The impending cease-fire deal with Hamas might bring us a little quiet, but it actually symbolizes the erosion of Israel's national strength on every level: the operational, the strategic, the moral – and against a gang of criminals who have taken the south hostage and are getting easier conditions in exchange for a mess of pottage.
For six months now, Hamas has been keeping the residents of southern Israel in a state of constant tension, while causing major damage to their day to day lives as well as their local economy, nature, and sense of security. Now, we have learned that in exchange for a satanic organization that seeks to destroy us agreeing to dial things down, we are compromising on everything possible, and thereby damaging every aspect of our own power.
In terms of principles, and this might be the most important aspect, it is inconceivable that we are agreeing to a deal with an organization that is still holding the bodies of our fallen soldiers Lt. Hadar Goldin and Staff Sgt. Oron Shaul, as well as two captive citizens. It is unacceptable that we will go easy on a group that trades in body parts. This raises the question: What did we learn from fighting Hezbollah in the North? We keep making the same mistakes, so we'll keep paying for them in blood.
When it comes to military operations, we cannot ignore the fact that Hamas exhausted the people living in Gaza-adjacent communities using a ridiculous method – kites. These "toys" ruined the summer for the residents of communities near the Gaza border, not to mention the damage they cause. So we need to ask how such a sophisticated army, which sucks over $60 million from the pockets of taxpayers, can't come up with a solution to a simple technical problem. The operational response is problematic, was not put together quickly enough, and doesn't actually do the job.
Diplomatically, the deal gives Hamas a huge prize. We are giving it the next few years to recover, recruit the masses, strengthen its military wing, and gain power, in addition to encouraging them to keep fighting by giving it what it sees as an enormous win. In effect, we are making a deal with an organization with negligible abilities that we will only face again three or four years from now, at a different level of strength.
And when it comes to strategy, the deal strikes a blow to Israel's deterrent capabilities. Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah has already rushed to proclaim the weakness of the IDF – that says everything. The picture that is emerging is that the criminal organization has managed to exhaust our home front, and no significant action was taken against it. In the street, there is a clear sense of a lack of faith, and not only in the army. The deal represents "deterrence fatigue" – not only against Hamas but against every other enemy plotting to challenge us and with whom we are afraid to face off. This will just spur all our neighborhood enemies to lift up their heads, and not too long from now.
The bottom line is that the Israeli government, which leads the strongest country in a radius of thousands of kilometers, with one of the strongest, most modern armies in the world, is heading into a deal with an organization that is nothing more than a gang, and why? Because the defense establishment couldn't handle methods of attack that were cobbled together in a backyard. When we demand answers, it explains why it wouldn't be right to go all the way and eliminate the threat that we are facing and that has been humiliating us.
This situation is unacceptable. A country that has the aforementioned strength and is surrounded by belligerent mutterings cannot allow itself to behave this way. It can't allow itself to provide such a thin, ineffectual solution for its citizens, either. They are paying a heavy price for living here. It appears that instead of deterring, we are deterred.
We should be looking at things correctly, especially now, when the question of who will serve as the next IDF chief of staff is up for discussion. Israel needs a military leader who projects confidence, who is unafraid to make hard decisions that come at a cost, who understands that sometimes you need to go all the way, and who knows that he has real influence on the political echelon and understands that it need to project confidence and capability.
We need a chief of staff who will push the defense forces to act, who won't compromise on a partial solution, who understands that wars are won on the ground and who will revolutionize Israel's ground capabilities along with creative commanders who insist on victory – commanders who excellence is measured by the security they give, and not by their brilliant explanations.
The deal with Hamas is a political decision, but it stems mainly from the military's failure to handle Hamas. Now, when the next leader of the IDF is being discussed, we should ask who will restore Israel's capacity to win and ensure deterrence.
