the Qalandiya crossing near Ramallah, but barely 1,000 arrived.
Israel succeeded in preventing the two other catalysts from coming to pass. Well-planned military operations that focused on minimizing friction with the Palestinian population ensured that even when clashes occurred they were devoid fatalities. In the absence of fatalities there were no mass funerals and without those, there was no anger that could be channeled into increased friction on the ground, thus avoiding more casualties and an escalation that could easily spin out of control.
The IDF, Israel Police and Shin Bet security agency have been pursuing extensive counterterrorism operations across Judea and Samaria. The vast majority of operations proved successful and it seems tensions were defused, but that all changed with the Jan. 9 shooting attack near the Samaria outpost of Havat Gilad, in which Shevach was killed.
Tensions intensified again after the Feb. 5 stabbing of Ben-Gal outside Ariel, and a security assessment held on Wednesday resulted in the decision to deploy three additional battalions to the area in an attempt to curtail the escalation.
Shevach's murder was unique in that it created a symbol: Ahmed Jarrar, the 22-year-old son of a top Hamas operative (killed by Israeli forces in 2002, at the height of the Second Intifada) and the leader of the terrorist cell that carried out the attack, became a hero on the Palestinian street and the fact he managed to evade Israeli security forces for weeks only increased his notoriety.
Jarrar was killed in a clash with Israeli security forces in Al-Yamun, a Palestinian town west of Jenin, on Tuesday but the month he spent at large was enough to turn him into a Palestinian icon.
The attempts to capitalize on 17-year-old Ahed Tamimi's 15 minutes of fame and turn her into an icon of Palestinian resistance after she was filmed assaulting IDF soldiers in the West Bank in December failed, but Jarrar's claim to infamy succeeded and Palestinian youth seem eager to follow in his footsteps.
Jarrar is a cause for Israeli concern for another reason: the infrastructure he set in place was very similar to what was prevalent during the Second Intifada and it had the potential to carry out major terrorist attacks, including suicide bombing and abductions.
Jarrar's elimination was the result of an impressive intelligence and operational effort, but it was still overshadowed by the failure of not preventing his cell's organization and actions before it could carry out a terrorist attack and the fact he managed to remain at large for weeks with the help of a sophisticated network of accomplices.
The effort to locate Jarrar and disrupt the infrastructure he set in place forced the IDF to operate intensively in northern Samaria, leading to near-nightly clashes with the Palestinian population. Palestinian casualties were inevitable, friction steadily increased and the very thing the military was trying to prevent – a wave of terrorism – began gaining momentum, fueled by the Palestinians' political and economic frustration.
The attack in which Ben-Gal was killed was part of the spike in violence, but it was not the action of a terrorist cell driven by ideology, rather that of a lone wolf, an Israeli Arab from Jaffa, driven by complex personal issues. Still, the fact that another Israeli was killed was seen as an achievement for terrorism and an inspiration for copycats, and as both victims were settlers, the Palestinians perceived them as "legitimate" targets.
Terrorist organizations prefer to use Israeli Arabs to carry out attacks – that is nothing new. They invest considerable efforts trying to recruit terrorists with an Israeli ID because the blue IDs afford freedom of movement and free access to desirable targets. Troops at checkpoint screen Israelis differently than they do Palestinians. All it takes is flashing the blue ID instead of the orange one and everything changes. This is probably what happened this week.
Lone-wolf terrorist attacks are notoriously difficult to prevent but Israel has marked impressive successes in its efforts nonetheless. This makes the Ariel terrorist stand out even more over his personal circumstances: As he regularly shuttled between his Israel mother in Jaffa and his Palestinian father in the West Bank, he was flagged by the defense establishment. It is unclear what the police and Shin Bet did with the information they had, but whatever it was, it obviously wasn't enough.
The defense establishment was unable to nip the wave of terrorism in the bud and it is currently focused on preventing it from gaining further momentum. Hamas headquarters in the Gaza Strip and abroad are putting tremendous effort into planning and carrying out terrorist attacks and there is no shortage of motivation on the ground, from protests that could easily turn into violent riots with casualties, to potential terrorists. Foiling these nefarious intents requires massive counterterrorism efforts, making friction with the Palestinian population inevitable.
The decision to bolster military presence on the ground seeks to prevent an escalation and increase operational flexibility, which will help security forces deal with Palestinian violence. Additional forces on the ground mean not only significantly boosting security on the precarious roads in Judea and Samaria, which will surely prevent Israeli casualties, but also fewer Palestinian casualties.
Past experience has shown that when small patrols face threats, they are more prone to using excessive force, leading to casualties and a near-inevitable escalation. A larger force, however, is naturally better equipped and harder to rattle, so it is less likely to use deadly force and provoke an undesired escalation. During a riot, for example, firepower is used only under clear and present danger and only toward a direct threat. This significantly reduces the number of Palestinian casualties and with it the potential for rage on the streets – the litmus test for predicting the force of a wave of terrorism.
Israel hopes increasing military deployment in Judea and Samaria will help defuse tensions on the ground. This will take time and it also involves another component over which Israel has little control, namely the Palestinian security forces.
Instrumental in defusing tensions in all other spikes in terrorist activity over the past few years, Palestinian security forces are motivated by a two-pronged interest: PA President Mahmoud Abbas' strategic choice to pursue a diplomatic struggle against Israel, and the PA's own fear that a wave of terrorism would bring about a wide-scale Israeli military campaign in the West Bank, which in turn could destabilize and even topple Fatah's rule, leaving the West Bank vulnerable to a Hamas takeover.
Palestinian security forces often extract Israeli drivers who accidentally enter West Bank villages and find themselves at the mercy of angry mobs, and they serve as a buffer between Israeli security forces and the crowds at mass protests, preventing friction and with it, casualties.
But in some places in the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority's ability to govern has been eroded, which in turn undermines the Palestinian security forces' ability to operate effectively, something that is especially evident in the refugee camps. Israel is troubled by this, and rightly so: Nature abhors a vacuum and any void left by Fatah will immediately be filled by Hamas. This will require Israel to pursue extensive counterterrorism operations, undoubtedly resulting in Palestinian casualties and further escalation.
The Israeli interest is to defuse the tensions and foster calm. Given the volatile energy on the ground, this will be anything but simple. Even if Israel is able to meet this challenge, it is likely that similar waves of terrorism will rise and fall in increasing frequency in the near future.
