Prof. Abraham Ben-Zvi

Prof. Abraham Ben-Zvi, an Israel Prize laureate, is an expert in American-Israeli relations. He is a professor emeritus at the University of Haifa's School of Political Science.

Sending a message to Tehran

After years of sword-polishing and pointed hostility between Washington and Pyongyang, the two rivals have reached a watershed moment that could create a chain reaction that goes far beyond Korea.

By putting together a road map for the basic principles of the process that will gradually lead to the denuclearization of North Korea, Washington is sending an unequivocal message to Tehran: that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un understands which way the winds are blowing, and has accepted the inevitable in exchange for a removal of the diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions on his country.

He has done so despite the fact that any deal will prevent North Korea from supplying any missile knowledge or technology to other countries, which provides a powerful example for all sides currently signatories to the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran, as well as permanent proof that a different approach can be adopted toward rogue and radicalized nations.

But alongside the hopes, we must not dismiss the risks and warning signs along the way. First of all, in the time of former U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, Pyongyang trampled signed agreements, so it is vital that any deal come with a reliable system of oversight that will immediately deter any attempt at fraud or secrecy.

Second, even though the North Korean leader blinked first and initiated the summit in light of the harsh sanctions and the unpredictable American leader he found himself facing, this is no guarantee that he will adopt pragmatic, compromising positions at the summit.

When it comes to that, the president's belief that personally handling diplomacy can serve as an effective tool to break down the blockages in communication and mediate through deep differences of opinion could turn out to be a painful delusion.

After all, great presidents like Franklin Delano Roosevelt fell repeatedly into the trap of this kind of thought. Roosevelt's hope that at summits in Tehran (1943) and Yalta (1945) he could work his magic on Soviet leader Joseph Stalin as if he were a typical American politician who could be directed, through friendly gestures, onto a path of moderation, were completely smashed.

Moreover, the fact that the current summit is not being preceded by serious preparations about the limitations that can be achieved heightens the risk. The American side still hasn't set down a deep enough message that can promise that the meeting will be a success.

Nothing is left but to hope that the summit will meet a different fate than that of the contrarian, stormy Paris Summit of 1960, which fell apart immediately after it got underway, exacerbating the Cold War.

In contrast to that failed attempt, and despite the dangers, we can hope that the Singapore summit will herald the start of a new, more stable era and sooner or later cause the Iranian side to come to its senses.

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