Ariel Bulshtein

Ariel Bulshtein is a journalist, translator, lecturer and lawyer.

A change to Oslo-inspired diplomacy

In recent years, the Israeli public has gotten so used to international achievements that the most recent one went almost unnoticed. The U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem, which for years functioned as a de facto "U.S. Embassy to Palestine," closed down in a step that clearly completed American recognition of Jerusalem as our capital. The closure of the consulate did not come amid public ceremonies, but Israelis should appreciate its symbolic and practical significance: From now on, the American administration is refusing to see the Palestinians as a state entity with any entitlement to Jerusalem.

And so the unacceptable situation in which the U.S. effectively maintained two separate consulates – one for Jews, and the other for the Arabs of east Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria – comes to an end, along with the hint that the U.S. did not agree to Israel's political demands about its control over its own capital and the parts of the country that were liberated in 1967.

In addition to the diplomatic ramifications of the American move, the decision provides us with an opportunity to examine Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's foreign relations doctrine, which has been very beneficial to Israel. Rejecting the counsel of the Left, the prime minister turned away from the approach that made Israel's international status conditional upon the concessions to the Arabs. The Left claimed that if Israel withdrew and gave things up, it would win the support of the nations of the world.

Apart from the moral flaw in this tactic and the argument that no other country would ever be tempted to abandon its own interests for the sake of receiving pats from the international community, the attempt to "buy" international support through a willingness to give up parts of the country to the enemy was a resounding failure. That experiment was like a drug-induced hallucination: In the short term, it made it seem like Israel was becoming the world's darling, but as the effects wore off, it turned out that the delusion of international support demanded more hits – in the form of territorial withdrawals – to sustain itself. The result was ruinous: For the concessions made in the spirit of the Oslo Accords, Israel paid not only in blood; the Jewish state lost international standing because of eagerness for withdrawals.

Netanyahu always argued the opposite – that only a strong Israel that stood up for its legitimate rights and developed a wide range of powers will be seen by the world as an ally and a valuable partner. The years have proven him correct. Were we facing a "diplomatic tsunami"? Instead of that, we've gotten waves of admiration from all over the globe. The Israel that give up parts of itself was seen by others as a junk stock because even the people in charge didn't believe it was in the right and were looking to placate Israel's enemies through negotiations.

Netanyahu's Israel is seen as a cool-headed, patient superpower that can withstand military and propaganda attacks while signaling a willingness to seek common interests with those who are dropping their hopes of defeating Israel.

The years since the Oslo Accords have been characterized by a recovery from the process itself and by blocking attempts by world leaders – from former U.S. President Barack Obama to German Chancellor Angela Merkel – to force us to continue our withdrawals. If we keep it up, most of the leading world actors will accept our positions sooner or later. The Netanyahu doctrine works.

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