Since March, Hamas has tried pushing Israel into a diplomatic arrangement; doing so with a terror a campaign veiled as civil unrest as leverage, along with cross-border arson tactics. The IDF's Southern Command is trying to contain the events and the Gaza-area communities continue to suffer. Despite all this, Israel is avoiding the inevitable, which is forcing Hamas to collapse.
In 2008, Hamas altered the equation. After throwing Fatah representatives off of buildings, literally, violently seizing control of Gaza and breaching the Rafah border crossing, Hamas has orchestrated events and dragged Israel along according to its whims. One time it was a "tahdiya" (a short-term truce in Arabic); another time, it was a massive ground operation.
This coming Hanukkah we will mark 10 years since Operation Cast Lead, when Israel launched an unprecedented military operation around and inside the Gaza Strip that rattled Hamas to its core but was nipped in the bud. In hindsight, it was an opportunity to implement substantial change and trample the scourge, but Israel under Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni at the time got cold feet and scampered without achieving anything of strategic significance.
What has happened since?
Israel developed a partial solution to the rocket problem and, with the help of the Iron Dome system, it has been able to mitigate the threats. Yet we've also been attacked with longer-range rockets and deeper underground tunnels. In a practical sense, the situation hasn't fundamentally changed over the past decade. The Gaza-area communities continue to suffer from Hamas belligerence and the south remains exceedingly unstable. On the diplomatic level, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi certainly helps narrow the scope of Hamas' initiatives, particularly by controlling the Philadelphi Route along their shared border and the Rafah crossing area, where Hamas' smuggling capabilities have dwindled. Again, though, taking a broader view, this hasn't dramatically changed the situation in the south.
Thus, since March, the IDF has used varying degrees of force to counter Hamas' ploys – whether these include protests, roadside bombs, and occasionally a 24-48 hour escalation consisting of rocket fire at Israeli civilians. Hamas has tried forcing Israel into another tahdiya although it appears this effort isn't bearing fruit. We can, therefore, expect another escalation in the near future and we will again have to ask: What's going to change?
The answer isn't surprising: Nothing will change unless this time Israel undertakes a massive operation to finally alter the situation on a fundamental level. Hamas needs to understand that the next confrontation will be its last. It will not provide hope. And Israel, for its part, needs to be ready to finish the job it left undone 10 years ago. The IDF is certainly ready and capable of this mission; the question is whether the will exists.
A compressive, far-reaching operation would unfold in several stages. The first will aim at isolating high-threat areas and cutting off escape routes for Hamas terrorists. The second will require a massive ground operation in these areas, including in Gaza City, Khan Younis and Rafah, and destroying the terror nests there. These two steps will require several weeks to complete and they won't be simple. Afterward will come the stabilizing phase, aimed at fully clearing the area of terrorists and their infrastructure and installing systems of governance and intelligence-gathering on the ground. This phase in its entirety should require no more than one year, but it will undoubtedly change the situation fundamentally. Ultimately, Israel will give itself a different array of capabilities to cope with any development, and it will be the one dictating the rules of the game, which is totally opposite the current situation of being captive to Hamas' whims.
Does the will exist for such an endeavor?
It's doubtful that a chief of staff stepping down in late December will push for such an operation; he may not have the energy or motivation to spearhead a lengthy, momentous campaign. Logic says this won't happen, but it's time to understand – a measure of this sort is inevitable. It's simply a matter of time.
What's most important is that if the decision is made to undertake such an endeavor, we should control how it starts and it should catch the enemy off guard. It should not be the result of a gradual escalation of hostilities. During Cast Lead, then-GOC Southern Command Maj. Gen. Yoav Gallant, who today holds the Construction and Housing portfolio in the government, orchestrated a jarring, surprising opening move. We would be wise to learn from that operation, only this time, the end has to be completely different.
