Long ago, guerrilla warfare was seen as a military doctrine employed by the weak against the strong who ruled them, and terrorism was viewed as a way to apply pressure on governments on sociopolitical issues through a violent war on civilians. We have fought both kinds of battles, and won.
Hamas, like other bedraggled gangs in the region and throughout the world, uses guerrilla terrorism, which combines both these tactics, to fight for political gain. The cooperation of civilians is vital. As far as Hamas is concerned, it is constantly initiating an offensive against us, while avoiding battles in which it would be at a disadvantage in terms of strength.
In Hamas' view, losing that initiative would cause it to lose power and shrink. So it changes tactics rapidly, as new vulnerabilities on our side are exposed. Guerrilla warfare isn't about fighting and winning quickly; it's about slowly and surely striking small blows that pressure the IDF into defending the existing situation but do not aggravate it enough to attack with full force.
Meanwhile, Hamas continues its terrorist approach, which blends in well with its aspiration to achieve its political and diplomatic goals. It does not hesitate to attack innocent civilians; fire mortars, rockets, and missiles; set fire to fields and other property using incendiary kites; or hesitate to deploy children, women, and other civilians to die on camera in a filthy, cynical psychological war. These are what the best soldiers in the best, strongest army in the Middle East are up against.
When I was GOC Northern Command, I would tell my soldiers, "Our obligation to the country and its citizens is not to define problems, but to win wars and ensure that the population is protected and safe in the face of threats."
Hamas is a tough enemy, but not an invincible one. We can make defeating Hamas a military goal, despite our limitations, and with the understanding that it will be a long process with ups and downs. It would require the country's leadership to change strategies and adopt a daring diplomatic-security plan.
To fight and win, it is not enough to remain on the defensive. We need to combine flexible tactics, effective defense, attacks, punishment, and sound defeat. When it comes to defense, we must firstly prevent any attacks on people or property and kill any terrorist or terrorists on their way to execute an attack, during an attack, or retreating after an attack. At the same time, we need to take the fight to Hamas' own guerrilla grounds. Using small attacks, the IDF can hurt the enemy all along its lifeline and force it onto the defensive. Consistent offensive actions and rising numbers of enemy casualties are more important than pinpoint strikes on senior members of the organization.
We need to transition to punishment and reward. Punishment should replace the goal of deterring and containing terrorism, and should play a major role in the battle against guerrilla terrorism. In the absence of political diplomacy, this would make clear through strength what we consider acceptable and what we don't. This would give us freedom to employ a variety of offensive methods in dealing out punishment, allowing us to determine the type and intensity of strikes. The current use of "deterrence and containment of terrorist infrastructures" allows the enemy to decide whether or not it is contained or deterred.
In the end, our aim is victory. No type of warfare can succeed if it is incapable of defeating the enemy. If the other methods prove ineffectual, there is no option other than a military victory. That means one thing: breaking the opponent's ability or desire to fight. Despite the density of the population and buildings in the Gaza Strip, we are talking about an area and an organization that are relatively small compared to the IDF, and Hamas could be beaten without any need for occupation for occupation's sake.
More importantly, without a diplomatic plan that complements the warfare and takes advantage of our military achievements, our victories will be tactical only.
To fight Hamas, we need to utilize the IDF's advantages in terms of personnel, weaponry, technology, and intelligence. But to overcome the vulnerable points of a large, regular military, it is important to understand the advantages of the "barefoot" and their doctrine of guerrilla terrorism. Hamas is counting on the IDF being awkward and heavy; we need to surprise it every time.
