Ram Ben-Barak

ram-ben-barak

Between Syria then and Iran now

Israel was tipped off about the nuclear reactor being built in Syria by a foreign source.

The information provided by the source was unclear, but it implied that President Bashar Assad was building a reactor. This information was, for me and for the defense establishment alike, a complete and utter surprise. We could not believe this type of information could land on our desks so innocuously, from a foreign source, without us knowing anything beforehand. Israel's penetration into Syria was and is excellent; we know what is happening there, top to bottom, side to side. To discover in such a happenstance manner, due to the kindness of a stranger, that Assad was undertaking a complex project of this sort under our noses and without us receiving any indication was no less than stunning.

No one in Israel knew about this activity in Syria. In retrospect, we understood that the concealment ran very deep, to the point that the entire circle around Assad himself was kept completely in the dark about the project. It was an immense achievement for the Syrian dictator, who managed to create a small alternative system in which only those directly involved were even aware of its existence. Even his closest confidants and relatives did not know about the reactor. Thus, virtually no information could make its way out to us, including about the significant role the North Koreans were playing.

The moment the initial information came in, then-Mossad chief Meir Dagan quickly directed me and others to unequivocally ascertain whether Syria was indeed building a nuclear reactor or whether the intelligence was mistaken. We vigorously threw ourselves into the mission. It was a complex undertaking requiring the preparation of agents and intensive sifting for information. But the situation necessitated a clear-cut answer; anything vague was useless. After a year of work, we finally received the "golden intel" proving the structure in the Syrian desert was in fact a nuclear reactor. Israel was considerably caught off its strategic guard.

This crucial information opened up a new world to us, changed the rules of the game and persuaded all the skeptics. The day the information arrived, intelligence officers rushed it to me, and then to Dagan, who took it straight to the prime minister.

This piece of intellience indicated that we had caught the Syrian project virtually at the last minute. Assad was very close to finishing the reactor and achieving a grand victory. It is important to understand: Had the reactor become operational, it would have been impossible to destroy it without irradiating the surrounding environment for decades. The picture that emerged before us was truly astonishing – we had found the reactor before the final window of opportunity was about to close.

Rapid action was necessary, and the prime minister tasked the air force with devising an operation to hit the reactor quickly. It was clear we did not have a year to sit around and plan, and we worked feverishly. Ultimately the prime minister opted for the "loud" plan of action: an airstrike that would leave no doubt as to who carried it out.

After the reactor was destroyed, Assad chose not to attack Israel. This decision stemmed primarily from the fact that building the reactor was a flagrant violation of international law in the first place. Additionally, the United States at the time was in firm control of the Middle East. President George W. Bush was in the White House and it was clear that if Assad made a fuss or did anything, the U.S. would respond aggressively.

From this perspective, Assad's nuclear gambit was more dangerous than Iran's nuclear endeavor. Assad ran with one project to the very end, in one specific location, as opposed to Iran, which moves its nuclear program from place to place.

Meanwhile, on the topic of Iran, it is important to note that the Mossad's success has been considerable.

Do not cede ground to Putin

The 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and world powers is not a good one. After it expires, Iran can supposedly move forward, but prior to the deal Iran had not acquired nuclear capabilities. I can alleviate some of the Israeli public's concerns by saying that today, too, Israel is bringing all it has to bear on the matter.

The primary problem with Iran, at least concerning its massive nuclear and ballistic missile programs, is that Israel alone cannot attack it and also prevent it from resuming those efforts. We must speak to U.S. President Donald Trump and convince him to stay in the region. We have to ensure that he persuades other global powers to force a follow-up deal on Iran.

In theory, Trump has to tell other Western countries that Iran should have no problem with another deal if it has no interest in becoming nuclear capable. Moreover, it is imperative to convince the United States to remain in the Middle East and stand by its regional allies. It is unthinkable that the American administration would cede this ground to President Vladimir Putin and Russia.

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